Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the reaction control system, volume 2 by Haufler, W. A. et al.
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ANALYSIS
OFTHE
REACTION CONTROL
SYSTEM
Voi. 2 of 3
19 JAN U/IJI:IY 1987
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19900001623 2020-03-20T01:15:12+00:00Z

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
815 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9 )
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $32
33V73A8S32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM
COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-717
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
816 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $32
33V73ASS32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN AND CAN BE
CLOSED WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE OPENED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CLOSE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE MDM COMMAND PATH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS, AND MAY CAUSE
THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO
MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-718
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
817 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTRO LS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 $33
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8S33
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY
SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE OPEN CONTACTS, AND THEN USE
THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-719
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 818 ABORT:
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $33
33V73A8S33
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE SWITCH FAILS
IN THE CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED
BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE SWITCH'S CLOSE CONTACTS
AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE MDM
COMMAND PATH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS DURING ABORTS, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-720
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 819 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUN': ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $33
33V73A8S33
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE CAN NOT BE CONTROLLED BY SWITCH, ONLY BY MDM OPEN OR CLOSE
COMMANDS. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE MDM COMMAND PATH WHILE THE
VALVE IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS,
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTH DURING ABORTS AND ENTRY, AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET
THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-721
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/ 2R
820 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 08 $33
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8S33
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH COMMAND,
ONLY BY MDM COMMAND, AND CAN CLOSED BY THE SWITCH OR THE MDM.
FAILURE OF THE MDM COMMAND PATH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS,
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY
TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO MEET THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-722
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 821 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
l, 2
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $33
33V73A8S33
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. IF
THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED AND CAN BE OPENED
WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE CLOSED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND. TO CLOSE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-723
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
822 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $33
33V73A8S33
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-724
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
823 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $33
33V73A8S33
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-725
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
824 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LO CAT I0 N:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $33
33V73ASS33
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM
COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM
COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-726
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
825 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $33
33V73A8S33
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED OR GPC
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN AND CAN BE
CLOSED WITH THE SWITCH, BUT CANNOT BE OPENED AGAIN BY SWITCH OR
MDM COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS
POWER FROM THE CLOSE CONTACTS, AND THEN USE GPC READ/WRITE
PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF THE MDM COMMAND PATH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS DURING ABORTS, AND MAY CAUSE
THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING RTLS ABORTS TO
MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CE, DE
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-727
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 826 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $34
33V73ASS34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED TO CLOSE THE VALVE. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN
THE OPEN POSITION WHILE THE VALVE IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL OPEN. FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-728
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: l/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 827 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $34
33V73A8S34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMAND. IF THE SWITCH FAILS
IN THE CLOSED POSITION WHILE THE VALVE IS IN ANY POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL CLOSE. IF THE MDM OPEN COMMAND IS ALSO PRESENT, OR
THE SWITCH OPEN COMMAND IS ALSO PRESENT THE VALVE WILL CYCLE
OPEN AND CLOSED UNTIL THE MDM OR SWITCH OPEN COMMAND IS REMOVED,
OR UNTIL THE CONTROL BUS POWER IS REMOVED FROM EITHER OF THE
SWITCH'S CLOSE CONTACTS. TO OPEN THE VALVE, CREW MUST REMOVE
POWER FROM EITHER OF THE SWITCH'S CLOSE CONTACTS, AND USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-729
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 828 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $34
33V73ASS34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS. TO OPERATE THE
VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. IF THE
VALVE IS CLOSED AND THE MDM OPEN COMMAND PATH FAILS, THE VALVE
CANNOT BE OPENED BY THE MDM SWITCH COMMANDS, CAUSING THE LOSS OF
THE VERNIER RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-730
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
829 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, 9X & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $34
33V73A8S34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-731
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
830 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 $34
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8S34
] B[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-732
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
831 ABORT: 3/3
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
SUBSYS LEAD:LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $34
33V73ASS34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-733
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
832 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $34
33V73ASS34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-734
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
833 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $34
33V73A8S34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMAND. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE
WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED BY THE SWITCH OR BY
THE MDM COMMAND, AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY THE SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY
BY THE MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-735
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
834 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $34
33V73ASS34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS AND THE OTHER SWITCH
CLOSE CONTACTS. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE
SWITCH IS IN THE GPC OR CLOSED POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE,
AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY MDM COMMAND, ONLY BY THE SWITCH COMMAND.
IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN OPEN, AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY MDM
COMMAND, ONLY BY SWITCH COMMAND. TO OPEN THE VALVE
WITH THE MDM COMMAND, THE CREW MUST REMOVE CONTROL BUS POWER FROM
THE CLOSE CONTACT SET 5,6 THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF THE VERNIER RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-736
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
835 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I O N:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O8 $34
33V73ASS34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMAND. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND,
BUT CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM COMMAND.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE
VALVE, AND WILL CAUSE LOSS OF THE VERNIER RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-737
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
836 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $34
33V73A8S34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED TO CLOSE THE VALVE. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS
FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE
VALVE WILL OPEN. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE
SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION, OR IF THE MDM CLOSE
COMMAND IS ALSO PRESENT, THE VALVE WILL CYCLE OPEN AND CLOSED
UNTIL CONTROL BUS POWER TO THE OPEN OR CLOSE CONTACTS IS REMOVED,
OR UNTIL THE MDM CLOSE COMMAND IS REMOVED.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-738
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 837 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9,
i0
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
e)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, I0
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $34
33V73A8S34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDAND THE MANUAL SWITCH
COMMAND. IF THE GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN, THE VALVE CAN BE OPENED
BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND, CAN BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND, AND
CANNOT BE CLOSED BY MDM COMMAND UNLESS THE SWITCH IS IN THE
CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF THE
VERNIER RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-739
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
838 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
I0
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9,
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, I0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $34
33V73ASS34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER CLOSE CONTACTS AND THE SWITCH AND
MDM OPEN COMMANDS. FIRST FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. FAILURE OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE AMD LOSS
OF THE VERNIER RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-740
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
839 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
ii, 12
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 08 $34
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8S34
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO REDUNDANCY. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE
OPENED BY THE SWITCH OR BY MDM COMMAND,
BUT CANNOT BE CLOSED BY THE SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. FAILURE WILL
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-741
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
840 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
ii, 12
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS Ii, 12
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 $34
33V73ASS34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS. IF THE
CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION,
THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, AND CAN BE CLOSED AND
OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, AND LOSS OF THE VERNIER
RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CA, DA
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-742
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 841 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FU TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
FU TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD
DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-743
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
842 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FU TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
e)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
FU TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
313 AOA: 313
313 ATO: 313
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MT8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD
DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-744
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 843 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FU TK OUT PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
FU TK OUT PRESS SENSOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MTI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD
DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-745
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
844 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FU TK OUT PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
FU TK OUT PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAI/NCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MTI8
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD
DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ll.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-746
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 845 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
OX TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
.22V42MT7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD
DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ll.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-747
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
846 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) INSTRUMENTATION
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
OX TK ULLAGE PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD
DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-748
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 847 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: OX TK OUT PRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
OX TK OUT PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MTI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD
DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-749
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 848 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX TK OUT PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) OX TK
OX TK OUT PRESS SENSOR
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MTI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT
CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD
DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-750
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 849 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FU PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
FU PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: _ 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MTI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING VALVE. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON
ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-751
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 850 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FU PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATI ON
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
FU PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MTI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING VALVE. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON
ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-752
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
851 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FU FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
FU FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT16
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING VALVE. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON
ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE i1.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-753
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
852 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FU FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
FU FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
313 TAL: 313
3/3 AOA: 3/3
313 ATO: 313
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT16
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING VALVE. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON
ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-754
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 853 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L FUEL PRESS LINE BACKUP TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
L FUEL PRESS LINE BACKUP TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MT605
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING VALVE. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON
ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE i1.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-755
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
854 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L FUEL PRESS LINE BACKUP TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
FU TK
L FUEL PRESS LINE BACKUP TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT605
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING VALVE. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON
ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC Ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-756
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 855 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
OX FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 2O
22V42MTI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING VALVE. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON
ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-757
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
856 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
OX FILL LINE TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MTI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING VALVE. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON
ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-758
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 857 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
OX PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MTII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING VALVE. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON
ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-759
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 858 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: OX PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
OX PRESS LINE (NEAR THERMOSTAT) TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MTII
B [ ] C C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING VALVE. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON
ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-760
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 859 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX PRESS LINE TEMP BACKUP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
OX PRESS LINE TEMP BACKUP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: "3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MT21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING VALVE. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON
ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-761
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 860 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX PRESS LINE TEMP BACKUP SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
OX PRESS LINE TEMP BACKUP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT21
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING VALVE. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON
ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-762
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
861 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX TK
OX TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MT9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSORS WILL
CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-763
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
862 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) OX TK
5) OX TK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PI_LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSORS WILL
CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-764
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
863 ABORT:
HDW/FUN C
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FU MANIF PRESS-1 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, FU
FU MANIF PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 2O
22V42MT30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED
ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-765
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 864 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FU MANIF PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, FU
FU MANIF PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PI_I_UNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED
ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-766
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
865 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX MANIF PRESS-1 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD l, OX
OX MANIF PRESS-1 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MT28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED
ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE I1.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-767
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
866 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX MANIF PRESS-1 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD i, OX
OX MANIF PRESS-1 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED
ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ll.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-768
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
867 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FU MANIF PRESS-2 PRESSSENSOR
INDICATES LOWERPRESSURETHAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYSLEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, FU
FU MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLI GHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED
ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-769
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 868 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FU MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, FU
FU MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MT26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED
ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-770
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 869 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX
OX MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF : 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO : 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT24
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED
ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-771
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 870 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX
OX MANIF PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT24
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED
ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-772
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 871 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FU MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, FU
FU MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED
ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-773
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 872 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FU MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INS TRUM ENTAT I ON
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, FU
FU MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MT31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED
ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-774
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
873 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX
OX MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED
ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-775
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
874 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX
OX MANIF PRESS-3 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/'_UNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/_
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MT29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED
ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-776
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 875 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FU MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, FU
FU MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED
ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ll.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-777
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 876 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FU MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, FU
FU MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED
ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-778
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: l/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 877 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: OX MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX
OX MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42MT25
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED
ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ll.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-779
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 878 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: OX MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INS TRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX
OX MANIF PRESS-4 PRESS SENSOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42MT25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE GROUND AND FLIGHT CREW DIFFICULTY IN
DETERMINING A LEAKING MANIFOLD. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED
ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-780
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
879 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDTRAVEL)
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5 SWITCH TALKBACK
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5
OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5 SWITCH TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/ 1R ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DS9, DSI0
33V73A8DS9; DSI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FWD RCS TK ISOL 1/2 & 3/4/5 POSITION INDICATION WOULD FALSELY
SHOW A BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FU OR OX A OR B VALVES
ARE STUCK PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH
BETWEEN THE TWO VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE
WOULD BE FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS
OF VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-781
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
880 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDTRAVEL)
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DSI6
33V73A8DSI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FWD RCS MANIF ISOL 1 POSITION INDICATION WOULD FALSELY SHOW A
BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FU OR OX A OR B VALVES ARE STUCK
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH BETWEEN THE
TWO VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE
FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-782
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
881 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDTRAVEL)
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOLVLV SWITCH TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF : 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO : 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DSI7
33V73A8DSI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FWD RCS MANIF ISOL 2 POSITION INDICATION WOULD FALSELY SHOW A
BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FU OR OX A OR B VALVES ARE STUCK
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH BETWEEN THE
TWO VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE
FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSEDRESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-783
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
882 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDTRAVEL)
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
I2%NDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DSI8
33V73A8DSI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FWD RCS MANIF ISOL 3 POSITION INDICATION WOULD FALSELY SHOW A
BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FU OR OX A OR B VALVES ARE STUCK
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH BETWEEN THE
TWO VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE
FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-784
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
883 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDTRAVEL)
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
47
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING : 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DSI9
33V73A8DSI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FWD RCS MANIF ISOL 4 POSITION INDICATION WOULD FALSELY SHOW A
BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FU OR OX A OR B VALVES ARE STUCK
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH BETWEEN THE
TWO VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE
FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-785
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
884 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDTRAVEL)
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLVS
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 08 DS20
33V73ASDS20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FWD RCS MANIF ISOL 5 POSITION INDICATION WOULD FALSELY SHOW A
BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FU OR OX A OR B VALVES ARE STUCK
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH BETWEEN THE
TWO VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE
FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE
TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-786
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 885 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
I/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22RPC39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER SOURCE TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS ARE
NOT USED IN DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD (4
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN
ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-787
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 886 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O' DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22RPC39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT
FLIGHT PHASE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED OFF FOR FCS
CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-788
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 887 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, PCA 1
8IV76A22RPC38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO MANIFOLD DRIVER & LOGIC CIRCUITS. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD
JETS NOT USED DURING DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE
MANIFOLD (4 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN
ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-789
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 888 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: F BAY I, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76A22RPC38
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. FORWARD JETS NOT USED DURING
DEORBIT. IF MANIFOLD LOGIC OR DRIVER POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW
CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE
MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-790
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
889 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23RPC36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER SOURCE TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS ARE
NOT USED IN DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD (4
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN
ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-791
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
890 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23RPC36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVERAND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. FORWARD JETS ARE NOT USED IN
DEORBIT FLIGHT PHASE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED OFF FOR
FCS CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-792
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 891 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
I/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23RPC37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO MANIFOLD DRIVER & LOGIC CIRCUITS. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD
JETS NOT USED DURING DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE
MANIFOLD (4 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN
ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-793
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 892 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23RPC37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. FORWARD JETS NOT USED DURING
DEORBIT. IF MANIFOLD LOGIC OR DRIVER POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW
CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE
MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-794
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
893 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3, PCA 3
83V76A24RPC40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT
USED IN DEORBIT FLIGHT PHASE. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE
MANIFOLD (4 PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP
TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-795
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
894 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3, PCA 3
83V76A24RPC40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVERAND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT
FLIGHT PHASE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED OFF FOR FCS
CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-796
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 895 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3, PCA 3
83V76A24RPC38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED DURING DEORBIT FLIGHT PHASE.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD (4 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD
RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ,
PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-797
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
896 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3, PCA 3
83V76A24RPC38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. FORWARD JETS NOT USED DURING
DEORBIT. IF MANIFOLD LOGIC OR DRIVER POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW
CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE
MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-798
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 897 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY l, PCA 1
81V76A22RPC52
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT
USED IN DEORBIT FLIGHT PHASE. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE
MANIFOLD (4 PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP
TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-799
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
898 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22RPC52
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THEAPPROPRIATE
ISOLATION VALVE. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT FLIGHT PHASE.
PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED OFF FOR FCS CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-800
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
899 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, PCA 1
8 IV76A22RPC50
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE
CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED DURING DEORBIT FLIGHT PHASE.
DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD (4 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD
RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ,
PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-801
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 900 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
71
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY I, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76A22RPCS0
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. FORWARD JETS NOT USED DURING
DEORBIT. IF MANIFOLD LOGIC OR DRIVER POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW
CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE
MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-802
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
901 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & F5, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3, PCA 3
83V76A24RPC39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT
FLIGHT PHASE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED OFF FOR FCS
CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-803
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 902 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & F5, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3, PCA 3
83 V76A24RPC37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO MANIFOLD DRIVER & LOGIC CIRCUITS. OTHER PRIMARY
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD
JETS NOT USED DURING DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE
MANIFOLD (2 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. LOSS OF
VERNIER MANIFOLD F5 (F5R AND F5L JETS) WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF
VERNIER RCS ATTITUDE CONTROL. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO)
AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT
OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-804
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
903 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & FS, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ .] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3, PCA 3
83V76A24RPC37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE SOME
ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. FORWARD JETS NOT USED DURING
DEORBIT. IF MANIFOLD LOGIC OR DRIVER POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW
CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE
MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-805
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 904 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3, PCA 3
83 V76A24RPC39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER SOURCE TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT
USED IN DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD (2 JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT
WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL,
AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET
ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-806
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 905 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD F5, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3, PCA 3
PART NUMBER:" 83V76A24RPC51
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER JET MANIFOLD F5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT.
LOSS OF F5R AND F5L VERNIER JETS WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS ATTITUDE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-807
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 906 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD F5, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3, PCA 3
83V76A24RPC51
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO VERNIER JET MANIFOLD F5 (JETS F5R AND FSL)
DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. FAILURE MAY CAUSE SOME ADDITIONAL POWER
CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER FAILS ON, THE
CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE
MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-808
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 907 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD F5, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3, PCA 3
83V76A24RPC47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER JET MANIFOLD F5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT.
LOSS OF F5R AND F5L VERNIER JETS WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS ATTITUDE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-809
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 908 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD F5, RJDF
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3, PCA 3
83V76A24RPC47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO VERNIER JET MANIFOLD F5 (JETS FSR AND FSL)
DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. FAILURE MAY CAUSE SOME ADDITIONAL POWER
CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER FAILS ON, THE
CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE
MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-810
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 909 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/1
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22CR35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER SOURCE TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS ARE
NOT USED IN DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD (4
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN
ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-811
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
910 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
"7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22CR35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE HAS NO IMPACT ON POWER TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-812
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 911 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22AICRI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING DIODE OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER
INPUT FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
POWER WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN
DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD (4 JETS FOR FI, 2, OR 3,
AND 2 JETS FOR F4) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD
CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2 LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR
CIRCUITS. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS
FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX
ops).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-813
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 912 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, PCA 1
8IV76A22AICRI 6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. SHORTED DIODE
MAY CAUSE A CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES,
DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS
CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-814
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 913 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22AICRI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING DIODE OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER
INPUT FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
POWER WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN
DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD (4 JETS FOR FI, 2, OR 3,
AND 2 JETS FOR F4) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD
CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2 LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR
CIRCUITS. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS
FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX
ops).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-815
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 914 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
8 IV76A22AICRI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. SHORTED DIODE
MAY CAUSE A CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES,
DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS
CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-816
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 915 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23CR40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER SOURCE TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS ARE
NOT USED IN DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD (4
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN
ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-817
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 916 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23CR40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE HAS NO IMPACT ON POWER TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-818
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 917 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23AICR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING DIODE OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER
INPUT FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
POWER WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN
DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD (4 JETS FOR FI, 2, OR 3,
AND 2 JETS FOR F4) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD
CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2 LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR
CIRCUITS. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS
FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX
OPS) •
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-819
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 918 ABORT:
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
_)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] cC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82 V76A23AICR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. SHORTED DIODE
MAY CAUSE A CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES,
DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS
CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-820
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
919 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F BAY 2, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76A23AICR6
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING DIODE OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER
INPUT FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
POWER WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN
DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD (4 JETS FOR FI, 2, OR 3,
AND 2 JETS FOR F4) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD
CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2 LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR
CIRCUITS. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS
FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX
OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-821
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
920 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23AICR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. SHORTED DIODE
MAY CAUSE A CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES,
DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS
CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-822
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
921 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AICR26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD
JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD
(4 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN
ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-823
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 922 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83 V76A24AICR26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT
USED IN DEORBIT. SHORTED DIODE MAY AFFECT CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN
THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGES
AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT DRIVER
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD
(4 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT
WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN ABORT
(TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-824
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
923 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
s)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AICRll
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING DIODE OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER
INPUT FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
POWER WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN
DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD 3 (4 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2
LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR CIRCUITS. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL,
AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET
ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-825
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 924 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24AICRII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. SHORTED DIODE
MAY CAUSE A CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES,
DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS
CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-826
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 925 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AICRI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER INPUT
FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER
WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR
ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT.
DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD 3 (4 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY
TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2
LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR CIRCUITS. INCREASE IN ABORT
(TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-827
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
926 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AICRI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. SHORTED DIODE
MAY CAUSE A CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES,
DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS
CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-828
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
927 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY l, PCA 1
8 lV76A22AICR49
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD
JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD
(4 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN
ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-829
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 928 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 1, PCA 1
8I_76A22AICR49
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT
USED IN DEORBIT. SHORTED DIODE MAY AFFECT CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN
THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGES
AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPCIS IN THE REDUNDANT DRIVER
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD
(4 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT
WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN ABORT
(TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-830
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 929 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
8 IV76A22AICRI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER INPUT
FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER
WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR
ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT.
DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD 3 (4 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY
TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2
LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR CIRCUITS. INCREASE IN ABORT
(TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-831
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 930 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
8 iV76A22AICRI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. SHORTED DIODE
MAY CAUSE A CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES,
DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS
CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-832
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 931 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLI GHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, PCA 1
81V76A22AICR20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER INPUT
FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER
WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR
ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT.
DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD 3 (4 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY
TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2
LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR CIRCUITS. INCREASE IN ABORT
(TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-833
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 932 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
8 IV76A22AICR20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. SHORTED DIODE
MAY CAUSE A CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES,
DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS
CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-834
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 933 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
T)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22CRAICR47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUITS. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD
JETS NOT USED DURING DEORBIT FLIGHT PHASE. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD (4 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP
TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-835
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 934 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 8 IV76A22CRAICR47
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT
USED IN DEORBIT. SHORTED DIODE MAY AFFECT CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN
THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGES
AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT LOGIC
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD
(4 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT
WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN ABORT
(TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-836
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 935 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22CRAICR48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD LOGIC CIRCUITS. OTHER
MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD
JETS NOT USED DURING DEORBIT FLIGHT PHASE. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS
OF THE MANIFOLD (4 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP
TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-837
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
936 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 2/IR
TAL: 3/2R
AOK: 3/2R
ATO: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F BAY I, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 8 IV76A22CRAICR48
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT
USED IN DEORBIT. SHORTED DIODE MAY AFFECT CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN
THE TWO DIFFERENT BUSES. DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGES
AND CURRENT SHARING, ONE OF THE RPC'S IN THE REDUNDANT LOGIC
CIRCUIT COULD TRIP OPEN. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD
(4 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT
WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-838
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 937 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & F5, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AICRI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING DIODE FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER INPUT FUSE
OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER WILL
RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR
ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT. DURING
RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD 4 (2 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
MANIFOLD CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2 LATCHING
DIODE/RESISTOR CIRCUITS. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF VERNIER RCS.
INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP
TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-839
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 938 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & FS, RJDF
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83 V76A24AICRI 4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. SHORTED DIODE
MAY CAUSE A CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES,
DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS
CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-840
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 939 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & F5, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24AICR9
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING DIODE FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER INPUT FUSE
OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER WILL
RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR
ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT.
DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD 4 (2 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY
TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2
LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR CIRCUITS. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL
DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-841
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 940 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & F5, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83 V76A24AICR9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. SHORTED DIODE
MAY CAUSE A CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES,
DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS
CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-842
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 941 ABORT:
HDW/F C
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & F5, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AICR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING DIODE OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER
INPUT FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
POWER WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN
DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD 4 (2 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2
LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR CIRCUITS. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF
VERNIER RCS. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD
RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ,
PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-843
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 942 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & F5, RJDF
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TA.L: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AICR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE ALLOWS REDUNDANT CIRCUIT OPERATION. SHORTED DIODE
MAY CAUSE A CHANGE IN CURRENT FLOW BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT BUSES,
DUE TO UNEQUAL BUS VOLTAGE AND CURRENT SHARING. THE 1.2K CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR WILL MINIMIZE CHANGE IN CONTROL BUS
CURRENT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-844
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 943 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AICR25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER SOURCE TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT
USED IN DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD (2 JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT
WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL,
AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET
ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-845
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 944 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AICR25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE HAS NO IMPACT ON POWER TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-846
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 945 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD F5, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83 V76A24AICR31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER JET MANIFOLD F5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT.
LOSS OF F5R AND F5L VERNIER JETS WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS ATTITUDE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-847
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 946 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD F5, RJDF
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83 V76A24AICR31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED DIODE HAS NO IMPACT ON POWER TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-848
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 947 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, RJDF
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
1/1
2/2
2/2
2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA 1
81V76AI6 J4-86 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER SOURCE TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS ARE
NOT USED IN DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD (4
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN
ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-849
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 948 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA 1
81V76AI6 J4-86 TYPE II
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
cc ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT
FLIGHT PHASE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED OFF FOR FCS
CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-850
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 949 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
i/I
2/2
2/2
2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, LCA 2
82V76AI7 J4-87 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER SOURCE TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS ARE
NOT USED IN DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD (4
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN
ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-851
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 950 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, LCA 2
82V76AI7 J4-87 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT
FLIGHT PHASE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED OFF FOR FCS
CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-852
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 951 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3, LCA 3
83V76AI8 J4-87 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT
USED IN DEORBIT FLIGHT PHASE. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE
MANIFOLD (4 PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP
TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-853
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
952 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3, LCA 3
83V76AI8 J4-87 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT
FLIGHT PHASE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED OFF FOR FCS
CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-854
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 953 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] SIP] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA 1
81V76AI6J4-114
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 2 POWER SOURCES TO MANIFOLD DRIVERS. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT
USED IN DEORBIT FLIGHT PHASE. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE
MANIFOLD (4 PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL
ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP
TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-855
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
954 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O_DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6J4-114
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVERAND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT
FLIGHT PHASE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED OFF FOR FCS
CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-856
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 955 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & 5, RJDF
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3, LCA 3
83V76AI8 J4-86 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO MANIFOLD DRIVER AND LOGIC CIRCUIT. MAY CAUSE
SOME ADDITIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC
POWER FAILS ON, THE CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY
INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE
APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT
FLIGHT PHASE. PRI MANIFOLD DRIVER PWR REQUIRED OFF FOR FCS
CHECKOUT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-857
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 956 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDF
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: i/1
TAL: 2/2
AOA: 2/2
AT O: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS4 A [ ] B [
LOCATION: F BAY 3, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AI8 J4-86 TYPE II
] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER SOURCE TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT
USED IN DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD (2 JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT
WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL,
AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET
ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-858
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
957 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5F, RJDF
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3, LCA 3
83V76A18 J8-111 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER JET MANIFOLD F5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT.
LOSS OF F5R AND FSL VERNIER JETS WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS ATTITUDE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-859
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 958 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)-
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5F, RJDF
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3, LCA 3
83V76AI8 J8-111 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER SUPPLIED TO VERNIER JET MANIFOLD F5 (JETS FSR AND FSL)
DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT. FAILURE MAY CAUSE SOME ADDITIONAL POWER
CONSUMPTION. IF MANIFOLD DRIVER OR LOGIC POWER FAILS ON, THE
CREW CAN PREVENT JETS FROM FIRING BY INHIBITING THE JETS ON THE
MANIFOLD, OR BY CLOSING THE APPROPRIATE ISOLATION VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-860
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 959 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 2A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
FUSE, 2A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O14 $7
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4FI2
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUSE FAILING OPEN WILL INHIBIT PWR TRANSFER FOR F1 MANIFOLD (4
JETS) DRIVER CIRCUITS, AND FOR 1 OF 2 REDUNDANT POWER SOURCES FOR
F3 MANIFOLD (4 JETS) DRIVER CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE
ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT
USED IN DEORBIT. DURING ABORTS, THE LOSS OF F1 MANIFOLD (4 JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO
MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. ABORT CRITICALITY FOR FUSE OPEN
IS 3/3 SINCE THE POWER LATCHING RELAY IS CLOSED PRIOR TO
LIFTOFF (OPS-9). FUSE CRITICALITY WILL BE REFLECTED BY THE
LATCHING RELAY FAIL ON OR OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-861
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 960 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, RJDF
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3_3
ONORBIT: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: i/1
TAL: 2/2
AOA: 2/2
ATO: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O14 $7
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4FII
] S[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER SOURCE TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS ARE
NOT USED IN DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD (4
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN
ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-862
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
961 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $7
33V73AI4FI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING DIODE OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER
INPUT FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
POWER WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN
DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD (4 JETS FOR FI, 2, OR 3,
AND 2 JETS FOR F4) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD
CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2 LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR
CIRCUITS. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS
FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX
OPS) .
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-863
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
962 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 2A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
FUSE, 2A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $7
33V73AI5F3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUSE FAILING OPEN WILL INHIBIT PWR TRANSFER FOR F2 MANIFOLD (4
JETS) DRIVER CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE
FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT FLIGHT
PHASE. DURING ABORTS, THE LOSS OF F2 MANIFOLD (4 JETS) WILL
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. ABORT CRITICALITY FOR FUSE OPEN IS 3/3
SINCE THE POWER LATCHING RELAY IS CLOSED PRIOR TO LIFTOFF (OPS-
9). FUSE CRITICALITY WILL BE REFLECTED BY THE LATCHING RELAY
FAIL ON OR OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-864
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
963 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
I/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 015 $7
33V73AI5F2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER SOURCE TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS ARE
NOT USED IN DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD (4
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN
ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-865
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
964 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PP_ELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: PNL O15 $7
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI5F1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING DIODE OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER
INPUT FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
POWER WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN
DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD (4 JETS FOR FI, 2, OR 3,
AND 2 JETS FOR F4) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD
CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2 LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR
CIRCUITS. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS
FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX
OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-866
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 965 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 & 4, RJDF
FUSE, 1A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V76AI6F9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUSE FAILING OPEN WILL INHIBIT PWR TRANSFER FOR F4 MANIFOLD (2
JETS) DRIVER CIRCUITS, AND FOR 1 OF 2 REDUNDANT POWER SOURCES FOR
F3 MANIFOLD (4 JETS) DRIVER CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE
ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED
IN DEORBIT. DURING ABORTS, THE LOSS OF F4 MANIFOLD (2 JETS) WILL
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. ABORT CRITICALITY FOR FUSE OPEN IS 3/3
SINCE THE POWER LATCHING RELAY IS CLOSED PRIOR TO LIFTOFF
(OPS-9). FUSE CRITICALITY WILL BE REFLECTED BY THE LATCHING
RELAY FAIL ON OR OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-867
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 966 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/1
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V76AI6F8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER SOURCE TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS ARE
NOT USED IN DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD (4
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN
ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME.
AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-868
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 967 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 1A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $5
33V76AI6F6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING DIODE OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER
INPUT FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
POWER WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN
DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD (4 JETS FOR FI, 2, OR 3,
AND 2 JETS FOR F4) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD
CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2 LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR
CIRCUITS. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS
FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX
ops).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-869
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
968 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 1A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & 5F, RJDF
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O16 S15
PART NUMBER: 33V76AI6FI5
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER JET MANIFOLD F5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT.
LOSS OF F5R AND F5L VERNIER JETS WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS ATTITUDE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-870
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 969 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & F5, RJDF
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 S12
33V76AI6F7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING DIODE OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER
INPUT FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
POWER WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN
DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD 4 (2 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2
LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR CIRCUITS. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF
VERNIER RCS. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD
RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ,
PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-871
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
970 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDF
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: PNL 016 S13
PART NUMBER: 33V76AI6FI0
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER SOURCE TO MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUIT. OTHER MANIFOLD
JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT
USED IN DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF THE MANIFOLD (2 JETS)
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT
WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL,
AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMPTIME. AFFECTS PRI JET
ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-872
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 971 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD F5, RJDF
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 S15
33V76AI6FI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO VERNIER JET MANIFOLD F5 DRIVER POWER CIRCUIT.
LOSS OF F5R AND F5L VERNIER JETS WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS ATTITUDE CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-873
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
972 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 & 3, RJDF
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/ 2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
8IV76A22KII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LATCHING RELAY FAILING OPEN WILL REMOVE POWER FROM F1 MANIFOLD (4
JETS) DRIVER CIRCUITS, AND REMOVE 1 OF 2 REDUNDANT POWER SOURCES
FROM F3 MANIFOLD (4 JETS) DRIVER CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS
ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS
NOT USED IN DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF F1 MANIFOLD (4
PRIMARY JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT
WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL,
AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS
PRIMARY JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-874
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 973 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 & 3, RJDF
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22KII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LATCHING RELAY FAILING CLOSED, WILL APPLY MN-A POWER TO THE RPC'S
WHICH CONTROL POWER TO F1 AND F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUITS. NO
EFFECT, SINCE POWER CAN STILL BE CONTROLLED BY THE CORRESPONDING
F1 AND F3 DRIVER SWITCHES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-875
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 974 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/I
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 2, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76A23KI3
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LATCHING RELAY FAILING OPEN WILL REMOVE POWER FROM F2 MANIFOLD (4
JETS) DRIVER CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE
FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT. DURING
RTLS, THE LOSS OF F2 MANIFOLD (4 PRIMARY JETS) WILL
CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND
DEORBIT FWR RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT
OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-876
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 975 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R°A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
g)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]. C [ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23KI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LATCHING RELAY FAILING CLOSED, WILL APPLY MN-B POWER TO THE RPC
WHICH CONTROLS POWER TO F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUITS. NO EFFECT,
SINCE POWER CAN STILL BE CONTROLLED BY THE F2 DRIVER SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-877
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 976 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 & 4, RJDF
RELAY, LATCHING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24K6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE •
LATCHING RELAY FAILING OPEN WILL REMOVE POWER FROM F4 MANIFOLD (2
JETS) DRIVER CIRCUITS, AND REMOVE 1 OF 2 REDUNDANT POWER SOURCES
FROM F3 MANIFOLD (4 JETS) DRIVER CIRCUITS. OTHER MANIFOLD JETS
ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS
NOT USED IN DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, THE LOSS OF F4 MANIFOLD (2
JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT
TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA,
ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET
ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-878
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 977 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY, LATCHING
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 & 4, RJDF
RELAY, LATCHING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24K6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LATCHING RELAY FAILING CLOSED, WILL APPLY MN-C POWER TO THE RPC'S
WHICH CONTROL POWER TO F3 AND F4 MANIFOLD DRIVER CIRCUITS. NO
EFFECT, SINCE POWER CAN STILL BE CONTROLLED BY THE CORRESPONDING
F3 AND F4 DRIVER SWITCHES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-879
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 978 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
8 IV76A22AIR72
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-880
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
979 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22AIR72
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-881
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 980 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6R Jl-107
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-882
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 981 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
_)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6R JI-107
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-883
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 982 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, I.SK i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
8 IV 76A22AIR41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE OF MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF.
THE BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO OF MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT
OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-884
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 983 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
8 IV76A22AIR41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-885
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 984 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22AIR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-886
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 985 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22AIR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-887
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 986 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76A22AIR82
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE OF MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF.
THE BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO OF MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT
OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-888
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
987 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] .C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
8 iV 76A22AIR82
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-889
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 988 ABORT:
HDW/n C
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22AIR79
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING DIODE OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER
INPUT FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
POWER WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN
DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD (4 JETS FOR FI, 2, OR 3,
AND 2 JETS FOR F4) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD
CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2 LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR
CIRCUITS. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS
FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX
oPs).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-890
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 989 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22AIR79
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-891
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 990 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
8 iV76A22AIR73
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-892
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 991 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
8 IV76A22AIR73
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-893
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
992 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76A22AIR81
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-894
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 993 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22AIR81
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION; VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-895
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 994 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: F BAY 2, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76A23AIR12
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-896
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 995 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23AIRI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-897
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 996 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, LCA 2
82V76AI7R Jl-106
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-898
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 997 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, LCA 2
82V76AI7R Ji-106
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-899
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 998 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23AIR41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-900
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 999 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: F BAY 2, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76A23AIR41
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-901
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: i000 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23AIR87
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING DIODE OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER
INPUT FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER
POWER WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO
AVAILABLE FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN
DEORBIT. DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD (4 JETS FOR FI, 2, OR 3,
AND 2 JETS FOR F4) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD
CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2 LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR
CIRCUITS. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS
FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX
oPs).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-902
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: I001 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23AIR87
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-903
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1002 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23AIRI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-904
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1003 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23AIRI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-905
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1004 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23AIR76
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE OF MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF.
THE BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO OF MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT
OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-906
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1005 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23AIR76
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-907
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1006 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
e)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23AIR77
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE OF MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF.
THE BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO OF MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT
OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-908
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1007 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RESISTOR, I.SK 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: F BAY 2, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76A23AIR77
] B[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-909
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1008 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 2, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76A23AIR42
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-910
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1009 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23AIR42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-911
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: I010 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 & 4, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24AIR9
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-912
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: I011 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 & 4, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AIR9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-913
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1012 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AI8R Jl-106
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-914
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1013 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 3
83V76AI8R Jl-106
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-915
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1014 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AIR41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-916
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1015 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83 V 76A24AIR41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-917
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1016 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24AIR76
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER INPUT
FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER
WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR
ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT.
DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD 3 (4 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY
TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2
LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR CIRCUITS. INCREASE IN ABORT
(TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-918
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1017 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83 V76A24AIR76
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-919
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1018 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24AIR72
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE OF MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF.
THE BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO OF MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT
OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-920
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1019 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS • 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAYING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24AIR72
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-921
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1020 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3 / 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AIR70
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE OF MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF.
THE BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO OF MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT
OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-922
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1021 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: RoA. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83 V76A24 AIR70
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-923
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1022 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AIR39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-924
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1023 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AIR39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-925
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1024 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24AIR8
B[ ] C[ .]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-926
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1025 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AIR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-927
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1026 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
8 iV76A22AIR96
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-928
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1027 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
81V76A22AIR96
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-929
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1028 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76A22AIR98
B [ F ] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER INPUT
FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER
WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR
ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT.
DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD 3 (4 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY
TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2
LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR CIRCUITS. INCREASE IN ABORT
(TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI
JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-930
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1029 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
V)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
8 IV76A22AIR98
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-931
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1030 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
"l)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76A22AIR95
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-932
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1031 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
8IV76A22AIR95
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-933
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1032 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
8IV 76A22AIR97
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE OF MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF.
THE BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO OF MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT
OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-934
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1033 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
8 iV 76A22AIR97
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-935
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1034 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & F5, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AIR89
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER INPUT
FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER
WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR
ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT.
DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD 4 (2 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY
TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2
LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR CIRCUITS. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL
DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-936
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1035 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & F5, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AIR89
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-937
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1036 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & F5, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24AIR75
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE LATCHING RESISTOR FAILS OPEN, AND THE LOGIC POWER INPUT
FUSE OR DIODE FAILS OPEN, LOSS OF MANIFOLD LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER
WILL RESULT. OTHER PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS ARE ALSO AVAILABLE FOR
ATTITUDE CONTROL. FORWARD JETS NOT USED IN DEORBIT.
DURING RTLS, LOSS OF MANIFOLD 4 (2 JETS) WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY
TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT WEIGHT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES. MANIFOLD CRITICALITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY 1 OR 2
LATCHING DIODE/RESISTOR CIRCUITS. ONORBIT, THE LOSS OF VERNIER
RCS. INCREASE IN ABORT (TAL, AOA, ATO) AND DEORBIT FWD RCS FUEL
DUMP TIME. AFFECTS PRI JET ONORBIT OPERATIONS (RNDZ, PROX OPS).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-938
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1037 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & F5, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AIR75
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITING TO RPC.
OPERATION.
EXPECT NO PROBLEM WITH RPC
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-939
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1038 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & F5, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24AIR7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-940
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1039 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & FS, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24AIR7
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-941
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/19/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1040 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & FS, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AIR69
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE OF MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF.
THE BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO OF MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT
OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-942
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1041 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & F5, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [.. ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AIR69
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-943
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1042 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
"3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & F5, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83 V76A24AIR38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-944
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1043 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 & F5, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AIR38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-945
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1044 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AI8R Jl-107
B[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-946
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1045 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 3
83V76AI8R Jl-107
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-947
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1046 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24AIR40
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-948
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1047 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24AIR40
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-949
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1048 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83 V76A24AIR71
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE OF MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF.
THE BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO OF MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT
OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-950
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1049 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AIR71
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-951
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1050 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5F, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76AI8R J8-82
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-952
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1051 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5F, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, LCA 3
83V76AI8R J8-82
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-953
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1052 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD F5, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24AIRgO
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-954
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1053 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD F5, RJDF
RESISTOR, 2.2K I/2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83 V76A24AIR90
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-955
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1054 ABORT:
HDW/FUN.C
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD F5, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AIR88
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-956
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1055 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD F5, RJDF
RESISTOR, 5.1K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AIR88
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MDM (OF) SHOULD RESPOND TO POWER ON/OFF CYCLES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-957
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1056 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD FS, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY 3A, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 83V76A24AIRgl
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE OF MDM WILL SEE AN ERRONEOUS "ON" SIGNAL WHEN RPC IS OFF.
THE BLEED RESISTOR NORMALLY SHUNTS LEAKAGE CURRENT TO GROUND AND
PREVENTS ERRONEOUS VOLTAGE READING TO OF MDM WITH INPUT CIRCUIT
OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-958
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1057 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: R.A. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD F5, RJDF
RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 3A, PCA 3
83V76A24AIR91
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER "ON" INDICATION TO OF MDM INSTRUMENTATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-959
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1058
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
313 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL O14 $8
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S8
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE F1
MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION. POWER CAN BE REMOVED
FROM RJDF BUS A ONLY BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN BUS A. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
DRIVER POWER FROM THE MANIFOLD, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND THE INABILITY TO REMOVE POWER TO RJDF BUS A.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.10, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-960
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1059
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/i
ITEM: RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, RJDF
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O14 $8
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S8
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY LOSS OF DRIVER POWER OR POWER TO RJDF BUS
A. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER
POWER TO THE MANIFOLD AND POWER TO RJDF BUS A, AND WILL AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT AND ABORT PROPELLANT DUMP.
FAILURE DURING RTLS MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-961
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1060
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $8
33V73AI4S8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER PROVIDED BY THE OTHER
F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS, OR BY PLACING THE F1
MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER FROM
THE F1 MANIFOLD, AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-962
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1061
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $8
33V73AI4S8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY LOSS OF DRIVER POWER. FAILURE WILL RESULT
IN THE LOSS OF MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER, AND WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT AND ABORT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS.
FAILURE DURING RTLS MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-963
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1062
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.Jo BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, RJDF
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3 / 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O14 $8
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S8
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-964
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1063
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 014 $8
33V73AI4S8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-965
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1064
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, RJDF
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $8
33V73AI4S8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER PROVIDED BY THE OTHER
F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS, OR BY PLACING THE F1
MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TOREMOVE DRIVER POWER FROM
THE F1 MANIFOLD, AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-966
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1065
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] 8,[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $8
33V73AI4S8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT UNTIL THE SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE OFF
POSITION. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY LOSS OF POWER TO RJDF BUS A.
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER TO THE MANIFOLD
AND POWER TO RJDF BUS A, AND WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND
DEORBIT AND ABORT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-967
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1066
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, RJDF
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 7, 8
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 014 $8
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S8
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER PROVIDED BY THE OTHER
F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS, OR BY PLACING THE F1
MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER FROM
THE F1 MANIFOLD, AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-968
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1067
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, RJDF
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 014 $8
33V73AI4S8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT UNTIL SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE OFF POSITION.
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY LOSS OF POWER TO RJDF BUS A. FAILURE WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER TO THE MANIFOLD AND POWER TO
RJDF BUS A, AND WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND
DEORBIT AND ABORT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/25/87 C-969
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1068
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $7
33V73AI4S7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER PROVIDED BY REMOVING
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE F1 LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS, BY
PLACING THE F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION, OR BY
REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN BUS A. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO REMOVE F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER,
AND WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-970
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1069
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, RJDF
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $7
33V73AI4S7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE F1 MANIFOLD
AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, DEORBIT PROPELLANT DUMP, AND
ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-971
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1070 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $7
33V73AI4S7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER PROVIDED BY REMOVING
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE F1 LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS, BY
PLACING THE F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION, OR BY
REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN BUS A. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO REMOVE F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER,
AND WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-972
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 2/2
MDAC ID: 1071 ABORT: i/I
ITEM: RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/ 2 ATO: 2/ 2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $7
33V73AI4S7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE F1 MANIFOLD
AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, DEORBIT PROPELLANT DUMP, AND
ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-973
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1072 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, RJDF
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O14 $7
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI4S7
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-974
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1073
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O14 $7
33V73AI4S7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-975
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1074
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 015 $8
33V73AI5S8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRIVER POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM THE MANIFOLD BY PLACING THE F2
MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE CLOSED POSITION. POWER CAN BE
REMOVED FROM RJDF BUS B ONLY BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN BUS B.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
DRIVER POWER FROM THE MANIFOLD, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND THE INABILITY TO REMOVE POWER TO RJDF BUS B.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ll.10, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-976
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1075
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/i
ITEM: RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $8
33V73AI5S8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY LOSS OF DRIVER POWER OR POWER TO RJDF BUS
B. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER
POWER TO THE MANIFOLD AND POWER TO RJDF BUS B, AND WILL AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT AND ABORT PROPELLANT DUMP
FAILURE DURING RTLS MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-977
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1076
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS I, 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $8
33V73AI5S8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER PROVIDED BY THE OTHER
F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS, OR BY PLACING THE F2
MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION. FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER FROM THE
F2 MANIFOLD, AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-978
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1077
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: PNL 015 $8
PART NUMBER: 33V73A15S8
] BC ] cc ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY LOSS OF DRIVER POWER. FAILURE WILL RESULT
IN THE LOSS OF MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER, AND WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT AND ABORT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS.
FAILURE DURING RTLS MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-979
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1078
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 015 $8
33V73AI5S8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-980
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1079
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED) OR OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
e)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O15 $8
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI5S8
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-981
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1080
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS 5, 6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL O15 $8
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI5S8
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER PROVIDED BY THE OTHER
F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS, OR BY PLACING THE F2
MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER FROM
THE F2 MANIFOLD, AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-982
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1081
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $8
33V73AI5S8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT UNTIL THE SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE OFF
POSITION. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY LOSS OF POWER TO RJDF BUS B.
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER TO THE MANIFOLD
AND POWER TO RJDF BUS B, AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND
DEORBIT AND ABORT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ2 JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-983
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1082
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIAF2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL O15 $8
PART NUMBER: 33V73AISS8
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER PROVIDED BY THE OTHER
F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS, OR BY PLACING THE F2
MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER FROM
THE F2 MANIFOLD, AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-984
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1083
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 015 $8
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI5S8
] B[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT UNTIL THE SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE OFF
POSITION. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY LOSS OF POWER TO RJDF BUS B.
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER TO THE MANIFOLD
AND POWER TO RJDF BUS B, AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND
DEORBIT AND ABORT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-985
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1084
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: RJDFIAF2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $7
33V73AI5S7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER PROVIDED BY REMOVING
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE F2 LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS, BY
PLACING THE F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION, OR BY
REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN BUS B. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO REMOVE F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER,
AND WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-986
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1085
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $7
33V73AISS7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE F2 MANIFOLD
AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOS AND PTIS, AND ABORT
DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-987
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1086
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIAF2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D°J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $7
33V73AI5S7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER PROVIDED BY REMOVING
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE F2 LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS, BY
PLACING THE F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION, OR BY
REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN BUS B. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO REMOVE F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER,
AND WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-988
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1087
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAYING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $7
33V73AI5S7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE F2 MANIFOLD
AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOS AND PTIS, AND ABORT
DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-989
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1088 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O15 $7
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI5S7
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AJ; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-990
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1089 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O15 $7
33V73AI5S7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-991
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1090
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V73AI6S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE POWER FROM THE F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER PROVIDED BY
PLACING THE F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION, OR BY
REMOVING POWER TO MAIN BUS C.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
POWER FROM THE F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND THE INABILITY TO REMOVE POWER TO RJDF BUS C.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-992
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1091
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/1
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V73AI6S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR POWER TO RJDF BUS C BY THE F4/F5 MANIFOLD
DRIVER SWITCH. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY LOSS OF DRIVER POWER.
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER TO THE MANIFOLD
AND REDUNDANT POWER TO RJDF BUS C, AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT PROPELLANT DUMPS LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-993
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1092
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V73AI6S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE POWER FROM THE F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER PROVIDED BY
PLACING THE F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION, OR BY
REMOVING POWER TO MAIN BUS C.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
POWER FROM THE F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND THE INABILITY TO REMOVE POWER TO RJDF BUS C.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-994
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1093
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i, 2
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS I, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V73AI6S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY LOSS OF DRIVER POWER. FAILURE WILL RESULT
IN THE LOSS OF MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER, AND WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT AND ABORT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS.
FAILURE DURING RTLS MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-995
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1094
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 016 $6
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6S6
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-996
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1095
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/ 3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3, 4
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED) OR OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: •A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 $6
33V73AI6S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE II.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-997
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1096
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V73AI6S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE POWER FROM THE F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER PROVIDED BY
PLACING THE F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION, OR BY
REMOVING POWER TO MAIN BUS C.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
POWER FROM THE F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND THE INABILITY TO REMOVE POWER TO RJDF BUS C.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-998
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1097
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5, 6
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V73AI6S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT UNTIL THE SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE OFF
POSITION. REDUNDANCY TO APPLY POWER TO RJDF BUS C PROVIDED BY THE
F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF RJDF BUS C POWER AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-999
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1098
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: DoJ. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
4)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $6
33V73AI6S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE POWER FROM THE F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER PROVIDED BY
PLACING THE F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION, OR BY
REMOVING POWER TO MAIN BUS C.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
POWER FROM THE F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND THE INABILITY TO REMOVE POWER TO RJDF BUS C.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1000
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1099
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7, 8
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 $6
33V73AI6S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT UNTIL THE SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE OFF
POSITION. REDUNDANCY TO APPLY POWER TO RJDF BUS C PROVIDED BY THE
F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF RJDF BUS C POWER AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1001
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: ii00
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 $5
33V73AI6S5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVEMANIFOLD DRIVER POWER PROVIDED BY REMOVING
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE F3 LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS, BY
PLACING THE F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION, OR BY
REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN BUS C. FAILURE OFALLREDUNDANCY
WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO REMOVE F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER,
AND WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ll.10, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-I002
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: ii01
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O16 $5
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6S5
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF LOGIC POWER TO THE F3 MANIFOLD (AND DRIVER
POWER IF THE F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE OFF
POSITION) AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, DEORBIT PROPELLANT
DUMP, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
DURING RTLS MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I003
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1102 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 $5
33V73AI6S5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER PROVIDED BY REMOVING
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE F3 LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS, BY
PLACING THE F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION, OR BY
REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN BUS C. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO REMOVE F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER,
AND WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT PROPELLANT DUMP
LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-1004 C <_(
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 2/2
MDAC ID: 1103 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 2/ 2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 $5
33V73AI6S5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF LOGIC POWER TO THE F3 MANIFOLD (AND DRIVER
POWER IF THE F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE OFF
POSITION) AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, DEORBIT PROPELLANT
DUMP, AND ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
DURING RTLS MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO
MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i005
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 $5
33V73AI6S5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i006
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1105 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 016 $5
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6S5
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG i,
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1007
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4/5, RJDF
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 S13
33V73AI6SI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE POWER FROM THE F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER PROVIDED
BY PLACING THE F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION, OR
BY REMOVING POWER TO MAIN BUS C.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
POWER FROM THE F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND THE INABILITY TO REMOVE POWER TO RJDF BUS C.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1008
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4/5, RJDF
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 S13
33V73AI6SI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR POWER TO RJDF BUS C BY THE F4/F5 MANIFOLD
DRIVER SWITCH. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY LOSS OF DRIVER POWER.
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER TO THE MANIFOLD
AND REDUNDANT POWER TO RJDF BUS C, AND MAY
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT PROPELLANT DUMPS LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i009
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1108
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
2
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 4/5, RJDF
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENs: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL O16 S13
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6SI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE POWER FROM THE F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER PROVIDED
BY PLACING THE F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION, OR
BY REMOVING POWER TO MAIN BUS C.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
POWER FROM THE F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND THE INABILITY TO REMOVE POWER TO RJDF BUS C.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1010
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1109
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: 1/1
ITEM:
2
FAILURE MODEl
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS i,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 4/5, RJDF
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 S13
33V73AI6SI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY LOSS OF DRIVER POWER. FAILURE WILL RESULT
IN THE LOSS OF MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER, AND WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT AND ABORT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS.
FAILURE DURING RTLS MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1011
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: Iii0
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4/5, RJDF
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 S13
33V73AI6SI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i012
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: iiii
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED) OR OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4/5, RJDF
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O16 S13
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6SI3
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I013
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1112
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4/5, RJDF
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS 5, 6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 S13
33V73AI6SI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE POWER FROM THE F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER PROVIDED
BY PLACING THE F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION, OR
BY REMOVING POWER TO MAIN BUS C.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
POWER FROM THE F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND THE INABILITY TO REMOVE POWER TO RJDF BUS C.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I014
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1113
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS 5,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4/5, RJDF
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS 5, 6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/2R ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 S13
33V73AI6SI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT UNTIL THE SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE OFF
POSITION. REDUNDANCY TO APPLY POWER TO RJDF BUS C PROVIDED BY THE
F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT
IN THE LOSS OF RJDF BUS C POWER AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1015
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1114
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4/5, RJDF
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 S13
33V73AI6SI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE POWER FROM THE F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER PROVIDED
BY PLACING THE F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION, OR
BY REMOVING POWER TO MAIN BUS C.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO REMOVE
POWER FROM THE F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND THE INABILITY TO REMOVE POWER TO RJDF BUS C.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1016
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1115
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS 7,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4/5, RJDF
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 S13
33V73AI6SI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT UNTIL THE SWITCH IS PLACED IN THE OFF
POSITION. REDUNDANCY TO APPLY POWER TO RJDF BUS C PROVIDED BY THE
F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT
IN THE LOSS OF RJDF BUS C POWER AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I017
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1116
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4/5, RJDF
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 S12
33V73AI6SI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER PROVIDED BYREMOVING
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE F4/F5 LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS, BY
PLACING THE F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION, OR
BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN BUS C. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO REMOVE F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER
POWER, AND WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT PROPELLANT
DUMP LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ll.10, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-I018
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1117
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4/5, RJDF
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 SI2
33V73AI6SI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF LOGIC POWER TO THE F4 MANIFOLD AND DRIVER
POWER TO THE F4 AND F5 MANIFOLD, WILL CAUSE LOSS OF THE VERNIER
RCS, WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND DEORBIT AND ABORT
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS
MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I019
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1118
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
2
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i,
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4/5, RJDF
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 S12
33V73AI6SI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER PROVIDED BY REMOVING
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE F4/F5 LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS, BY
PLACING THE F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION, OR
BY REMOVING POWER FROM MAIN BUS C. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO REMOVE F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER
POWER, AND WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND DEORBIT PROPELLANT
DUMP LENGTHS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-I020
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 2/2
MDAC ID: 1119 ABORT: i/I
ITEM: RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4/5, RJDF
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/2
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/2
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 S12
33V73AI6SI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF LOGIC AND DRIVER POWER TO THE F1 MANIFOLD
AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, DEORBIT PROPELLANT DUMP, AND
ABORT DUMP LENGTHS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS MAY
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1021
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1120
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4/5, RJDF
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL O16 S12
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6SI2
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I022
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1121
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3,
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4/5, RJDF
RJDF2B F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 S12
33V73AI6SI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THE OFF CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1023
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: RJDF2B LS/FS/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, RJDF
RJDF2B L5/FS/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 S15
33V73AI6SI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER TO THE LS/F5/R5,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF THE VERNIER RCS, AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i024
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1123
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: RJDF2B LS/FS/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, RJDF
RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 S15
33V73AI6SI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER PROVIDED BY THE OTHER
LS/FS/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS, OR BY PLACING THE
F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER
FROM THE MANIFOLD DRIVER, AND WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i025
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1124
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
I, 2
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B L5/FS/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, RJDF
RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 S15
33V73AI6SI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER TO THE L5/F5/R5,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF THE VERNIER RCS, AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1026
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1125
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
I, 2 OR 5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
a)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, RJDF
RJDF2B L5/FS/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 S15
33V73AI6SI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER PROVIDED BY THE OTHER
L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS, OR BY PLACING THE
F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER
FROM THE MANIFOLD DRIVER, AND WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i027
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1126
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B LS/FS/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, RJDF
RJDF2B LS/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 S15
33V73AI6SI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i028
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1127
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B LS/FS/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTSFAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, RJDF
RJDF2B LS/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 S15
33V73AI6SI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1029
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1128
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B LS/FS/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 5, RJDF
RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 S15
33V73AI6SI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF DRIVER POWER TO THE L5/F5/R5,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF THE VERNIER RCS, AND MAY AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.I0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1030
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1129
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B LS/FS/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER ON SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, RJDF
RJDF2B LS/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL O16 S15
PART NUMBER: 33V73AI6SI5
SIP] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY TO REMOVE MANIFOLD DRIVER POWER PROVIDED BY THE OTHER
L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH ON CONTACTS, OR BY PLACING THE
F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO REMOVE DRIVER POWER
FROM THE MANIFOLD DRIVER, AND WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I031
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1130
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
3, 4 OR 7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B LS/FS/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, RJDF
RJDF2B LS/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL O16 S15
33V73AI6SI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1032
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1131
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
3, 4 OR 7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2B LS/FS/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER OFF SWITCH CONTACTS
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED (SHORTED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, RJDF
RJDF2B LS/FS/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] S[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 016 S15
33V73AI6SI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01, AN; JSC 11174, SPACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE Ii.i0, RCS SIG 1
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1033
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1132
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIB MANIFOLD F1 TRICKLE TEST
TEST DOES NOT OPERATE OR OPERATES ERRATICALLY.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, RJDF
RJDFIB MANIFOLD F1 TRICKLE TEST
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GPC VIA MDM
PART NUMBER: GPC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW AND GROUND CANNOT DETERMINE THE OPERATIONAL STATUS OF THE
FWD RCS JETS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CJ
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I034
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1133
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDFIAMANIFOLD F2 TRICKLE TEST
TEST DOES NOT OPERATE OR OPERATES ERRATICALLY.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, RJDF
RJDFIA MANIFOLD F2 TRICKLE TEST
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GPC VIA MDM
PART NUMBER: GPC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW AND GROUND CANNOT DETERMINE THE OPERATIONAL STATUS OF THE
FWD RCS JZTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CJ
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1035
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1134
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RJDF2AMANIFOLD F3 TRICKLE TEST
TEST DOES NOT OPERATE OR OPERATES ERRATICALLY.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, RJDF
P.JDF2A MANIFOLD F3 TRICKLE TEST
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: GPC VIA MDM
PART NUMBER: GPC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW AND GROUND CANNOT DETERMINE THE OPERATIONAL STATUS OF THE
FWD RCS JETS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CJ
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I036
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 1135
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RJDF2B MANIFOLD F4, F5 TRICKLE TEST
FAILURE MODE: TEST DOES NOT OPERATE OR OPERATES ERRATICALLY.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4/5, RJDF
RJDF2B MANIFOLD F4, F5 TRICKLE TEST
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: GPC VIA MDM
PART NUMBER: GPC
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW AND GROUND CANNOT DETERMINE THE OPERATIONAL STATUS OF THE
FWD RCS JETS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CJ
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1037
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1136 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
F2D, F4D
FAILURE MODE:
CHAMBER PRESSURE (PC) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FID, F3D,
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, DOWN
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FID, F3D, F2D, F4D
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: V42PI551A, V42PI553A, V42PI552A, V42PI554A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET AND ANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF. CREW MAY MAKE WRONG DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1038
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1137 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: CHAMBER PRESSURE (PC) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FID, F3D,
F2D, F4D
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON, INDICATING A PRESSURE HIGHER THAN THE
CHAMBER PRESSURE DETECTION LEVEL IN THE RJD.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, DOWN
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FID, F3D, F2D, F4D
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42PI551A, V42PI553A, V42PI552A, V42PI554A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL ANNOUNCE THE JET AS FAILED ON. CREW
MAY MAKE WRONG DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-I039
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1138 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
F3F
FAILURE MODE:
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIF, F2F,
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, FWD
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIF, F2F, F3F
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42PI541A, V42PI542A, V42PI543A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET ANDANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF. CREW MAY MAKE WRONG DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I040
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1139 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIF, F2F,
F3F
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON, INDICATING A PRESSURE HIGHER THAN THE
CHAMBER PRESSURE DETECTION LEVEL IN THE RJD.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, FWD
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIF, F2F, F3F
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42PI541A, V42PI542A, V42PI543A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL ANNOUNCE THE JET AS FAILED ON. CREW
MAY MAKE WRONG DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-I041
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1140 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
F2R, F4R
FAILURE MODE:
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIL, F3L,
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, L/R
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIL, F3L, F2R, F4R
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42PI544A, V42PI546A, V42PI545A, V42PI547A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET AND ANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF. CREW MAY MAKE WRONG DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I042
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1141 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIL, F3L,
F2R, F4R
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON, INDICATING A PRESSURE HIGHER THAN THE
CHAMBER PRESSURE DETECTION LEVEL IN THE RJD.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, L/R
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIL, F3L, F2R, F4R
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42PI544A, V42PI546A, V42PI545A, V42PI547A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL ANNOUNCE THE JET AS FAILED ON. CREW
MAY MAKE WRONG DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-I043
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1142 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
F3U
FAILURE MODE:
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIU, F2U,
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, UP
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIU, F2U, F3U
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42PI548A, V42PI549A, V42PI550A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET ANDANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF. CREW MAY MAKE WRONG DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i044
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1143 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FlU, F2U,
F3U
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON, INDICATING A PRESSURE HIGHER THAN THE
CHAMBER PRESSURE DETECTION LEVEL IN THE RJD.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, UP
CHAMBER PRESSURE (PC) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FlU, F2U, F3U
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42PI548A, V42PI549A, V42PIS50A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL ANNOUNCE THE JET AS FAILED ON. CREW
MAY MAKE WRONG DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-i045
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1144 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FSL, FSR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, L/R
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FSL, FSR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: V42PI555A, V42PI556A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET AND ANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED OFF. CREW MAY MAKE WRONG DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i046
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1145 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L, F5R
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON, INDICATING A PRESSURE HIGHER THAN THE
CHAMBER PRESSURE DETECTION LEVEL IN THE RJD.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, L/R
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FSL, FSR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42PI555A, V42PI556A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL ANNOUNCE THE JET AS FAILED ON. CREW
MAY MAKE WRONG DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/23/87 C-i047
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1146 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
F3D, F4D
FAILURE MODE:
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FID, F2D,
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THANACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, DOWN
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FID, F2D, F3D, F4D
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42TI521C THRU 28C
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET AND ANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED LEAKING. CREW MAY MAKE WRONG DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE ii.6
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I048
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1147 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
F3D, F4D
FAILURE MODE:
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FID, F2D,
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, DOWN
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FID, F2D, F3D, F4D
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42TI521C THRU 28C
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I049
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1148 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
F3F
FAILURE MODE:
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIF, F2F,
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEADz D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, FWD
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIF, F2F, F3F
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42TI501C THRU 06C
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET AND ANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED LEAKING. CREW MAY MAKE WRONG DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1050
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1149 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
F3F
FAILURE MODE:
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIF, F2F,
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THANACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, FWD
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIF, F2F, F3F
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42TI501C THRU 06C
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i051
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1150 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
F2R, F4R
FAILURE MODE:
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIL, F3L,
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, L/R
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIL, F3L, F2R, F4R
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42TI507C THRU 14C
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JETANDANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED LEAKING. CREW MAY MAKE WRONG DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i052
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1151 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
F2R, F4R
FAILURE MODE:
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIL, F3L,
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, L/R
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIL, F3L, F2R, F4R
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42TIS07C THRU 14C
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1053
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1152 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
F3U
FAILURE MODE:
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIU, F2U,
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, UP
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIU, F2U, F3U
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42TI515C THRU 20C
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET ANDANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED LEAKING. CREW MAY MAKE WRONG DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1054
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1153 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
F3U
FAILURE MODE:
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIU, F2U,
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, UP
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FIU, F2U, F3U
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: V42TISI5C THRU 20C
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I055
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1154 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FSL, F5R
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, L/R
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS FSL, FSR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/2R TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42TI529C THRU 32C
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT WILL DESELECT THE JET AND ANNOUNCE IT AS
FAILED LEAKING. CREW MAY MAKE WRONG DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1056
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
1155 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L, FSR
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
THRUSTER SUBSYSTEM
THRUSTERS, L/R
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L, F5R
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: V42TI529C THRU 32C
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, PAGE 11.6
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1057
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1156 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A, FU FWD
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA 1
81V76AI6AR J5-Q TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I058
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1157 ABORT:
HDW/nmC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A, FU FWD
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6ARJS-Q TYPE III
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR BEING FAILED 'ION" WHICH
COULD PRODUCE A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN FRCS. CREW SWITCH
AVAILABLE TO REMOVE POWER FROM FAILED HTR CIRCUIT AND SELECT
REDUNDANT HTR SYSTEM.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD PRODUCE UPPER TEMP LIMITS EXCEEDING
REDLINES CAUSING NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I059
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1158 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A, FU LOWER
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA 1
81V76AI6AR JS-N TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I060
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1159 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A, FU LOWER
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA 1
81V76AI6AR J5-N TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR BEING FAILED "ON" WHICH
COULD PRODUCE A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN FRCS. CREW SWITCH
AVAILABLE TO REMOVE POWER FROM FAILED HTR CIRCUIT AND SELECT
REDUNDANT HTR SYSTEM.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD PRODUCE UPPER TEMP LIMITS EXCEEDING
REDLINES CAUSING NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I061
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1160 ABORT:
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A, FU UPPER
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA 1
81V76AI6AR J5-S TYPE III
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1062
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1161 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A, FU UPPER
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA 1
81V76AI6AR J5-S TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR BEING FAILED "ON" WHICH
COULD PRODUCE A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN FRCS. CREW SWITCH
AVAILABLE TO REMOVE POWER FROM FAILED HTR CIRCUIT AND SELECT
REDUNDANT HTR SYSTEM.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD PRODUCE UPPER TEMP LIMITS EXCEEDING
REDLINES CAUSING NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I063
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1162 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A, OX LOWER
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: F BAY I, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6AR JS-M' TYPE III
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I064
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1163 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A, OX LOWER
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA 1
81V76AI6AR J5-M I TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR BEING FAILED "ON" WHICH
COULD PRODUCE A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN FRCS. CREW SWITCH
AVAILABLE TO REMOVE POWER FROM FAILED HTR CIRCUITAND SELECT
REDUNDANT HTR SYSTEM.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD PRODUCE UPPER TEMP LIMITS EXCEEDING
REDLINES CAUSING NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i065
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1164 ABORT:
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A, OX UPPER
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA 1
81V76AI6AR J5-R TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR BEING FAILED "ON" WHICH
COULD PRODUCE A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN FRCS. CREW SWITCH
AVAILABLE TO REMOVE POWER FROM FAILED HTR CIRCUITAND SELECT
REDUNDANT HTR SYSTEM.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD PRODUCE UPPER TEMP LIMITS EXCEEDING
REDLINES CAUSING NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I066
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1165 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A, OX UPPER
DRIVER, HYBRID
4)
5)
6)
"/)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [+P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA 1
81V76AI6AR J5-R TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE THERMOSTAT CONTROL FOR ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM REDUNDANT GROUP
AVAILABLE. SECOND FUSE FAILURE RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO
NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1067
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1166 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A, OX UPPER
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA 1
81V76AI6AR J5-P I TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i068
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1167 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A, OX UPPER
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, LCA 1
81V76AI6AR J5-P' TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR BEING FAILED "ON" WHICH
COULD PRODUCE A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN FRCS. CREW SWITCH
AVAILABLE TO REMOVE POWER FROM FAILED HTR CIRCUIT AND SELECT
REDUNDANT HTR SYSTEM.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD PRODUCE UPPER TEMP LIMITS EXCEEDING
REDLINES CAUSING NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I069
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1168 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL B, FU FWD
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, LCA 2
82V76AI7AR J5-Q TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I070
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1169 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL B, FU FWD
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: F BAY 2, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76AI7ARJ5-Q TYPE III
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR BEING FAILED "ON" WHICH
COULD PRODUCE A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN FRCS. CREW SWITCH
AVAILABLE TO REMOVE POWER FROM FAILED HTR CIRCUIT AND SELECT
REDUNDANT HTR SYSTEM.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD PRODUCE UPPER TEMP LIMITS EXCEEDING
REDLINES CAUSING NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I071
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1170 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL B, FU LOWER
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA:
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, LCA 2
82V76AI7AR JS-N TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I072
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1171 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL B, FU LOWER
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, LCA 2
82V76AI7AR J5-N TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR BEING FAILED "ON" WHICH
COULD PRODUCE A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN FRCS. CREW SWITCH
AVAILABLE TO REMOVE POWER FROM FAILED HTR CIRCUIT AND SELECT
REDUNDANT HTR SYSTEM.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD PRODUCE UPPER TEMP LIMITS EXCEEDING
REDLINES CAUSING NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I073
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE" i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1172 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
HDWIFUNC
312R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL B, FU UPPER
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, LCA 2
82V76AI7AR JS-S TYPE III
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i074
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1173 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL B, FU UPPER
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, LCA 2
82V76AI7AR J5-S TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR BEING FAILED "ON" WHICH
COULD PRODUCE A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN FRCS. CREW SWITCH
AVAILABLE TO REMOVE POWER FROM FAILED HTR CIRCUIT AND SELECT
REDUNDANT HTR SYSTEM.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD PRODUCE UPPER TEMP LIMITS EXCEEDING
REDLINES CAUSING NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1075
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1174 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL B, OX FWD
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ P] C [ P]
F BAY 2, LCA 2
82V76AI7AR J5-P' TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i076
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
IA19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1175 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL B, OX FWD
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, LCA 2
82V76AI7AR JS-P' TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR BEING FAILED "ON" WHICH
COULD PRODUCE A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN FRCS. CREW SWITCH
AVAILABLE TO REMOVE POWER FROM FAILED HTR CIRCUIT AND SELECT
REDUNDANT HTR SYSTEM.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD PRODUCE UPPER TEMP LIMITS EXCEEDING
REDLINES CAUSING NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1077
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1176 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL B, OX LOWER
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAD'NCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: F BAY 2, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76AI7AR J5-M TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1078
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1177 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL B, OX LOWER
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, LCA 2
82V76AI7ARJ5-M TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR BEING FAILED "ON" WHICH
COULD PRODUCE A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN FRCS. CREW SWITCH
AVAILABLE TO REMOVE POWER FROM FAILED HTR CIRCUIT AND SELECT
REDUNDANT HTR SYSTEM.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD PRODUCE UPPER TEMP LIMITS EXCEEDING
REDLINES CAUSING NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i079
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1178 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL B, OX UPPER
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: F BAY 2, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76AI7AR J5-R' TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I080
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1179 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL B, OX UPPER
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: F BAY 2, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76AI7AR J5-R' TYPE III
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED HTR BEING FAILED "ON" WHICH
COULD PRODUCE A HIGHER THAN DESIRED TEMP IN FRCS. CREW SWITCH
AVAILABLE TO REMOVE POWER FROM FAILED HTR CIRCUIT AND SELECT
REDUNDANT HTR SYSTEM.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD PRODUCE UPPER TEMP LIMITS EXCEEDING
REDLINES CAUSING NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1081
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1180 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 20A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A, FU FWD
FUSE, 20A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22FI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1082
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1181 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) HTR PNL A, FU LOWER
FUSE, 20A
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, PCA 1
81V76A22FI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I083
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1182 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A, OX FWD
FUSE, 20A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY I, PCA 1
81V76A22FI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I084
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1183 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A, OX UPPER
FUSE, 20A
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22FII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1085
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1184 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL B, FU FWD
FUSE, 20A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23F21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I086
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1185 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 20A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL B, FU LOWER
FUSE, 20A
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23F23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I087
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1186 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 20A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL B, OX FWD
FUSE, 20A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23F22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I088
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1187 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 20A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL B, OX UPPER
FUSE, 20A
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F BAY 2, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76A23F20
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT
DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i089
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1188 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A
FUSE, IA
SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 $3
36V73AI4FII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE THERMOSTAT CONTROL FOR ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM REDUNDANT GROUP
AVAILABLE. SECOND FUSE FAILURE RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO
NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-1090
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1189 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 $3
36V73AI4F9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO POWER HEATERS FOR ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM, REDUNDANT
GROUP AVAILABLE. SECOND FUSE FAILURE RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO
NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I091
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1190 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM B
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 $3
36V73AI4FI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO POWER HEATERS FOR ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM, REDUNDANT
GROUP AVAILABLE. SECOND FUSE FAILURE RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO
NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-i092
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1191 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM B
FUSE, IA
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 $3
36V73AI4FI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE THERMOSTAT CONTROL FOR ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM REDUNDANT GROUP
AVAILABLE. SECOND FUSE FAILURE RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO
NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/18/87 C-I093
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1192 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 7.5A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
FUSE, 7.5A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S14
36V73AI4F32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL MANIFOLD 1 HTRS. INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN LOWER TEMPERATURE LIMIT WILL TRIGGER A CLASS 2 ALARM AND
CAUSE ASSOCIATED ENGINES TO BE DESELECTED THROUGH LEAK DETECTION
SOFTWARE. LOSS OF MANIFOLD ENGINES WILL RESULT IN A
LOSS OF FULL MISSION CAPABILITIES.
REFERENCES:
28JUNE85
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I094
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1193 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, 7.5A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
FUSE, 7.5A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S15
36V73AI4F33
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL MANIFOLD 2 HTRS. INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN LOWER TEMPERATURE LIMIT WILL TRIGGER A CLASS 2 ALARM AND
CAUSE ASSOCIATED ENGINES TO BE DESELECTED THROUGH LEAK DETECTION
SOFTWARE. LOSS OF MANIFOLD ENGINES WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF
LOSS OF FULL MISSION CAPABILITIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
28JUNE85
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-i095
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1194 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 7.5A
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
FUSE, 7.5A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S16
36V73AI4F34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL MANIFOLD 3 HTRS. INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN LOWER TEMPERATURE LIMIT WILL TRIGGER A CLASS 2 ALARM AND
CAUSE ASSOCIATED ENGINES TO BE DESELECTED THROUGH LEAK DETECTION
SOFTWARE. LOSS OF MANIFOLD ENGINES WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF
LOSS OF FULL MISSION CAPABILITIES.
REFERENCES:
28JUNE85
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I096
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1195 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 7.5A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
FUSE, 7.5A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S17
36V73AI4F35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL MANIFOLD 4 HTRS. INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN LOWER TEMPERATURE LIMIT WILL TRIGGER A CLASS 2 ALARM AND
CAUSE ASSOCIATED ENGINES TO BE DESELECTED THROUGH LEAK DETECTION
SOFTWARE. LOSS OF MANIFOLD ENGINES WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF
LOSS OF FULL MISSION CAPABILITIES.
REFERENCES:
28JUNE85
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I097
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1196 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 7.5A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
FUSE, 7.5A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S18
36V73AI4F36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL MANIFOLD 5 HTRS. INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN LOWER TEMPERATURE LIMIT WILL TRIGGER A CLASS 2 ALARM AND
CAUSE ASSOCIATED ENGINES TO BE DESELECTED THROUGH LEAK DETECTION
SOFTWARE. LOSS OF MANIFOLD ENGINES WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF
LOSS OF FULL MISSION CAPABILITIES.
REFERENCES:
28JUNE85
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I098
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1197 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A/B, FU FWD
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 3
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42HTI03
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS
AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I099
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1198 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 3
FAILS SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A/B, FU FWD
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 , ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42HTI03
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT INAN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS
AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-ll00
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1199 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A/B, FU UPPER
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3 / 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42HTI01
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS
AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-ll01
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1200 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 1
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A/B, FU UPPER
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2 R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42HTI01
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS
AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-II02
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1201 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: HEATER 90W, A & B OX FWD HTR PNL 4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A/B, OX FWD
HEATER 90W, A & BOX FWD HTR PNL 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42HTI04
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS
AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1103
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1202 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: HEATER 90W, A & BOX FWD HTR PNL 4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A/B, OX FWD
HEATER 90W, A & BOX FWD HTR PNL 4
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42HTI04
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS
AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-ii04
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1203 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A/B, OX UPPER
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/_ ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42HTI02
B[P] c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS
AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099"REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-II05
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1204 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A/B, OX UPPER
HEATER 90W, A & B OX LWR HTR PNL 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42HTI02
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS
AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-ii06
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1205 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 90W, A & B FU FWD HTR PNL 5
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A/B, FU LOWER
HEATER 90W, A & B FU FWD HTR PNL 5
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42HTI05
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS
AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-II07
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1206 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 90W, A & B FU FWD HTR PNL 5
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A/B, FU LOWER
HEATER 90W, A & B FU FWD HTR PNL 5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42HTI05
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS
AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-II08
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1207 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 6
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) HTR PNL A/B, OX LOWER
5) HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 6
s)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42HTI06
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS
AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-II09
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1208 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 90W, A & BOX LWR HTR PNL 6
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR PNL A/B, OX LOWER
HEATER 90W, A & B OX LWR HTR PNL 6
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42HTI06
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS
AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF
FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-i110
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1209 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, -XAXIS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, -X AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42HRFID
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANTS WILL FREEZE IN THE JET. FAILURE IS
DETECTABLE VIA JET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER. IF THE TEMPERATURE
DROPS BELOW C&W LIMITS, JETS WILL BE ANNOUNCED AS "FAILED OFF".
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS. THE
PROPELLANTS WILL NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO FREEZE DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES:
28JUNE85
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-llll
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1210 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, -X AXIS
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, -X AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: V42HRFID
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANTS WILL FREEZE IN THE JET. FAILURE IS
DETECTABLE VIA JET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER. IF THE TEMPERATURE
DROPS BELOW C&W LIMITS, JETS WILL BE ANNOUNCE AS "FAILED OFF".
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS. THE
PROPELLANTS WILL NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO FREEZE DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 150CT82 LTR
28JUNE85
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1112
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1211 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: V42HRFIF
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANTS WILL FREEZE IN THE JET. FAILURE IS
DETECTABLE VIA JET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER. IF THE TEMPERATURE
DROPS BELOW C&W LIMITS, JETS WILL BE ANNOUNCED AS "FAILED OFF".
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY TO
MEET CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. THE PROPELLANTS WILL NOT HAVE ENOUGH
TIME TO FREEZE DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES:
28JUNE85
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1113
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
1212 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: V42HRFIF
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANTS WILL FREEZE IN THE JET. FAILURE IS
DETECTABLE VIA JET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER. IF THE TEMPERATURE
DROPS BELOW C&W LIMITS, JETS WILL BE ANNOUNCED AS "FAILED OFF".
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY TO
MEET CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. THE PROPELLANTS WILL NOT HAVE ENOUGH
TIME TO FREEZE DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES:
28JUNE85
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-II14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1213 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: V42HRFIL
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANTS WILL FREEZE IN THE JET. FAILURE IS
DETECTABLE VIA JET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER. IF THE TEMPERATURE
DROPS BELOW C&W LIMITS, JETS WILL BE ANNOUNCED AS "FAILED OFF".
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS. THE
PROPELLANTS WILL NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO FREEZE DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 150CT82 LTR
28JUNE85
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-II15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1214 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY MANIFOLD JETS
HEATER 20W, THRUSTER, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELALTNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: V42HRFIL
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANTS WILL FREEZE IN THE JET. FAILURE IS
DETECTABLE VIA JET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER. IF THE TEMPERATURE
DROPS BELOW C&W LIMITS, JETS WILL BE ANNOUNCED AS "FAILED OFF".
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS. THE
PROPELLANTS WILL NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO FREEZE DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES:
28JUNE85
VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I116
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1215 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
VERNIER MANIFOLD JETS
HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
2/2 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42HRF5L
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO REDUNDANCY. PROPELLANTS WILL FREEZE IN THE JET. FAILURE IS
DETECTABLE VIA JET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER. IF THE TEMPERATURE
DROPS BELOW THE C&W LIMITS, JET WILL BE ANNOUNCED AS "FAILED
OFF". FAILURE WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF VERNIER RCS.
REFERENCES:
28JUNE85
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-II17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1216 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
VERNIER MANIFOLD JETS
HEATER 10W, THRUSTER, VERNIER, ALL AXES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
2/2 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
V42HRF5L
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO REDUNDANCY. PROPELLANTS WILL FREEZE IN THE JET. FAILURE IS
DETECTABLE VIA JET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER. IF THE TEMPERATURE
DROPS BELOW THE C&W LIMITS, JET WILL BE ANNOUNCED AS "FAILED
OFF". FAILURE WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF VERNIER RCS.
REFERENCES:
28JUNE85
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1118
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1217 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) HTR SYSTEM A
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
8IV76A22KI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO
FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/2_/87 C-ii19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1218 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76A22KI0
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE MAIN BUS POWER FROM THE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. NO EFFECT, HYBRID DRIVERS AND THERMOSTAT INPUTS PROVIDE
PROPER ON/OFF CONTROL OF HTR SYSTEM. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN
PRODUCE UPPER TEMP LIMITS EXCEEDING FRCS REDLINES
CAUSING NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I120
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1219 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM B
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23KI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF POWER FOR ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN AN INABILITY TO MAINTAIN
PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO
FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-i121
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1220 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3)
4)
s)
7)
8)
9)
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM B
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, PCA 2
82V76A23KI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE MAIN BUS POWER FROM THE ASSOCIATED HTR
SYSTEM. NO EFFECT, HYBRID DRIVERS AND THERMOSTAT INPUTS PROVIDE
PROPER ON/OFF CONTROL OF HTR SYSTEM. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN
PRODUCE UPPER TEMP LIMITS EXCEEDING FRCS REDLINES
CAUSING NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-i122
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1221 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA 1
81V76AI6R J4-74
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FU SYSTEM THERMOSTAT CONTROL FOR ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM
REDUNDANT GROUP AVAILABLE. SECOND FUSE FAILURE RESULTS IN AN
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND
WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1123
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1222 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHTPHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6R J4-74
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, HEATER SYSTEM STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-i124
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1223 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
X)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3 / 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, LCA 1
81V76AI6R J4-78
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OX SYSTEM THERMOSTAT CONTROL FOR ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM
REDUNDANT GROUP AVAILABLE. SECOND FUSE FAILURE RESULTS IN AN
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND
WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I125
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1224 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6R J4-78
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, HEATER SYSTEM STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I126
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1225 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY i, PCA 1
81V76A22AIR78
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FRCS HTR SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK. NO EFFECT, SWITCH
POSITION CAN BE INDIRECTLY DETERMINED BY MONITORING HTR SYSTEM
OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1127
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1226 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76A22AIR78
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1128
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1227 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY I, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6R J4-82
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1129
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1228 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: F BAY i, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 81V76AI6R J4-82
B [ ] C C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-i130
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1229 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM B
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, LCA 2
82V76AI7R J4-82
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I131
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1230 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM B
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, LCA 2
82V76AI7R J4-82
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1132
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1231 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM B
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: F BAY 2, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76AI7R J4-78
SIP] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OX SYSTEM THERMOSTAT CONTROL FOR ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM,
REDUNDANT GROUP AVAILABLE. SECOND FUSE FAILURE RESULTS IN AN
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND
WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-i133
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1232 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM B
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, LCA 2
82V76AI7R J4-78
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, HEATER SYSTEM STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-i134
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1233 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM B
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: F BAY 2, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76A23AIRI8
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FRCS HTR SWITCH POSITION TALKBACK. NO EFFECT, SWITCH
POSITION CAN BE INDIRECTLY DETERMINED BY MONITORING HTR SYSTEM
OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I135
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1234 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: F BAY 2, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 82V76A23AIRI8
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, TALKBACK STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I136
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1235 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM B
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, LCA 2
82V76AI7R J4-74
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE FU SYSTEM THERMOSTAT CONTROL FOR ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM,
REDUNDANT GROUP AVAILABLE. SECOND FUSE FAILURE RESULTS IN AN
INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND
WOULD BE CAUSE TO NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1137
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1236 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM B
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
F BAY 2, LCA 2
82V76AI7R J4-74
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, HEATER SYSTEM STILL FULLY OPERATIONAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I138
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1237 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S14
36V73AI4-A2RI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC TALKBACK FOR "RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET i" SWITCH
POSITION. NO EFFECT, THERMOSTATS IN SYSTEM WILL MAINTAIN PROPER
THERMAL CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
28JUNE85; MC467-0029 REV G AMENDMENT SEQ. 2.
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I139
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1238 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PI_ELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S14
36V73AI4-A2RI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, TALKBACK FOR "RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET i" SWITCH
POSITION IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
28JUNE85; MC467-0029 REV G AMENDMENT SEQ. 2.
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1140
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1239 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S15
36V73AI4-A3RI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC TALKBACK FOR "RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 2" SWITCH
POSITION. NO EFFECT, THERMOSTATS IN SYSTEM WILL MAINTAIN PROPER
THERMAL CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
28JUNE85; MC467-0029 REV G AMENDMENT SEQ. 2.
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I141
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1240 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S15
36V73AI4-A3RI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, TALKBACK FOR "RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 2" SWITCH
POSITION IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
28JUNE85; MC467-0029 REV G AMENDMENT SEQ. 2.
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I142
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1241 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S16
36V73AI4-A4RI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC TALKBACK FOR "RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 3" SWITCH
POSITION. NO EFFECT, THERMOSTATS IN SYSTEM WILL MAINTAIN PROPER
THERMAL CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
28JUNE85; MC467-0029 REV G AMENDMENT SEQ. 2.
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-i143
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1242 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S16
36V73AI4-A4RI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, TALKBACK FOR "RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 3" SWITCH
POSITION IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 150CT82 LTR
28JUNE85; MC467-0029 REV G AMENDMENT SEQ. 2.
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I144
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1243 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
Z)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S17
36V73AI4-A5RI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC TALKBACK FOR "RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 4" SWITCH
POSITION. NO EFFECT, THERMOSTATS IN SYSTEM WILL MAINTAIN PROPER
THERMAL CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
28JUNE85; MC467-0029 REV G AMENDMENT SEQ. 2.
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-i145
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1244 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S17
36V73AI4-A5RI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION_ MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, TALKBACK FOR "RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 4" SWITCH
POSITION IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
28JUNE85; MC467-0029 REV G AMENDMENT SEQ. 2.
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I146
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1245 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] CC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S18
36V73AI4-A6RI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE GPC TALKBACK FOR "RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 5" SWITCH
POSITION. NO EFFECT, THERMOSTATS IN SYSTEM WILL MAINTAIN PROPER
THERMAL CONTROL.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
28JUNE85; MC467-0029 REV G AMENDMENT SEQ. 2.
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I147
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1246 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S18
36V73AI4-A6RI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, TALKBACK FOR "RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 5" SWITCH
POSITION IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 150CT82 LTR
28JUNE85; MC467-0029 REV G AMENDMENT SEQ. 2.
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I148
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1247 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN A-AUTO POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A/B, OX
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 $3
36V73AI4S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM HEATER SYSTEM. HEATER SYSTEM
THERMOSTATS ARE STILL AVAILABLE TO MAINTAIN PROPER THERMAL
CONTROL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN PRODUCE UPPER TEMP LIMITS
EXCEEDING FRCS REDLINES CAUSING NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS,
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I149
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/19/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1248 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN B-AUTO POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) POD
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A/B, OX
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 $3
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4S3
B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM HEATER SYSTEM. HEATER SYSTEM
THERMOSTATS ARE STILL AVAILABLE TO MAINTAIN PROPER THERMAL
CONTROL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN PRODUCE UPPER TEMP LIMITS
EXCEEDING FRCS REDLINES CAUSING NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS,
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1150
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1249 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (STUCK IN OFF POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A/B, OX
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 $3
36V73AI4S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE THERMOSTAT CONTROL FOR ASSOCIATEDHEATER SYSTEM REDUNDANT
GROUP AVAILABLE. SECOND FUSE FAILURE RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO
NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1151
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1250 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/1R AOA: 3/1R
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S14
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI4
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE
USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I152
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1251 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. B RKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
MANIFOLD 1, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 $14
36V73AI4SI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
ON THE MANIFOLD. THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS FOR ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I153
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 2/2
1252 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATERCONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S14
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI4
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
ON THE MANIFOLD. THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS FOR ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I154
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
1253 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
1, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S14
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI4
B[P] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-i155
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1254 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S14
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI4
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1156
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1255 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S14
36V73AI4SI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I157
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1256 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 1
FAILS TO SWITCH (FAILS IN AUTO POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 1
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S14
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI4
SIP] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM THE FRCS JET 1 HTR SYSTEM. NO
EFFECT, THERMOSTATS IN SYSTEM WILL MAINTAIN PROPER THERMAL
CONTROL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN JET 1 HEATERS AND
REDUNDANT JET HEATERS FAILED "ON" CAUSING LOSS OF ASSOCIATED
HEATERS, THEREFORE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
28JUNE85; MC467-0029 REV G AMENDMENT SEQ. 2.
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1158
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1257 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 1
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (FAILS IN OFF POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 1 JETS
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S14
36V73AI4SI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL MANIFOLD 1 HTRS. INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN LOWER TEMPERATURE LIMIT WILL TRIGGER A CLASS 2 ALARM AND
CAUSE ASSOCIATED ENGINES TO BE DESELECTED THROUGH LEAK DETECTION
SOFTWARE. LOSS OF MANIFOLD ENGINES WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF
LOSS OF FULL MISSION CAPABILITIES.
REFERENCES:
28JUNE85
VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I159
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1258 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LI FTO FF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S15
36V73AI4SI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JETASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE
USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I160
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1259 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S15
36V73AI4SI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
ON THE MANIFOLD. THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS FOR ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1161
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 2/2
1260 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PH_E HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S15
36V73AI4SI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
ON THE MANIFOLD. THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS FOR ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1162
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
1261 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
?)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S15
36V73AI4SI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1163
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1262 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S15
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI5
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I164
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1263 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 T_L: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S15
36V73AI4SI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1165
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1264 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (FAILS IN AUTO POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 2
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S15
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI5
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM THE FRCS JET 2 HTR SYSTEM. NO
EFFECT, THERMOSTATS IN SYSTEM WILL MAINTAIN PROPER THERMAL
CONTROL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN JET 1 HEATERS AND
REDUNDANT JET HEATERS FAILED 'iON" CAUSING LOSS OF ASSOCIATED
HEATERS, THEREFORE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
28JUNE85; MC467-0029 REV G AMENDMENT SEQ. 2.
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1166
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1265 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (FAILS IN OFF POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2 JETS
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S15
36V73AI4SI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL MANIFOLD 2 HTRS. INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN LOWER TEMPERATURE LIMIT WILL TRIGGER A CLASS 2 ALARM AND
CAUSE ASSOCIATED ENGINES TO BE DESELECTED THROUGH LEAK DETECTION
SOFTWARE. LOSS OF MANIFOLD ENGINES WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF
LOSS OF FULL MISSION CAPABILITIES.
REFERENCES:
28JUNE85
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1167
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1266 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/ IR ATO: 3/ IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S16
36V73AI4SI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JETASSEMBLY BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE
USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I168
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1267 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S16
36V73AI4SI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
ON THE MANIFOLD. THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS FOR ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1169
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 2/2
1268 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PI_LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S16
36V73AI4SI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
ON THE MANIFOLD. THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS FOR ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1170
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
1269 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/ IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S16
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4S16
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1171
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1270 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 SIS
36V73AI4SI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1172
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1271 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S16
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI6
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I173
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1272 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 3
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (FAILS IN AUTO POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 3
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S16
36V73AI4SI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM THE FRCS JET 3 HTR SYSTEM. NO
EFFECT, THERMOSTATS IN SYSTEM WILL MAINTAIN PROPER THERMAL
CONTROL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN JET 1 HEATERS AND
REDUNDANT JET HEATERS FAILED "ON" CAUSING LOSS OF ASSOCIATED
HEATERS, THEREFORE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
28JUNE85; MC467-0029 REV G AMENDMENT SEQ. 2.
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-i174
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1273 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 3
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (FAILS IN OFF POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3 JETS
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S16
36V73AI4SI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL MANIFOLD 3 HTRS. INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN LOWER TEMPERATURE LIMIT WILL TRIGGER A CLASS 2 ALARM AND
CAUSE ASSOCIATED ENGINES TO BE DESELECTED THROUGH LEAK DETECTION
SOFTWARE. LOSS OF MANIFOLD ENGINES WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF
LOSS OF FULL MISSION CAPABILITIES.
REFERENCES:
28JUNE85
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1175
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1274 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S17
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI7
B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE
USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I176
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1275 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S17
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI7
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
ON THE MANIFOLD. THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS FOR ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1177
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 2/2
1276 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S17
36V73AI4SI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
ON THE MANIFOLD. THIS COULD AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND
PROPELLANT DUMP LENGTHS FOR ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I178
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
1277 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S17
36V73AI4SI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS. THIS COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I179
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1278 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S17
36V73AI4SI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-i180
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1279 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
RANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S17
36V73AI4SI7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I181
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1280 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 4
FAILS TO SWITCH (FAILS IN AUTO POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4 JETS
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S17
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI7
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM THE FRCS JET 4 HTR SYSTEM. NO
EFFECT, THERMOSTATS IN SYSTEM WILL MAINTAIN PROPER THERMAL
CONTROL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN JET 1 HEATERS AND
REDUNDANT JET HEATERS FAILED "ON" CAUSING LOSS OF ASSOCIATED
HEATERS, THEREFORE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
28JUNE85; MC467-0029 REV G AMENDMENT SEQ. 2.
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1182
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1281 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (FAILS IN OFF POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 4 JETS
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S17
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI7
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL MANIFOLD 4 HTRS. INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN LOWER TEMPERATURE LIMIT WILL TRIGGER A CLASS 2 ALARM AND
CAUSE ASSOCIATED ENGINES TO BE DESELECTED THROUGH LEAK DETECTION
SOFTWARE. LOSS OF MANIFOLD ENGINES WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF
LOSS OF FULL MISSION CAPABILITIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
28JUNE85
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1183
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1282 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE ON POSITION
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/1R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S18
36V73AI4SI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS AND LOSS OF VEHICLE
IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I184
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1283 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OFF POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S18
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI8
] B[ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
ON THE MANIFOLD, AND WILL CAUSE LOSS OF THE VERNIER RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-i185
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 2/2
1284 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS i,
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S18
36V73AI4SI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANT IN JETS WILL FREEZE. THIS WILL CAUSE LOSS OF ALL JETS
ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT MANIFOLD, AND WILL CAUSE LOSS OF THE
VERNIER RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I186
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FRCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
1285 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
I, 2
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS
SWITCH ON CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH ON CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S18
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI8
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THERMOSTATS IN EACH JET ASSEMBLY AND BY
CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN ZOTS AND LOSS OF VEHICLE
IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH THE JETS ARE USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I187
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1286 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S18
36V73AI4SI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I188
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1287 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF
SWITCH OFF CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH OFF CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S18
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI8
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, CL, DL
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1189
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1288 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 5
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH (FAILS IN AUTO POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL AI4 S18
PART NUMBER: 36V73AI4SI8
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ABILITY TO REMOVE POWER FROM THE FRCS JET 5 HTR SYSTEM. NO
EFFECT, THERMOSTATS IN SYSTEM WILL MAINTAIN PROPER THERMAL
CONTROL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN JET 1 HEATERS AND
REDUNDANT JET HEATERS FAILED "ON" CAUSING LOSS OF ASSOCIATED
HEATERS, THEREFORE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
28JUNE85; MC467-0029 REV G AMENDMENT SEQ. 2.
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1190
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1289 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 5
FAILS TO SWITCH (FAILS IN OFF POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5 JETS
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS JET 5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL AI4 S18
36V73AI4SI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL MANIFOLD 5 HTRS. INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN LOWER TEMPERATURE LIMIT WILL TRIGGER A CLASS 2 ALARM AND
CAUSE ASSOCIATED ENGINES TO BE DESELECTED THROUGH LEAK DETECTION
SOFTWARE. LOSS OF MANIFOLD ENGINES WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF
LOSS OF FULL MISSION CAPABILITIES.
REFERENCES:
28JUNE85
VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 18549 15OCT82 LTR
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1191
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1290 ABORT:
ITEM: FU SYSTEMA & B THERMOSTAT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A/B, FU
FU SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEOREIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42TSI01, 201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE THERMOSTAT CONTROL FOR ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM REDUNDANT GROUP
AVAILABLE. SECOND FUSE FAILURE RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO
NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-i192
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1291 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FU SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A/B, FU
FU SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
22V42TSIOI, 201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERMOSTAT FAILURE CAUSES THREE OUT OF THE SIX HEATERS TO BE
CONTINUALLY ON. THE REDUNDANT HTR SYSTEM OR MANUAL CREW CYCLE OF
SYSTEM STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN PRODUCE UPPER
TEMP LIMITS EXCEEDING FRCS REDLINES CAUSING NO-GO
FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I193
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1292 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A/B, OX
OX SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42TS201, 202
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE THERMOSTAT CONTROL FOR ASSOCIATED HTR SYSTEM REDUNDANT GROUP
AVAILABLE. SECOND FUSE FAILURE RESULTS IN AN INABILITY TO
MAINTAIN PROPELLANTS AT DESIRED TEMPERATURE AND WOULD BE CAUSE TO
NO-GO FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I194
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1293 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OX SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
POD
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
HTR SYSTEM A/B, OX
OX SYSTEM A & B THERMOSTAT
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE AREA 20
PART NUMBER: 22V42TS201, 202
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THERMOSTAT FAILURE CAUSES THREE OUT OF THE SIX HEATERS TO BE
CONTINUALLY ON. THE REDUNDANT HTR SYSTEM OR MANUAL CREW CYCLE OF
SYSTEM STILL AVAILABLE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN PRODUCE UPPER
TEMP LIMITS EXCEEDING FRCSREDLINES CAUSING NO-GO
FURTHER USE OF FRCS, LOSS OF MISSIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I195
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1294 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, - X AXIS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY THRUSTERS, - X AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, - X AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
JET ASSEMBLY
V42TSFIF, F2F, F3F
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANTS WILL FREEZE IN THE JET. FAILURE IS
DETECTABLE VIA JET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER. IF TENPERATURE FALLS
BELOW C&W LIMITS, JETS WILL BE ANNOUNCED AS "FAILED OFF".
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1196
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1295 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, - X AXIS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) PRIMARY THRUSTERS, - X AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, - X AXIS
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
2/IR TAL: 2/1R
2/1R AOA: 2/1R
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: V42TSFIF, F2F, F3F
B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER SWITCHES OR CAN INHIBIT THE
JET FROM FIRING WITH THE DPS. HOWEVER, THE C&W DOES NOT
ANNUNCIATE THIS HIGH TEMPERATURE CONDITION. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN
ZOTS AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH
THE JETS ARE USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-i197
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1296 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: V42TSFIL, F3L, F2R, F4R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROP WILL FREEZE IN JET. FAILURE DETECTABLE VIA JET
TEMP TRANSDUCER. IF TEMP DROPS BELOW C&W LIMITS, JET WILL BE
ANNOUNCED AS "FAILED OFF".
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPS. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROP TO MEET CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES
DURING ENTRY. PROP WILL NOT HAVE TIME TO FREEZE DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I198
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1297 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
2/1R TAL: 2/1R
2/IR AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: V42TSFIL, F3L, F2R, F4R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER SWITCHES OR CAN INHIBIT THE
JET FROM FIRING WITH THE DPS. HOWEVER, THE C&WDOES NOT
ANNUNCIATE THIS HIGH TEMPERATURE CONDITION. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN
ZOTS AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH
THE JETS ARE USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-I199
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1298 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) THRUSTER
3) THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
4) PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: V42TSFIU, F2U, F3U, FID, F2D, F3D, F4D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THRUSTERS WHICH FIRE IN THE SAME
DIRECTION. PROPELLANTS WILL FREEZE IN THE JET. FAILURE IS
DETECTABLE VIA JET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER. IF THE TEMPERATURE
DROPS BELOW C&W LIMITS, JETS WILL BE ANNOUNCED AS "FAILED OFF".
FAILURE MAY AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS. THE PROPELLANTS WILL NOT
HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO FREEZE DURING ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1200
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1299 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 2/1R
2/1R TAL: 2/1R
2/1R AOA: 2/IR
2/1R ATO: 2/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: V42TSFIU, F2U, F3U, FID, F2D, F3D, F4D
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER SWITCHES OR CAN INHIBIT THE
JET FROM FIRING WITH THE DPS. HOWEVER, THE C&W DOES NOT
ANNUNCIATE THIS HIGH TEMPERATURE CONDITION. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN
ZOTS AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH
THE JETS ARE USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO DO1; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1201
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FRCS FLIGHT:
1300 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
FAILS TO CLOSE (FAILS OPEN).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: V42TSF5L, F5R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROPELLANTS WILL FREEZE IN THE JET. FAILURE IS DETECTABLE VIA
JET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER. IF THE TEMPERATURE DROPS BELOW THE
C&W LIMITS, JET WILL BE ANNOUNCED AS "FAILED OFF". FAILURE WILL
RESULT IN LOSS OF VERNIER RCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1202
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1301 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
FAILS TO OPEN (FAILS CLOSED).
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
THRUSTER
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
2/IR AOA: 3/3
313 ATO: 313
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: JET ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: V42TSF5L, F5R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW CAN REMOVE POWER FROM THE HEATER SWITCHES OR CAN INHIBIT THE
JET FROM FIRING WITH THE DPS. HOWEVER, THE C&W DOES NOT
ANNUNCIATE THIS HIGH TEMPERATURE CONDITION. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE OVERHEATING OF PROPELLANTS, RESULTING IN
ZOTS AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE IN ANY FLIGHT PHASE IN WHICH
THE JETS ARE USED.
REFERENCES: VS70-942099 REV D EO D01; FLIGHT RULE 6-95
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1203
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1302 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/1R RTLS: 3/1R
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31RPC8; RPCI3
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC OR "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A SWITCH" TO
CLOSE "OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES". ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST TO
CLOSE THE VALVES. THE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO
CLOSE CASE, RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR
LINES, AND MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1204
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1303 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76A131RPC8; RPC13
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC TO OPEN THE "OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES",
SINCE THIS FAILURE CONSTANTLY POWERS THE VALVE CLOSE SOLENOIDS,
UNLESS THE "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A SWITCH" IS IN OPEN POSITION.
FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME
VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE, RESULTING IN NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE
(OTHER VALVE A OR B) CAUSING LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION
CAPABILITY. THIS LOSS WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY
CAUSE THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO TRAPPED
PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1205
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1304 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LI FTO F F:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31RPC9; RPCI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC OR "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A SWITCH" TO
CLOSE "OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES". ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST TO
CLOSE THE VALVES. THE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS THE VALVES FAIL TO
CLOSE CASE, RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR
LINES, AND MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1206
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1305 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBI T: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31RPC9; RPCI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO AUTOMATICALLY INHIBIT CLOSING THE "OX & FU HE
ISOL A" VALVES WHEN THEY BECOME FULLY CLOSED. HOWEVER, THE
VALVES CAN STILL BE OPENED VIA GPC OR SWITCH. FOR LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, THE EFFECTS WOULD BE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN
CASE, RESULTING IN NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE CAUSING LOSS OF HELIUM
PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS,
AND MAY CAUSE THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1207
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1306 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31RPCI0; RPCI5
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC TO OPEN THE "OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES".
VALVES CAN STILL BE OPERATED BY "AFT L RCS HE PRESS A SWITCH".
FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, EFFECT WOULD BE SAME AS VALVES FAIL
TO OPEN CASE, RESULTING IN NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE (OTHER
VALVE A OR B) AFFECTING ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND POSSIBLY CAUSING
LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY. THIS LOSS WILL CAUSE
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO
BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO TRAPPED
PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1208
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1307 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31RPCI0; RPCI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONSTANTLY COMMANDS "OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVE" TO OPEN, EVEN WHEN
AT FULL OPEN POSITION. WHEN SWITCH OR GPC COMMANDS VALVE TO
CLOSE, BOTH OPEN AND CLOSE SOLENOIDS IN THE VALVES ARE POWERED
UP. THE EFFECT IS THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE,
RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR LINES, AND MAY
CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1209
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1308 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32RPCI0; RPCII
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A SWITCH" TO OPEN THE
"OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS. VALVES
CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE,
RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANK AND/OR LINES, AND MAY
CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1210
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1309 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/1R RTLS: 3/1R
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI32RPCI0; RPCII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONSTANTLY COMMANDS "OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVE" TO OPEN, EVEN WHEN
AT FULL OPEN POSITION. WHEN SWITCH OR GPC COMMANDS VALVE TO
CLOSE, BOTH OPEN AND CLOSE SOLENOIDS IN THE VALVES ARE POWERED
UP. THE EFFECT IS THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE,
RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANK AND/OR LINES, AND MAY
CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1211
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1310 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
56V76AI33RPC8; 55V76AI32RPCI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC OR "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B SWITCH" TO
CLOSE "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES". ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST TO
CLOSE THE VALVES. THE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS THE VALVES FAIL TO
CLOSE CASE, RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR
LINES, AND MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1212
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1311 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBI T: 3/ 1R ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
56V76AI33RPC8 ; 55V76AI32RPCI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES", SINCE
THIS FAILURE CONSTANTLY POWERS THE VALVE CLOSE SOLENOIDS, UNLESS
THE "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B SWITCH" IS IN OPEN POSITION. FOR
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS
VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE, RESULTING IN NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE
(OTHER VALVE A OR B) AFFECTING ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND POSSIBLY
CAUSING LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY. THIS LOSS WILL
CAUSE THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO TRAPPED
PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1213
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1312 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/1R TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
56V76AI33RPC9; 55V76AI32RPCI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC OR "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B SWITCH" TO
CLOSE "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES". ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST TO
CLOSE THE VALVES. THE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS THE VALVES FAIL TO
CLOSE CASE, RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR
LINES, AND MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1214
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1313 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
CONTROI_R, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
56V76AI33RPC9; 55V76AI32RPCI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO AUTOMATICALLY INHIBIT CLOSING THE "OX & FU HE
ISOL B VALVES" WHEN THEY BECOME FULLY CLOSED. HOWEVER, THE
VALVES CAN STILL BE OPENED VIA GPC OR SWITCH. FOR LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO
OPEN CASE, RESULTING IN NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE (OTHER VALVE A OR
B) AFFECTING ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND POSSIBLY CAUSING LOSS OF
HELIUM PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY. THIS LOSS WILL CAUSE THE TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE
EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S
WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1215
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1314 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)"
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33RPCI3; 55V76AI32RPCI2
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC TO OPEN THE "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES".
VALVES CAN STILL BE OPERATED BY "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B SWITCH".
FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, EFFECT WOULD BE SAME AS VALVES FAIL
TO OPEN CASE, RESULTING IN NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE (OTHER
VALVE A OR B) AFFECTING ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND POSSIBLY CAUSING
LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY. THIS LOSS WILL CAUSE
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO
BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO TRAPPED
PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1216
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1315 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/1R
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33RPCI3; 55V76AI32RPCI2
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
CONSTANTLY COMMANDS "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVE" TO OPEN, EVEN WHEN
AT FULL OPEN POSITION OR COMMANDED TO CLOSE. WHEN SWITCH OR GPC
COMMANDS VALVE TO CLOSE, BOTH OPEN AND CLOSE SOLENOIDS IN THE
VALVES ARE POWERED UP. THE EFFECT IS THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL
TO CLOSE CASE, RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR
LINES, AND MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1217
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1316 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBI T: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 6, PCA3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31RPCI6; 56V76AI33RPCII
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B SWITCH" TO OPEN THE
"OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS. VALVES
CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE,
RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR LINES, AND MAY
CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1218
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1317 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORB IT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA i; AV BAY 6, PCA3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31RPCI6; 56V76AI33RPCII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONSTANTLY COMMANDS "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVE" TO OPEN, EVEN WHEN
AT FULL OPEN POSITION. WHEN SWITCH OR GPC COMMANDS VALVE TO
CLOSE, BOTH OPEN AND CLOSE SOLENOIDS IN THE VALVES ARE POWERED
UP. THE EFFECT IS THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE,
RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR LINES, AND MAY
CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1219
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1318 ABORT:
HDWlFUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21CR J2-34; J2-24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY FOR GPC TO CLOSE THE "OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES".
VALVES CAN STILL BE OPERATED BY "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A SWITCH".
FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, THE EFFECT WOULD BE THE SAME AS
VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE, RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF
TANKS AND/OR LINES, AND MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1220
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1319 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21CR J2-34; J2-24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. MDM HAS INTERNAL PROTECTION FROM REVERSE CURRENT -
HIGH OUTPUT RESISTANCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1221
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1320 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21CR J4-25; J4-16
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A SWITCH" TO CLOSE THE
"OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS. VALVES
CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS THE VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE
CASE, RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR LINES, AND
MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1222
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1321 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21CR J4-25; J4-16
] c C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. CAUSES TALKBACK TO INDICATE THE PRESENCE OF EITHER
GPC OR SWITCH COMMAND TO CLOSE THE "OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES",
INSTEAD OF ONLY THE SWITCH COMMAND.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1223
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1322 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31A2CR5; A3CR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC TO OPEN THE "OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES".
VALVES CAN STILL BE OPERATED BY "AFT L RCS HE PRESS A SWITCH".
FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, EFFECT WOULD BE SAME AS VALVES FAIL
TO OPEN CASE, RESULTING IN NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE (OTHER
VALVE A OR B) AFFECTING ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND POSSIBLY CAUSING
LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY. THIS LOSS WILL CAUSE
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO
BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO TRAPPED
PROPELLANTIS WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1224
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1323 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, PCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31A2CRS; A3CR4
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE SOME ISOLATION BETWEEN BUSES MN A AND MN B.
HAS INTERNAL PROTECTION FROM REVERSE CURRENT - HIGH OUTPUT
RESISTANCE.
MDM
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1225
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1324 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 1R RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31A2CR6; A3CR5
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A SWITCH" TO OPEN THE
"OX & FUHE ISOL A VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS. VALVES
CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE,
RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR LINES, AND MAY
CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1226
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1325 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31A2CR6; A3CR5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE SOME ISOLATION BETWEEN BUSES MN A AND MN B.
HAS INTERNAL PROTECTION FROM REVERSE CURRENT - HIGH OUTPUT
RESISTANCE.
MDM
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1227
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1326 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DSI; DS4
33V73A7A2CRI, A2CR2; 33V73A7A3CRI, A3CR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OPEN OR CLOSE POSITION OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS
HE PRESS A" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES" ARE
FULLY OPEN OR CLOSED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1228
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1327 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DSI; DS4
33V73A7A2CRI, A2CR2; 33V73A7A3CRI, A3CR2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1229
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1328 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
56V76AI23CR J2-24 (!80); 55V76AI22CR J2-24 (180)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY FOR GPC TO CLOSE THE "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES".
VALVES CAN STILL BE OPERATED BY "AFT L RCS HE PRESS B SWITCH".
FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, THE EFFECT WOULD BE THE SAME AS
VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE, RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF
TANKS AND/OR LINES, AND MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1230
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1329 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23CR J2-24 (180); 55V76AI22CR J2-24 (180)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. MDM HAS INTERNAL PROTECTION FROM REVERSE CURRENT -
HIGH OUTPUT RESISTANCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1231
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1330 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
56V76AI23CR J4-16 (181); 55V76AI22CR J4-16 (181)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B SWITCH" TO CLOSE THE
"OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS. VALVES
CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS THE VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE
CASE, RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR LINES, AND
MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1232
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1331 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23CR J4-16 (181); 55V76AI22CR J4-16 (181)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. CAUSES TALKBACK TO INDICATE THE PRESENCE OF EITHER
GPC OR SWITCH COMMAND TO CLOSE THE "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES",
INSTEAD OF ONLY THE SWITCH COMMAND.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1233
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1332 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ P] C [ P]
AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
56V76AI33A2CRI6; 55V76AI32A3CR22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC TO OPEN THE "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES".
VALVES CAN STILL BE OPERATED BY "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B SWITCH".
FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, EFFECT WOULD BE SAME AS VALVES FAIL
TO OPEN CASE, RESULTING IN NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE (OTHER
VALVE A OR B) AFFECTING ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND POSSIBLY CAUSING
LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY. THIS LOSS WILL CAUSE
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO
BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO TRAPPED
PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1234
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1333 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
56V76AI33A2CRI6; 55V76AI32A3CR22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE SOME ISOLATION BETWEEN BUSES MN A AND MN B.
HAS INTERNAL PROTECTION FROM REVERSE CURRENT - HIGH OUTPUT
RESISTANCE.
MDM
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1235
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1334 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
56V76AI33A2CRI5; 55V76AI32A3CR23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B SWITCH" TO OPEN THE
"OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES 'I, OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS. VALVES
CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE,
RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR LINES, AND MAY
CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1236
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1335 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3; AV BAY 5, PCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33A2CRI5; 55V76AI32A3CR23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE SOME ISOLATION BETWEEN BUSES MN A AND MN B.
HAS INTERNAL PROTECTION FROM REVERSE CURRENT - HIGH OUTPUT
RESISTANCE.
MDM
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1237
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1336 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DS2; DS5
33V73A7A2CR3, A2CR4; 33V73A7A3CR3, A3CR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OPEN OR CLOSE POSITION OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS
HE PRESS B" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES" ARE
FULLY OPEN OR CLOSED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1238
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1337 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DS2; DS5
33V73A7A2CR3, A2CR4; 33V73A7A3CR3, A3CR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1239
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1338 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21AR J8-63 TYPE I; J6-54 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC OR "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A SWITCH" TO
CLOSE "OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES". ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST TO
CLOSE THE VALVES. THE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO
CLOSE CASE, RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR
LINES, AND MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1240
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1339 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J8-63 TYPE I; J6-54 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC TO OPEN THE "OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES",
SINCE THIS FAILURE CONSTANTLY POWERS THE VALVE CLOSE SOLENOIDS,
UNLESS THE "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A SWITCH" IS IN THE OPEN
POSITION. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, THE EFFECTS WOULD BE SAME
AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE, RESULTING IN NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE
(OTHER VALVE A OR B) CAUSING LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION
CAPABILITY. THIS LOSS WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY
CAUSE THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO TRAPPED
PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1241
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1340 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J8-62 TYPE I; J6-53 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC OR "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A SWITCH" TO
CLOSE 'fOX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES". ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST TO
CLOSE THE VALVES. THE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS THE VALVES FAIL TO
CLOSE CASE, RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR
LINES, AND MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1242
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1341 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J8-62 TYPE I; J6-53 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY TO AUTOMATICALLY INHIBIT CLOSING THE "OX & FU HE
ISOL A" VALVES WHEN THEY BECOME FULLY CLOSED. HOWEVER, VALVE CAN
STILL BE OPENED VIA SWITCH OR GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
EFFECTS WOULD BE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE.
THIS CASE RESULTS IN NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE (OTHER VALVE A OR B)
CAUSING LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY. THIS LOSS WILL
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED
DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1243
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBS YSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1342 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/XR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J8-64 TYPE I; J6-55 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC TO OPEN THE "OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES".
VALVES CAN STILL BE OPERATED BY "AFT L RCS HE PRESS A SWITCH".
FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, EFFECT WOULD BE SAME AS VALVES FAIL
TO OPEN CASE, RESULTING IN NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE (OTHER
VALVE A OR B) AFFECTING ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND POSSIBLY CAUSING
LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY. THIS LOSS WILL CAUSE
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO
BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO TRAPPED
PROPELLANTIS WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1244
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1343 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J8-64 TYPE I; J6-55 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONSTANTLY COMMANDS "OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVE" TO OPEN, EVEN WHEN
AT FULL OPEN POSITION. WHEN SWITCH OR GPC COMMANDS VALVE TO
CLOSE, BOTH OPEN AND CLOSE SOLENOIDS IN THE VALVES ARE POWERED
UP. THE EFFECT IS THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE,
RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANK AND/OR LINES, AND MAY
CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1245
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1344 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[.P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J8-65 TYPE I; J8-64 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A SWITCH" TO OPEN THE
"OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS. VALVES
CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE,
RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKAND/OR LINES, AND MAY
CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1246
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1345 ABORT:
HDW/nmC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 5, LCA 2
55V76AI22AR J8-65 TYPE I; J8-64 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONSTANTLY COMMANDS "OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVE" TO OPEN, EVEN WHEN
AT FULL OPEN POSITION. WHEN SWITCH OR GPC COMMANDS VALVE TO
CLOSE, BOTH OPEN AND CLOSE SOLENOIDS IN THE VALVES ARE POWERED
UP. THE EFFECT IS THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE,
RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANK AND/OR LINES, AND MAY
CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1247
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1346 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J8-59 TYPE II; J8-50 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OPEN POSITION OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS
A" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES" ARE FULLY
OPEN - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. ALSO LOSE CAPABILITY OF
INHIBITING THE OPENING OF THE VALVES VIA THE SWITCH WHEN VALVES
BECOME OR ARE ALREADY FULLY OPEN, BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1248
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1347 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J8-59 TYPE II; J8-50 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INHIBITS THE OPENING OF THE VALVES VIA THE "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS
A SWITCH". VALVES CAN STILL BE OPERATED BY GPC. LOSE CAPABILITY
OF BARBERPOLE TALKBACK "AFT L RCS HE PRESS A" TO PROPERLY
INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES" ARE FULLY CLOSED.
INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. ALSO INDICATES OPEN WHEN IT SHOULD
INDICATE BARBERPOLE. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, EFFECTS WOULD
BE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO OPEN CASE, RESULTING IN NEXT ASSOCIATED
FAILURE (OTHER VALVE A OR B) AFFECTING ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND
POSSIBLY CAUSING LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY. THIS
LOSS WILL CAUSE THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1249
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1348 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J8-57 TYPE II; J8-48 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CLOSE POSITION OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS
A" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES" ARE FULLY
CLOSED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD.
ALSO LOSE CAPABILITY OF INHIBITING THE CLOSING OF THE VALVES VIA
THE SWITCH WHEN VALVES BECOME OR ARE ALREADY FULLY CLOSED, BUT
WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1250
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1349 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J8-57 TYPE II; J8-48 TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INHIBITS THE CLOSING OF THE VALVES VIA THE "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS
A SWITCH". VALVES CAN STILL BE OPERATED BY GPC. LOSE CAPABILITY
OF BARBERPOLE TALKBACK ASSOCIATED TO PROPERLY INDICATE WHEN BOTH
"OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES" ARE FULLY OPENED. INDICATES
BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. ALSO INDICATES CLOSED WHEN IT SHOULD
INDICATE BARBERPOLE. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, EFFECTS WOULD
BE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE, RESULTING IN NEXT
ASSOCIATED FAILURE (OTHER VALVE A OR B) AFFECTING ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND POSSIBLY CAUSING LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION
CAPABILITY. THIS LOSS WILL CAUSE THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY
OR ABORTS DUE TO TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1251
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1350 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE I
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
56V76AI23AR J8-54 (168) TYPE I; 55V76AI22AR J8-54
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC OR "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B SWITCH" TO
CLOSE "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES". ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST TO
CLOSE THE VALVES. THE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO
CLOSE CASE, RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR
LINES, AND MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1252
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1351 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE I
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
56V76AI23AR J8-54 (168) TYPE I; 55V76AI22AR J8-54
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC TO OPEN THE "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES",
SINCE THIS FAILURE CONSTANTLY POWERS THE VALVE CLOSE SOLENOIDS,
UNLESS THE "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B" SWITCH IS IN OPEN POSITION.
FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS
VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE, RESULTING IN NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE
(OTHER VALVE A OR B) AFFECTING ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND POSSIBLY
CAUSING LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY. THIS LOSS WILL
CAUSE THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO TRAPPED
PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1253
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBS YSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1352 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23ARI67 TYPE I; 55V76AI22AR J8-53 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC OR "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B SWITCH" TO
CLOSE "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES". ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST TO
CLOSE THE VALVES. THE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS THE VALVES FAIL TO
CLOSE CASE, RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR
LINES, AND MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1254
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1353 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23ARI67 TYPE I; 55V76AI22AR J8-53 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO AUTOMATICALLY INHIBIT CLOSING THE "OX & FU HE
ISOL B" VALVES WHEN THEY BECOME FULLY CLOSED. HOWEVER, VALVE CAN
STILL BE OPENED VIA SWITCH OR GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE.
THIS CASE RESULTS IN NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE (OTHER VALVE A OR B)
AFFECTING ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND POSSIBLY CAUSING LOSS OF HELIUM
PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY. THIS LOSS WILL CAUSE THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE
EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S
WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1255
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1354 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/ IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE I
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
56V76AI23AR J8-55 (169) TYPE I; 55V76AI22AR J8-55
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC TO OPEN THE "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES".
VALVES CAN STILL BE OPERATED BY "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B SWITCH".
FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, EFFECT WOULD BE SAME AS VALVES FAIL
TO OPEN CASE, RESULTING IN NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE (OTHER
VALVE A OR B) AFFECTING ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND POSSIBLY CAUSING
LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY. THIS LOSS WILL CAUSE
THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO
BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO TRAPPED
PROPELLANTIS WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1256
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
•DATE: I/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1355 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE I
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
56V76AI23AR J8-55 (169) TYPE I; 55V76AI22AR J8-55
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONSTANTLY COMMANDS "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVE" TO OPEN, EVEN WHEN
AT FULL OPEN POSITION. WHEN SWITCH OR GPC COMMANDS VALVE TO
CLOSE, BOTH OPEN AND CLOSE SOLENOIDS IN THE VALVES ARE POWERED
UP. THE EFFECT IS THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE,
RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR LINES, AND MAY
CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1257
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1356 ABORT:
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J8-65 TYPE I; 56V76AI23AR J8-64 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF '_FT L/R RCS HE PRESS B SWITCH" TO OPEN THE
"OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS. VALVES
CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE,
RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR LINES, AND MAY
CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1258
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1357 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J8-65 TYPE I; 56V76AI23AR J8-64 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONSTANTLY COMMANDS "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVE" TO OPEN, EVEN WHEN
AT FULL OPEN POSITION. WHEN SWITCH OR GPC COMMANDS VALVE TO
CLOSE, BOTH OPEN AND CLOSE SOLENOIDS IN THE VALVES ARE POWERED
UP. THE EFFECT IS THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE,
RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR LINES, AND MAY
CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1259
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1358 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE II
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
56V76AI23ARJ8-59 (165) TYPE II; 55V76AI22AR J8-50
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OPEN POSITION OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS
B" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES" ARE FULLY
OPEN - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. ALSO LOSE CAPABILITY OF
INHIBITING THE OPENING OF THE VALVES VIA THE SWITCH WHEN VALVES
BECOME OR ARE ALREADY FULLY OPEN, BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1260
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1359 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE II
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
56V76AI23ARJ8-59 (165) TYPE II; 55V76AI22AR J8-50
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INHIBITS THE OPENING OF THE VALVES VIA THE "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS
B SWITCH". VALVES CAN STILL BE OPERATED BY GPC. LOSE CAPABILITY
OF BARBERPOLE TALKBACK "AFT L RCS HE PRESS B" TO PROPERLY
INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES" ARE FULLY CLOSED.
INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. ALSO INDICATES OPEN WHEN IT SHOULD
INDICATE BARBERPOLE. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, EFFECTS WOULD
BE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO OPEN CASE, RESULTING IN NEXT ASSOCIATED
FAILURE (OTHER VALVE A OR B) AFFECTING ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND POSSIBLY CAUSING LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION
CAPABILITY. THIS LOSS WILL CAUSE THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY
OR ABORTS DUE TO TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1261
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM" ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1360 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE II
AV BAY 6, LCA 31AV BAY 5, LCA 2
56V76AI23AR J8-57 (164) TYPE II; 55V76AI22AR J8-48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CLOSE POSITION OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS
B" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES" ARE FULLY
CLOSED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. ALSO LOSE CAPABILITY OF
INHIBITING THE CLOSING OF THE VALVES VIA THE SWITCH WHEN
VALVES BECOME OR ARE ALREADY FULLY CLOSED, BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1262
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1361 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR J8-57 (164) TYPE II; 55V76AI22AR J8-48
TYPE II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INHIBITS THE CLOSING OF THE VALVES VIA THE "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS
B SWITCH". VALVES CAN STILL BE OPERATED BY GPC. LOSE CAPABILITY
OF BARBERPOLE TALKBACK "AFT L RCS HE PRESS B" TO PROPERLY
INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES" ARE FULLY OPENED.
INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. ALSO INDICATES CLOSED WHEN IT
SHOULD INDICATE BARBERPOLE. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, EFFECTS
WOULD BE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE, RESULTING IN NEXT
ASSOCIATED FAILURE (OTHER VALVE A OR B) AFFECTING ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND POSSIBLY CAUSING LOSS OF HELIUM PRESSURIZATION
CAPABILITY. THIS LOSS WILL CAUSE THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES TO BE EXCEEDED DURING ENTRY
OR ABORTS DUE TO TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1263
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1362 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 SI0; PNL 07 S13
33V73A7FI; F7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A SWITCH" TO CLOSE THE
"OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS. VALVES
CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS THE VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE
CASE, RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR LINES, AND
MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1264
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1363 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: PNL 07 SI0; PNL 07 S13
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7F2; F8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A SWITCH" TO CLOSE THE
"OX & FU HE ISOL A VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS. VALVES
CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS THE VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE
CASE, RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR LINES, AND
MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1265
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/19/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1364 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBI T: 3/ IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDWlFUNC
3/1R
311R
311R
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 SII; PNL 07 S14
33V73A7F3 ; F9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B SWITCH" TO CLOSE THE
"OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS. VALVES
CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS THE VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE
CASE, RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR LINES, AND
MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1266
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1365 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
FUSE, IA
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO"
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 SII; PNL 07 S14
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7F4; FI0
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B SWITCH" TO CLOSE THE
"OX & FU HE ISOL B VALVES". OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS. VALVES
CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS THE VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE
CASE, RESULTING IN OVERPRESSURIZATION OF TANKS AND/OR LINES, AND
MAY CAUSE ZOTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1267
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1366 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDWlFUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21R J2-35; J2-25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A" SWITCH IN CLOSE
POSITION. SWITCH OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM FOUR "HE ISOL
VLV" TALKBACKS AND FROM THE BARBERPOLE INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1268
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1367 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J2-35; J2-25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A" SWITCH IN CLOSE
POSITION. LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM OAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0
TO 28 VDC) INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1269
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1368 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J2-35; J2-25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A" SWITCH IN CLOSE
POSITION. LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM OAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0
TO 28 VDC) INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1270
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1369 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
313
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J2-35; J2-25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A" SWITCH IN CLOSE
POSITION. SWITCH OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM FOUR "HE ISOL
VLV" TALKBACKS AND FROM THE BARBERPOLE INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1271
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I/19/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1370 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22R J2-37; J2-36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A" SWITCH IN OPEN
POSITION. SWITCH OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM FOUR "HE ISOL
VLV" TALKBACKS AND FROM THE BARBERPOLE INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1272
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1371 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22R J2-37; J2-36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1273
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1372 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J2-33; J2-23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX HE ISOL A VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION. VALVE
OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM OTHER TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1274
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1373 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J2-33; J2-23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1275
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1374 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J2-31; J2-21
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX HE ISOL A VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION. VALVE
OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM OTHER TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1276
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1375 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J2-31; J2-21
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1277
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1376 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J8-60, 61; J8-51, 52
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE THE FOUR TALKBACKS FOR OPEN AND CLOSED POSITIONS OF BOTH "OX
& FU HE ISOL A VALVES". ALSO LOSE INHIBITS TO STOP OPENING OR
CLOSING VALVES WHEN THEY ARE FULLY OPENED OR CLOSED,
RESPECTIVELY, BUT THIS WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1278
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1377 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J8-60, 61; J8-51, 52
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1279
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1378 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J2-32; J2-22
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU HE ISOL A VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION. VALVE
OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM OTHER TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1280
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1379 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J2-32; J2-22
] cc ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1281
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1380 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J2-30; J2-20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE TALKBACK "FU HE ISOL A VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION. VALVE
OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM OTHER TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1282
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1381 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J2-301 J2-20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1283
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1382 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITI CALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-25; 55V76AI22R J2-25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B" SWITCH IN CLOSE
POSITION. SWITCH OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM FOUR "HE ISOL
VLV" TALKBACKS AND FROM BARBERPOLE INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1284
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: l/19/8 7
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1383
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
56V76AI23R J2-25; 55V76AI22R J2-25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B" SWITCH IN CLOSE
POSITION. LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM OAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0
TO 28 VDC) INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1285
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1384 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
56V76AI23R J2-25 (134); 55V76AI22R J2-25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B" SWITCH IN CLOSE
POSITION. LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM OAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0
TO 28 VDC) INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1286
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1385 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
2)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-25 (134); 55V76AI22R J2-25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B" SWITCH IN CLOSE
POSITION. SWITCH OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM FOUR "HE ISOL
VLV" TALKBACKS AND FROM THE BARBERPOLE INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1287
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1386 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA i; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J2-37; 56V76AI23R J2-36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS B" SWITCH IN OPEN
POSITION. SWITCH OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM FOUR "HE ISOL
VLV" TALKBACKS AND FROM THE BARBERPOLE INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1288
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1387 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBI T: 3/ 3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA I; AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21R J2-37; 56V76AI23R J2-36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1289
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1388 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-33 (129) ; 55V76AI22R J2-23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX HE ISOL B VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION. VALVE
OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM OTHER TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1290
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1389 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-33 (129); 55V76AI22R J2-23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1291
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1390 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-31 (126); 55V76AI22R J2-21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "OX HE ISOL B VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION. VALVE
OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM OTHER TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1292
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1391 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-31 (126) ; 55V76AI22R J2-21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1293
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1392 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J8-60, 61 (131); 55V76AI22R J8-51, 52
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE THE FOUR TALKBACKS FOR OPEN AND CLOSED POSITIONS OF BOTH "OX
& FU HE ISOL B VALVES". ALSO LOSE INHIBITS TO STOP OPENING OR
CLOSING VALVES WHEN THEY ARE FULLY OPENED OR CLOSED,
RESPECTIVELY, BUT THIS WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1294
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1393 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J8-60, 61 (131); 55V76AI22R J8-51, 52
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
i
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1295
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1394 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-32 (130); 55V76AI22R J2-22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "FU HE ISOL B VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION. VALVE
OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM OTHER TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1296
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1395 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-32 (130); 55V76AI22R J2-22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1297
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1396 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELALTNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 31 AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-30 (127); 55V76AI22R J2-20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK "FU HE ISOL B VALVE" IN CLOSED POSITION. VALVE
OPERATION CAN BE DETERMINED FROM OTHER TALKBACKS AND BARBERPOLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1298
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1397 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
313
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV B
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3; AV BAY 5, LCA 2
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23R J2-30 (127); 55V76AI22R J2-20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1299
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1398 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
3/IR TAL: 3/IR
3/IR AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
311R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 SI0
33V73A7SI0, SII; 33V73A7SI3, S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE PRESSURE REGULATOR AND THE PRESSURE
RELIEF VALVE. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION WHILE THE
VALVE IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN AND CANNOT BE
CLOSED BY MDM COMMAND.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE OVERPRESSURIZATION
AND RUPTURE OF THE PROPELLANT TANKS AND/OR LINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1300
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1399 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 SI0
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7SI0, SII; 33V73A7SI3, S14
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS ANDTHEPARALLEL
ISOL VALVE. IF THE SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION WHILE THE
VALVE IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE. IF THE MDM OPEN
COMMAND IS ALSO PRESENT, OR THE SWITCH OPEN COMMAND IS ALSO
PRESENT, THE VALVE WILL CYCLE OPEN AND CLOSEDUNTIL THE MDM OR
SWITCH OPEN COMMAND IS REMOVED, ORUNTIL THE CONTROL BUS POWER IS
REMOVED FROM EITHER OF THE SWITCHtS CLOSE CONTACTS. TO OPEN THE
VALVE, CREW MUSTREMOVE POWER FROM EITHER OF THE SWITCHtS
CLOSE CONTACTS AND THEN USE THE GPC READ/WRITE PROCEDURES.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND
WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING
ABORTS TO MEET TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS OR CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1301
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1400 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
SWITCH FAILS IN THE GPC POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 SI0
33V73A7SI0, SII; 33V73A7SI3, S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE PRESSURE REGULATOR AND THE PRESSURE
RELIEF VALVE. TO OPERATE THE VALVE, THE CREW MUST USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. IF THE VALVE IS CLOSED AND THE MDM OPEN
COMMAND PATH FAILS, THE VALVE CANNOT BE OPENED BY THE MDM
SWITCH COMMANDS. IF THE VALVE IS OPEN WHEN THE SWITCH FAILS, AND
ALL REDUNDANCY FAILS, THE RESULT WILL BE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND
RUPTURE OF THE PROPELLANT TANKS AND/OR LINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1302
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1401 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS I, 2
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS i, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 SI0
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7SI0, SII; 33V73A7SI3, S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1303
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
I/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1402 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 1, 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 SI0
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7SI0, SII; 33V73A7SI3, S14
c [ ]
CAUSES" CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1304
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1403 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 SI0
PART NUMBER: 33V73ATSI0, SII; 33V73A7SI3, S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1305
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1404 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 3, 4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 SI0
33V73ATSI0, SII; 33V73A7SI3, S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE, THESE CONTACTS ARE NOT IN A CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1306
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1405 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 SI0
33V73A7SI0, SII; 33V73ATSI3, S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM CLOSE COMMAND, THE PRESSURE
REGULATOR, AND THE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS
FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL
REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE OPENED BY THE SWITCH OR BY THE
MDM COMMAND, AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY THE SWITCH COMMAND, ONLY BY
THE MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF THE PROPELLANT TANKS AND/OR
LINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1307
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1406 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE
SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B.[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 SI0
33V73A7SI0, SII; 33V73A7S13, S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDS, THE OTHER SWITCH
CLOSE CONTACTS, AND THE PARALLEL ISOL VALVE. IF THE CLOSE
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE GPC OR CLOSED
POSITION, THE VALVE WILL CLOSE, AND CANNOT BE OPENED BY MDM
COMMAND, ONLY BY SWITCH COMMAND. IF THE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN
OPEN, AND CANNOT BE CLOSE BY MDM COMMAND, ONLY BY SWITCH COMMAND.
TO OPEN THE VALVE WITH THE MDM COMMAND, THE CREW MUSTREMOVE
CONTROL BUS POWER FROM THE CLOSE CONTACTS 5,6, AND USE THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT
ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY AND ABORTS TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1308
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1407 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
CONTACTS 7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 SI0
33V73A7SI0, SII; 33V73A7SI3, S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMANDSAND THE PARALLEL
ISOL VALVE. IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS
IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT POSITION, CAN BE
CLOSED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE OPENED BY SWITCH
COMMAND, ONLY BY MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL
AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS, AND MAY RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING ENTRY AND ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1309
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1408 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
CONTACTS 7, 8
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN
SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 SI0
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7SI0, SlI; 33V73A7SI3, SI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE PRESSURE REGULATOR AND THE PRESSURE
RELIEF VALVE . IF THE OPEN CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH
IS IN THE OPEN OR GPC POSITION, THE VALVE WILL OPEN. IF THE OPEN
CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN THE CLOSED
POSITION, OR IF THE MDM CLOSE COMMAND IS ALSO PRESENT, THE VALVE
WILL CYCLE OPEN AND CLOSED UNTIL CONTROL BUS POWER TO THE OPEN OR
CLOSE CONTACTS IS REMOVED, OR UNTIL THE MDM CLOSE COMMAND IS
REMOVED. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF THE PROPELLANT TANKS AND/OR
LINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1310
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATEz
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/3
1409 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
9, i0
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, i0"
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 SI0
33V73A7SI0, SII; 33V73A7SI3, S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE MDM OPEN COMMAND AND THE PARALLEL
ISOLATION VALVE. IF THE GPC CONTACTS FAIL OPEN, THE VALVE CAN BE
OPENED BY SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND, CAN BE CLOSED BY SWITCH COMMAND,
AND CANNOT BE CLOSED BY MDM COMMAND UNLESS THE SWITCH IS IN
THE CLOSED POSITION. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN
LOSS OF GPC CONTROL OF THE HELIUM PRESSURE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1311
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1119187 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
1410 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
9, i0
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
SWITCH GPC CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC CONTAhTS 9, I0
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA" 3/IR
3/ 1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 SI0
33V73A7SI0, SII; 33V73A7SI3, S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER CLOSE CONTACTS AND THE SWITCH
AND MDM OPEN COMMAND. FIRST FAILURE WILLHAVE NO EFFECT.
FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE
VALVE, WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT OPERATIONS AND MAY CAUSE THE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1312
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1411 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS ii, 12
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS Ii, 12
CRITICALITI'ES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 SI0
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7SI0, SII; 33V73A7SI3, S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE SWITCH GPC CONTACTS AND THE MDM CLOSE
COMMAND, AND BY THE PRESSURE REGULATORS AND THE PRESSURE RELIEF
VALVE. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL OPEN WHILE THE SWITCH IS IN
ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILLREMAIN IN THAT POSITION,
CAN BE OPENED BY THE SWITCH OR MDM COMMAND, BUT CANNOT BE CLOSED
BY THE SWITCH OR MDM CLOSE COMMAND. THE VALVE CAN BE CLOSED BY
PLACING THE SWITCH IN THE GPC POSITION, AND THEN USING THE GPC
READ/WRITE PROCEDURES. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN
THE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF THE PROPELLANT TANKS AND OR
LINES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1313
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1412 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS Ii, 12
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS Ii, 12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 SI0
PART NUMBER: 33V73ATSI0, SII; 33V73A7SI3, S14
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THE OTHER SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS ANDTHE
PARALLEL ISOL VALVE. IF THE CLOSE CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED WHILE THE
SWITCH IS IN ANY POSITION, THE VALVE WILL REMAIN IN THAT
POSITION, AND CAN BE CLOSED AND OPENED BY SWITCH
OR MDM COMMAND. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL AFFECT ONORBIT
OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1314
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
ARCS FLIGHT: 3/IR
1413 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIDTRAVEL)
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH TALKBACK
ERRONEOUS INDICATION (FAILS HIGH, FAILS LOW, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DSI, DS2_ PNL 07 DS4, DS5
33V73A7DSI, DS2; DS4, DS5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFT L/R RCS HE PRESS A/B POSITION INDICATION WOULD FALSELY SHOW A
BARBERPOLE INDICATING EITHER THE FU OR OX A OR B VALVES ARE STUCK
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED OR THERE IS A POSITION MISMATCH BETWEEN THE
TWO VALVES. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF DIRECT VALVE TALKBACK TO CREW. WORST CASE WOULD BE
FALSELY FAILING THE A OR B VALVE CLOSED RESULTING IN LOSS OF
MISSION DUE TO SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS
OF VEHICLE/LIFE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2, DA, CA
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1315
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1414 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42PT2021 52V42PT302
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1316
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1415 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42PT202; 52V42PT302
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1317
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1416 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT201; 52V42PT301
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1318
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1417 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42PT201; 52V42PT301
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1319
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1418 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
PART NUMBER: 51V42PT204; 52V42PT304
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1320
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1419 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT204 ; 52V42PT304
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1321
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1420 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-2 PRESSSENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER PRESSURETHAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT203 ; 52V42PT303
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1322
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1421 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: INDICATES LOWER PRESSURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB I T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBI T: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42PT203 ; 52V42PT303
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE OF TANK TEMPERATURE SENSOR AND REDUNDANT PRESSURE SENSOR
WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK.
CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1323
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1422 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE OX TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
L/R HE OX TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT" HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT202; 52V42TT302
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND
DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION
BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1324
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1423 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE OX TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
L/R HE OX TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT202; 52V42TT302
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND
DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION
BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1325
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1424 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE FUTANKTEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES HIGHER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
HE TK
L/R HE FU TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT201; 52V42TT301
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND
DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION
BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1326
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1425 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
L/R HE FU TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
INDICATES LOWER TEMPERATURE THAN ACTUAL.
LEAD ANALYST: V.J. BURKEMPER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) INSTRUMENTATION
3) HE PRESS SUBSYSTEM
4) HE TK
5) L/R HE FU TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
L/R OMS POD, RCS MANIFOLDS AND THRUSTERS
51V42TT201; 52V42TT301
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TANK PRESSURE SENSORS WILL CAUSE CREW AND GROUND
DIFFICULTY IN DETECTING A TANK LEAK. CREW MAY MAKE BAD DECISION
BASED ON ERRONEOUS DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1327
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1426 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33RPCI5; RPCI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC OR "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL SWITCH" TO
CLOSE "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVES". ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST
TO CLOSE THE VALVES. THE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS THE VALVES FAIL
TO CLOSE CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN NO EFFECT SINCE
PROPELLANT CAN BE ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION
VALVES 3/4/5 A OR B, AND VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING
ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1328
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1427 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33RPCI5; RPCI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC TO OPEN THE "OX & FU MANIF 5 ISOL VALVES"
SINCE THIS FAILURE CONSTANTLY POWERS THE VALVE CLOSE SOLENOIDS,
UNLESS "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL SWITCH" IS IN OPEN POSITION.
FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, THE EFFECTS WOULD BE SAME AS
VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN LOSS OF VRC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1329
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1428 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33RPCI4; RPCI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC TO OPEN THE "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL
VALVES". VALVES CAN STILL BE OPERATED BY "AFT L RCS MANIFOLD 5
ISOL SWITCH". FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, EFFECT WOULD BE SAME
AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN LOSS OF VRCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1330
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1429 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33RPCI4; RPCI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONSTANTLY COMMANDS "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVE" TO OPEN, EVEN
WHEN AT FULL OPEN POSITION. WHEN SWITCH OR GPC COMMANDS VALVE TO
CLOSE, BOTH OPEN AND CLOSE SOLENOIDS IN THE VALVES ARE POWERED
UP. THE EFFECT IS THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE.
THIS CASE RESULTS IN NO EFFECT SINCE PROPELLANT CAN BE ISOLATED
FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVES 3/4/5 A OR B, AND
VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1331
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1430 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31RPCII; RPCI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL SWITCH" TO OPEN
THE "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC
COMMANDS. VALVES CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY, EFFECT WOULD BE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN
CASE, RESULTING IN LOSS OF VRCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1332
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1431 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI31RPCII; RPCI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONSTANTLY COMMANDS "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL A VALVE" TO OPEN,
EVEN WHEN AT FULL OPEN POSITION. WHEN SWITCH OR GPC COMMANDS
VALVE TO CLOSE, BOTH OPEN AND CLOSE SOLENOIDS INTHE VALVES ARE
POWERED UP. THE EFFECT IS THE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE
CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN NO EFFECT SINCE PROPELLANT CAN BE
ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVES 3/4/5 A OR
B, AND VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1333
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1432 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6-ALL DIODES; 56V76AII6-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 28 DIODES THERE ARE 6 OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF ONE OF FOUR SIGNAL PATHS TO OPEN THE OX & FU TK ISOL
1/2 VLV. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE
DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE
PROPELLANT (POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL & MASS PROPERTIES VIOLATION).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1334
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1433 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/ 2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6-ALL DIODES; 56V76AII6-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 28 DIODES THERE ARE TWO OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD
RESULT IN ONE OF THE TWO OX & FU TK ISOL 1/2 VLVS BEING STUCK
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED WHEN COMMANDED OPEN WHICH IS THE WORST
CASE. WITH ONE VALVE FAILED MIDTRAVEL, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO
OPEN OTHER VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DURING
ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT (POSSIBLE
STRUCTURAL & MASS PROPERTIES VIOLATION). FLOW RATE INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT BURN MAKES THIS PROPELLANT IN AFFECTED TANK UNUSABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1335
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1434 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DSI; DS4
33V73A7A2CR5, A2CR6; 33V73A7A3CR5, A3CR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL
3/4/5 A" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVES"
ARE OPEN OR CLOSED, DEPENDING ON WHICH DIODE FAILED. INDICATES
BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. CREW CAN DETERMINE VALVE POSITION FROM
TALKBACKS VIA GPC DISPLAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1336
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1435 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DSI; DS4
33V73A7A2CR5, A2CR6; 33V73ATA3CR5, A3CR6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1337
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1436 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/2R TAL: 3/1R
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 28 DIODES THERE ARE 5 OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF ONE OF TWO SIGNAL PATHS TO OPEN THE OX & FU TK ISOL
3/4/5 A VLV. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT (POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL & MASS PROPERTIES
VIOLATION).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1338
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1437 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4-ALL DIODES
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 14 DIODES THERE ARE FOUR OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD
RESULT IN ONE OF THE TWO OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VLVS BEING STUCK
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED WHEN COMMANDED OPEN WHICH IS THE WORST
CASE. WITH ONE VALVE FAILED MIDTRAVEL, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO
OPEN OTHER VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DURING
ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT (POSSIBLE
STRUCTURAL & MASS PROPERTIES VIOLATION). FLOW RATE INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT BURN. THIS MAKES PROPELLANT IN AFFECTED TANK
UNUSABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1339
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1438 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DSI; DS4
33V73A7A2CR7, A2CR8; 33V73A7A3CR7, A3CR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL
3/4/5 B" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVES"
ARE OPEN OR CLOSED, DEPENDING ON WHICH DIODE FAILED. INDICATES
BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. CREW CAN DETERMINE VALVE POSITION FROM
TALKBACKS VIA GPC DISPLAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1340
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1439 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DSI; DS4
33V73A7A2CR7, A2CR8; 33V73ATA3CR7, A3CR8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/_0/87 C-1341
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1440 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
311R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/2 R
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBI T: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5-ALL DIODES
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 14 DIODES THERE ARE 5 OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF ONE OF TWO SIGNAL PATHS TO OPEN THE OX & FU TK ISOL
3/4/5 B VLV. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS DUE TO INABILITY TO
USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT (POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL & MASS PROPERTIES
VIOLATION).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1342
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1441 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 2R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
OUT OF THE 14 DIODES THERE ARE FOUR OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD
RESULT IN ONE OF THE OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VLVS BEING STUCK
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSED WHEN COMMANDED OPEN WHICH IS THE WORST
CASE. WITH ONE VALVE FAILED MIDTRAVEL, ONE FAILURE (FAILURE TO
OPEN OTHER VALVE) AWAY FROM POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DURING
ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT (POSSIBLE
STRUCTURAL & MASS PROPERTIES VIOLATION). FLOW RATE INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT BURN MAKES THIS PROPELLANT IN AFFECTED TANK UNUSABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1343
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1442 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
OUT OF THE 28 DIODES THERE ARE 6 OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF ONE OF FOUR SIGNAL PATHS TO OPEN THE OX & FU TK FEED
1/2 VLVS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS
OF OMS INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND LOSS OF
ENGINE REDUNDANCY. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE
AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP OMS PROP
THROUGH RCS JETS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1344
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1443 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
312R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 28 DIODES THERE ARE TWO OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD
RESULT IN ONE OF THE TWO OX & FU TK XFEED 1/2 VLVS BEING STUCK
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSE WHEN COMMANDED OPEN WHICH IS THE WORST CASE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF OMS
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY.
FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP OMS PROP THROUGH RCS JETS
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL
DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1345
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1444 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/ IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2 R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4-ALL DIODES; 56V76AII6-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 28 DIODES THERE ARE 6 OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF ONE OF FOUR SIGNAL PATHS TO OPEN THE OX & FU TK XFEED
3/4/5 VLV. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS
OF OMS INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND LOSS OF
ENGINE REDUNDANCY. FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE
AWAY FROM LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP OMS PROP
THROUGH RCS JETS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME
CRITICAL DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1346
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1445 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA i; AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4-ALL DIODES; 56V76AII6-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 28 DIODES THERE ARE TWO OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD
RESULT IN ONE OF THE TWO OX & FU TK XFEED 3/4/5 VLVS BEING STUCK
PARTIALLY OPEN/CLOSE WHEN COMMANDED OPEN WHICH IS THE WORST CASE.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF OMS
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY AND LOSS OF ENGINE REDUNDANCY.
FIRST FAILURE DURING RTLS OR TAL, ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF
VEHICLE/LIFE DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP OMS PROP THROUGH RCS JETS
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE INABILITY TO COMPLETE TIME CRITICAL
DUMP.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1347
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1446 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/2R ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 3 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 9 DIODES THERE ARE 2 OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF ONE OF TWO SIGNAL PATHS TO OPEN THE OX & FU MANIF 1
ISOL VLV. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE
DURING ABORTS DUE TO INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT
(POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL & MASS PROPERTIES VIOLATION).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1348
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1447 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AIIS-ALL DIODES
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 9 DIODES THERE ARE TWO OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD RESULT
IN FALSE TALKBACK ON THE BARBERPOLE INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1349
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1448 ABORT:
HDWlFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DSI3; DSI8
33V73A7A2CR9, A2CRI0; 33V73A7A3CRg, A3CRI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 1
ISO_' TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU MANIF 1 ISOL VALVES" ARE
OPEN OR CLOSED, DEPENDING ON WHICH DIODE FAILED. INDICATES
BARBERPOLE INSTEAD.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1350
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1449 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DSI3; DSI8
33V73A7A2CR9, A2CRI0; 33V73A7A3CR9, A3CRI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1351
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1450 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/ 1R
AOA: 3/1R
ATO: 3/1R
A[3 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
OUT OF THE 9 DIODES THERE ARE TWO OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF ONE OF TWO SIGNAL PATHS TO OPEN THE OX & FU MANIF 2
ISOL VLVS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE
DURING ABORTS DUE TO INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT
(POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL & MASS PROPERTIES VIOLATION).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1352
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1451 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3 / 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 9 DIODES THERE ARE TWO OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD RESULT
IN FALSE TALKBACK ON THE "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 2" BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1353
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1452 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DSI4; DSI9
33V73A7A2CRII, A2CRI2; 33V73A7A3CRII, A3CRI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 2
ISO_' TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU MANIF 2 ISOL VALVES" ARE
OPEN OR CLOSED, DEPENDING ON WHICH DIODE FAILED. INDICATES
BARBERPOLE INSTEAD.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1354
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1453 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DSI4; DSI9
33V73A7A2CRII, A2CRI2; 33V73ATA3CRII, A3CRI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1355
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1454 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
312R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH:
LI FTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/3 TAL: 3/1R
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/2R ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6-ALL DIODES
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
OUT OF THE 9 DIODES THERE ARE TWO OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF ONE OF TWO SIGNAL PATHS TO OPEN THE OX & FU MANIF 3
ISOL VLVS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE
DURING ABORTS DUE TO INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT
(POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL & MASS PROPERTIES VIOLATION).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1356
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1455 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6-ALL DIODES
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 9 DIODES THERE ARE TWO OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD RESULT
IN FALSE TALKBACK ON THE "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 3" BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1357
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1456 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DSI4; DS20
33V73A7A2CRI3, A2CRI4; 33V73A7A3CRI3, A3CRI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 3
ISOL" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU MANIF 3 ISOL VALVES" ARE
OPEN OR CLOSED, DEPENDING ON WHICH DIODE FAILED. INDICATES
BARBERPOLE INSTEAD.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1358
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1457 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DSI4; DS20
33V73A7A2CRI3, A2CRI4; 33V73A7A3CRI3, A3CRI4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1359
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1458 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/2R AOA: 3/IR
3/2R ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6-ALL DIODES
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 9 DIODES THERE ARE TWO OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF ONE OF TWO SIGNAL PATHS TO OPEN THE OX & FU MANIF 4
ISOL VLVS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/LIFE
DURING ABORTS DUE TO INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT
(POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL & MASS PROPERTIES VIOLATION).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1360
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1459 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
S)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6-ALL DIODES
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OUT OF THE 9 DIODES THERE ARE TWO OF WHICH A FAILURE WOULD RESULT
IN FALSE TALKBACK ON THE "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 4" BARBERPOLE
INDICATOR.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 20923 PCN-I
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1361
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1460 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 DSIS; DS21
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7A2CRI5, A2CRI6; 33V73A7A3CRIS, A3CRI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 4
ISOL" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU MANIF 4 ISOL VALVES" ARE
OPEN OR CLOSED, DEPENDING ON WHICH DIODE FAILED. INDICATES
BARBERPOLE INSTEAD.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1362
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1461 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 DSI5; DS21
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7A2CRI5, A2CRI6; 33V73A7A3CRI5, A3CRI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1363
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1462 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23CR J2-44 (183) ; CR J2-28 (178)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC TO CLOSE THE "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL
VALVES". VALVES CAN STILL BE OPERATED BY"AFT L RCS MANIFOLD 5
ISOL SWITCH". FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, THE EFFECT WOULD BE
THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN NO
EFFECT SINCE PROPELLANT CAN BE ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE
TANK ISOLATION VALVES 3/4/5 A OR B, AND VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT
USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1364
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1463 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23CR J2-44 (183) ; CR J2-28 (178)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. MDM HAS INTERNAL PROTECTION FROM REVERSE CURRENT -
HIGH OUTPUT RESISTANCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1365
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1464 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23CR J4-38 (182) ; CR J4-19 (179)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL SWITCH" TO CLOSE
THE "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC
COMMANDS. VALVES CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY, THE EFFECT WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO
CLOSE CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN NO EFFECT SINCE PROPELLANT CAN
BE ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVES 3/4/5 A
OR B, AND VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1366
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1465 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23CR J4-38 (182); CR J4-19 (179)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. CAUSES TALKBACK TO INDICATE THE PRESENCE OF EITHER
GPC OR SWITCH COMMAND TO CLOSE THE "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL
VALVES", INSTEAD OF ONLY THE SWITCH COMMAND.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1367
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1466 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33A2CR5; A2CR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC TO OPEN THE "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL
VALVES". VALVES CAN STILL BE OPERATED BY "AFT L RCS MANIFOLD 5
ISOL SWITCH". FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, EFFECT WOULD BE SAME
AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN LOSS OF VRCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1368
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1467 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33A2CRS; A2CR4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. LOSE SOME ISOLATION BETWEEN BUSES MN A AND MN B.
HAS INTERNAL PROTECTION FROM REVERSE CURRENT - HIGH OUTPUT
RESISTANCE.
MDM
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1369
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1468 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, PCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI33A2CRI3; A2CRI2
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL SWITCH" TO OPEN
THE "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC
COMMANDS. VALVES CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY, THE EFFECT WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO
CLOSE CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN NO EFFECT SINCE PROPELLANT CAN
BE ISOLATE FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVES 3/4/5 A OR
B, AND VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1370
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1471 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 DSI7; DS22
33V73A7A2CRI7, A2CRI8; 33V73A7A3CRI7, A3CRI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1373
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1472 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)"
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB I T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6ARI4 TYPE I; ARI6 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX
& FU ISOL 1/2 VALVES" ARE FULLY CLOSED. INDICATES BARBERPOLE
INSTEAD.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1374
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1473 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6ARI4 TYPE I; ARI6 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO PROPERLY INDICATE
STATUS OF "OX & FU ISOL 1/2 VALVES". INDICATES BARBERPOLE WHEN
VALVES ARE OPEN AND INDICATES CLOSED WHEN VALVES ARE INBETWEEN
(SHOULD BE BARBERPOLE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1375
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1474 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6ARI3 TYPE I; ARI5 TYPE I
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX
& FU ISOL 1/2 VALVES" ARE FULLY OPENED. INDICATES BARBERPOLE
INSTEAD.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1376
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1475 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6ARI3 TYPE I; ARI5 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO PROPERLY INDICATE
STATUS "OX & FU ISOL 1/2 VALVES". INDICATES BARBERPOLE WHEN
VALVES ARE CLOSED AND INDICATES OPEN WHEN VALVES ARE INBETWEEN
(SHOULD BE BARBERPOLE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1377
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1476 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
"LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4ARI3 TYPE I; ARII TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL
3/4/5 A" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVES"
ARE OPEN - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. CREW CAN DETERMINE
VALVE POSITION FROM TALKBACKS VIA GPC DISPLAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1378
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1477 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4AR13 TYPE I; ARll TYPE I
c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL
3/4/5 A" TO PROPERLY INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A
VALVES" ARE CLOSED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. ALSO
INDICATES OPEN WHEN IT SHOULD INDICATE BARBERPOLE. CREW CAN
DETERMINE VALVE POSITION FROM TALKBACKS VIA GPC DISPLAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1379
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1478 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4ARI2 TYPE I; ARIO TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL
3/4/5 A" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVES"
ARE CLOSED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. CREW CAN DETERMINE
VALVE POSITION FROM TWO TALKBACKS VIA GPC DISPLAY. ALSO LOSE
CAPABILITY TO OPEN RELAYS TO CUT POWER TO "OX & FU ISOL 3/4/5A
VALVE" MOTORS WHEN BOTH VALVES BECOME CLOSED. POWER TO MOTORS
CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH" IS MOVED TO
ITS GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR THE GPC CLOSE VALVE
COMMAND ENDS. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1380
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1479 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/1
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4ARI2 TYPE I; ARI0 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
STOPS, AND INDICATES WITH BARBERPOLE TALKBACK, THE CLOSURE OF
BOTH "FU & OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVES" WHEN FUEL VALVE IS CLOSED,
IGNORING THE OXID VALVE STATUS. THIS COULD RESULT IN LEAVING
OXID LINE PARTIALLY OPENED, SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE.
THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1381
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1480 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J4-I15 TYPE I; J4-5 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL
3/4/5 A" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVES"
ARE CLOSED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. CREW CAN DETERMINE
VALVE POSITION FROM TWO TALKBACKS VIA GPC DISPLAY. ALSO LOSE
CAPABILITY TO OPEN RELAYS TO CUT POWER TO "OX & FU ISOL 3/4/5 A
VALVE" MOTORS WHEN BOTH VALVES BECOME CLOSED. POWER TO MOTORS
CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH" IS MOVED TO
ITS GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR THE GPC CLOSE
VALVE COMMAND ENDS. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1382
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1481 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBI T: 2/ 2 AOA: 2/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, LCA 1
54V76AI21AR J4-i15 TYPE I; J4-5 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
STOPS, AND INDICATES WITH BARBERPOLE TALKBACK, THE CLOSURE OF
BOTH "FU & OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVES" WHEN OXID VALVE IS CLOSED,
IGNORING FUEL VALVE STATUS. THIS COULD RESULT IN LEAVING THE
FUEL LINE PARTIALLY OPENED, SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE.
THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1383
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1482 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5ARI2 TYPE I; ARI4 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL
3/4/5 B" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVES"
ARE OPEN - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD.
CREW CAN DETERMINE VALVE POSITION FROM TALKBACKS VIA GPC DISPLAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1384
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1483 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLI GHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76Al15AR12 TYPE I; AR14 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL
3/4/5 B" TO PROPERLY INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B
VALVES" ARE CLOSED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. ALSO
INDICATES OPEN WHEN IT SHOULD INDICATE BARBERPOLE. CREW CAN
DETERMINE VALVE POSITION FROM TALKBACKS VIA GPC DISPLAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1385
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1484 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5ARII TYPE I; ARI3 TYPE I
c C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL
3/4/5 B" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVES"
ARE CLOSED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. CREW CAN DETERMINE
VALVE POSITION FROM TWO TALKBACKS VIA GPC DISPLAY. ALSO LOSE
CAPABILITY TO OPEN RELAYS TO CUT POWER TO "OX & FU ISOL 3/4/5 A
VALVE" MOTORS WHEN BOTH VALVES BECOME CLOSED. POWER TO MOTORS
CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH" IS MOVED TO
ITS GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR THE GPC CLOSE
VALVE COMMAND ENDS. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1386
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1485 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/l
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AIISARII TYPE I; ARI3 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
STOPS, AND INDICATES WITH BARBERPOLE TALKBACK, THE CLOSURE OF
BOTH "FU & OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVES" WHEN FUEL VALVE IS CLOSED,
IGNORING THE OXID VALVE STATUS. THIS COULD RESULT IN LEAVING
OXID LINE PARTIALLY OPENED, SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE.
THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES •
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1387
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1486 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J4-I15 TYPE I; J4-5 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL
3/4/5 B" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVES"
ARE CLOSED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. CREW CAN DETERMINE
VALVE POSITION FROM TWO TALKBACKS VIA GPC DISPLAY. ALSO LOSE
CAPABILITY TO OPEN RELAYS TO CUT POWER TO "OX & FU ISOL 3/4/5 A
VALVE" MOTORS WHEN BOTH VALVES BECOME CLOSED. POWER TO MOTORS
CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH" IS MOVED TO
ITS GPC POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR THE GPC CLOSE
VALVE COMMAND ENDS. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT
DAMAGE IT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1388
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1487 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AI22AR J4-i15 TYPE I; J4-5 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
STOPS, AND INDICATES WITH BARBERPOLE TALKBACK, THE CLOSURE OF
BOTH "FU & OX TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVES" WHEN OXID VALVE IS CLOSED,
IGNORING THE FUEL VALVE STATUS. THIS COULD RESULT IN LEAVING
FUEL LINE PARTIALLY OPENED, SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE.
THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND POSSIBLE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES •
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1389
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1488 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6ARI8 TYPE I; AR20 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX
& FU XFEED 1/2 VALVES" ARE FULLY CLOSED. INDICATES BARBERPOLE
INSTEAD.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1390
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1489 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
I) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6ARI8 TYPE I; AR20 TYPE I
c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO PROPERLY INDICATE
STATUS "OX & FU XFEED 1/2 VALVES". INDICATES BARBERPOLE WHEN
VALVES ARE OPEN AND INDICATES CLOSED WHEN VALVES ARE INBETWEEN
(SHOULD BE BARBERPOLE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1391
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1490 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6ARI7 TYPE I; ARI9 TYPE I
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX
& FU XFEED 1/2 VALVES" ARE FULLY OPENED. INDICATES BARBERPOLE
INSTEAD.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1392
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1491 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AlI6AR17 TYPE I; ARI9 TYPE I
c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO PROPERLY INDICATE
STATUS "OX & FU XFEED 1/2 VALVES". INDICATES BARBERPOLE WHEN
VALVES ARE CLOSED AND INDICATES OPEN WHEN VALVES ARE INBETWEEN
(SHOULD BE BARBERPOLE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1393
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1492 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LI FTOFF: 3 / 3 TAL:
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4ARI6 TYPE I; ARI4 TYPE I
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX
& FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVES" ARE FULLY CLOSED. INDICATES BARBERPOLE
INSTEAD.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1394
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1493 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4ARI6 TYPE I; ARI4 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO PROPERLY INDICATE
STATUS "OX & FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVES". INDICATES BARBERPOLE WHEN
VALVES ARE OPEN AND INDICATES CLOSED WHEN VALVES ARE INBETWEEN
(SHOULD BE BARBERPOLE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1395
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1494 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4ARI5 TYPE I; ARI5 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX
& FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVES" ARE FULLY OPENED. INDICATES BARBERPOLE
INSTEAD.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1396
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
I/2D/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1495 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4ARI5 TYPE I; ARI5 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE TALKBACK TO PROPERLY INDICATE
STATUS "OX & FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVES". INDICATES BARBERPOLE WHEN
VALVES ARE CLOSED AND INDICATES OPEN WHEN VALVES ARE INBETWEEN
(SHOULD BE BARBERPOLE).
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1397
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1496 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5ARI0 TYPE I; AR7 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 1
ISOL" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU MANIF 1 ISOL VALVES" ARE
CLOSED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. CREW CAN DETERMINE VALVE
POSITION FROM TWO TALKBACKS VIA GPC DISPLAY. ALSO LOSE
CAPABILITY TO CUT POWER TO "OX & FU MANIF 1 ISOL VALVE" MOTORS
WHEN BOTH VALVES BECOME CLOSED. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL
SWITCH IS MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION OR COMMAND ENDS. PROLONGED
POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1398
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1497 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76Al15AR10 TYPE I; AR7 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 1 ISOL SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX & FU MANIF 1 ISOL VALVES". THE VALVES WILL REMAIN
CLOSED ONLY IF THE VALVES WERE CLOSED AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF
NOT COMMANDED OPENED SINCE FAILURE. EFFECTS ARE THE SAME
AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE. HOWEVER, PROPELLANT CAN BE
ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2. ALSO
CAUSED BARBERPOLE INDICATOR TO SHOW BARBERPOLE WHEN OPEN AND SHOW
CLOSED WHEN SHOULD SHOW BARBERPOLE. THE CORRECT VALVE
POSITIONS ARE STILL AVAILABLE FROM FOUR VALVE TALKBACKS VIA GPC
DISPLAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1399
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1498 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5AR9 TYPE I; AR8 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 1
ISO_' TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU MANIF 1 ISOL VALVES" ARE
OPENED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. CREW CAN DETERMINE VALVE
POSITION FROM TWO TALKBACKS VIA GPC DISPLAY. ALSO LOSE
CAPABILITY TO CUT POWER TO "OX & FU MANIF 1 ISOL VALVE" MOTORS
WHEN BOTH VALVES BECOME OPENED. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL
SWITCH IS MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION OR COMMAND ENDS. PROLONGED
POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1400
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1499 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AIISAR9 TYPE I; AR8 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 1 ISOL SWITCH" TO
OPEN THE "OX & FU MANIF 1 ISOL VALVE". THIS VALVE WILL REMAIN
OPEN ONLY IF THE VALVES WERE OPEN AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF THE
VALVES ARE NOT COMMANDED CLOSED SINCE FAILURE. EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. DURING ENTRY, THIS CASE
MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. DURING RTLS, JETS
ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THOSE ON THIS
MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS
OF THE 3 PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1401
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1500 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAII/IRE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4AR9 TYPE I; AR7 TYPE I
c C ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 2
ISOL" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU MANIF 2 ISOL VALVES" ARE
CLOSED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. CREW CAN DETERMINE VALVE
POSITION FROM TWO TALKBACKS VIA GPC DISPLAY. ALSO LOSE
CAPABILITY TO CUT POWER TO "OX & FU MANIF 2 ISOL VALVE" MOTORS
WHEN BOTH VALVES BECOME CLOSED. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL
SWITCH IS MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION OR COMMAND ENDS. PROLONGED
POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1402
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1501 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4AR9 TYPE I; AR7 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 2 ISOL SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX & FU MANIF 2 ISOLVALVES". THE VALVES WILL REMAIN
CLOSED ONLY IF THE VALVES WERE CLOSED AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF
NOT COMMANDED OPENED SINCE FAILURE. EFFECTS ARE THE SAME
AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE. HOWEVER, PROPELLANT CAN BE
ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2. ALSO
CAUSED BARBERPOLE INDICATOR TO SHOW BARBERPOLE WHEN OPEN AND SHOW
CLOSED WHEN SHOULD SHOW BARBERPOLE. THE CORRECT VALVE
POSITIONS ARE STILL AVAILABLE FROM FOUR VALVE TALKBACKS VIA GPC
DISPLAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1403
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1502 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4AR8 TYPE I; ARe TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 2
ISOL" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU MANIF 2 ISOL VALVES" ARE
OPENED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. CREW CAN DETERMINE VALVE
POSITION FROM TWO TALKBACKS VIA GPC DISPLAY. ALSO LOSE
CAPABILITY TO CUT POWER TO "OX & FU MANIF 2 ISOL VALVE" MOTORS
WHEN BOTH VALVES BECOME OPENED. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL
SWITCH IS MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION OR COMMAND ENDS. PROLONGED
POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1404
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1503 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4AR8 TYPE I; AR6 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 2 ISOL SWITCH" TO
OPEN THE "OX & FU MANIF 2 ISOL VALVE". THIS VALVE WILL REMAIN
OPEN ONLY IF THE VALVES WERE OPEN AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF THE
VALVES ARE NOT COMMANDED CLOSED SINCE FAILURE. EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. DURING ENTRY, THIS CASE
MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. DURING RTLS, JETS
ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THOSE ON THIS
MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS
OF THE 3 PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO
EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND OR
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1405
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1504 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6AR6; AR8 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 3
ISOL" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU MANIF 3 ISOL VALVES" ARE
CLOSED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. CREW CAN DETERMINE VALVE
POSITION FROM TWO TALKBACKS VIA GPC DISPLAY. ALSO LOSE
CAPABILITY TO CUT POWER TO "OX & FU MANIF 3 ISOL VALVE" MOTORS
WHEN BOTH VALVES BECOME CLOSED. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL
SWITCH IS MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION OR COMMAND ENDS. PROLONGED
POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1406
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1505 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
313
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6AR6; AR8 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 3 ISOL SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX & FU MANIF 3 ISOL VALVES". THE VALVES WILL REMAIN
CLOSED ONLY IF THE VALVES WERE CLOSED AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF
NOT COMMANDED OPENED SINCE FAILURE. EFFECTS ARE THE SAME
AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE. HOWEVER, PROPELLANT CAN BE
ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 A OR B.
ALSO CAUSED BARBERPOLE INDICATOR TO SHOW BARBERPOLE WHEN OPEN AND
SHOW CLOSED WHEN SHOULD SHOW BARBERPOLE. THE CORRECT VALVE
POSITIONS ARE STILL AVAILABLE FROM FOUR VALVE TALKBACKS VIA GPC
DISPLAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1407
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1506 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6ARS; AR7 TYPE I
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 3
ISOL" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU MANIF 3 ISOL VALVES" ARE
OPENED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. CREW CAN DETERMINE VALVE
POSITION FROM TWO TALKBACKS VIA GPC DISPLAY. ALSO LOSE
CAPABILITY TO CUT POWER TO "OX & FU MANIF 3 ISOL VALVE" MOTORS
WHEN BOTH VALVES BECOME OPENED. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL
SWITCH IS MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION OR COMMAND ENDS. PROLONGED
POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1408
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1507 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6AR5; ART TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 3 ISOL SWITCH" TO
OPEN THE "OX & FU MANIF 3 ISOL VALVE". THIS VALVE WILL REMAIN
OPEN ONLY IF THE VALVES WERE OPEN AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF THE
VALVES ARE NOT COMMANDED CLOSED SINCE FAILURE. EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. DURING ENTRY, THIS CASE
MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. DURING RTLS, JETS
ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THOSE ON THIS
MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS
OF THE 3 PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND OR
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1409
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1508 ABORT:
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID "
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ON ORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6ARI0; ARI2 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE •
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 4
ISOL" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU MANIF 4 ISOL VALVES" ARE
CLOSED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. CREW CAN DETERMINE VALVE
POSITION FROM TWO TALKBACKS VIA GPC DISPLAY. ALSO LOSE
CAPABILITY TO CUT POWER TO "OX & FU MANIF 4 ISOL VALVE" MOTORS
WHEN BOTH VALVES BECOME CLOSED. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL
SWITCH IS MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION OR COMMAND ENDS. PROLONGED
POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1410
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1509 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCy SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6ARI0; ARI2 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 4 ISOL SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX & FU MANIF 4 ISOL VALVES". THE VALVES WILL REMAIN
CLOSED ONLY IF THE VALVES WERE CLOSED AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF
NOT COMMANDED OPENED SINCE FAILURE. EFFECTS ARE THE SAME
AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE. HOWEVER, PROPELLANT CAN BE
ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 A OR B.
ALSO CAUSED BARBERPOLE INDICATOR TO SHOW BARBERPOLE WHEN OPEN AND
SHOW CLOSED WHEN SHOULD SHOW BARBERPOLE. THE CORRECT VALVE
POSITIONS ARE STILL AVAILABLE FROM FOUR VALVE TALKBACKS VIA GPC
DISPLAY.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1411
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1510 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6AR9; ARII TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 4
ISOL" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU MANIF 4 ISOL VALVES" ARE
OPENED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. CREW CAN DETERMINE VALVE
POSITION FROM TWO TALKBACKS VIA GPC DISPLAY. ALSO LOSE
CAPABILITY TO CUT POWER TO "OX & FU MANIF 4 ISOL VALVE" MOTORS
WHEN BOTH VALVES BECOME OPENED. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL
SWITCH IS MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION OR COMMAND ENDS. PROLONGED
POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1412
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1511 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6AR9; ARII TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 4 ISOL SWITCH" TO
OPEN THE "OX & FU MANIF 4 ISOL VALVE". THIS VALVE WILL REMAIN
OPEN ONLY IF THE VALVES WERE OPEN AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF THE
VALVES ARE NOT COMMANDED CLOSED SINCE FAILURE. EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. DURING ENTRY, THIS CASE
MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. DURING RTLS, JETS
ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THOSE ON THIS
MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS
OF THE 3 PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1413
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1512 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, LCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI23AR J9-51 (180) TYPE I; AR J9-50 (163) TYPE
I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC OR "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL SWITCH" TO
CLOSE "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVES". ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST
TO CLOSE THE VALVES. THE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO
CLOSE CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN NO EFFECTS SINCE PROPELLANT CAN
BE ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVES 3/4/5 A
OR B, AND VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1414
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1513 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
I
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23AR J9-51 (180) TYPE I; AR J9-50 (163) TYPE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC TO OPEN THE "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL
VALVES", SINCE THIS FAILURE CONSTANTLY POWERS THE VALVE CLOSE
SOLENOIDS, UNLESS "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL SWITCH" IS IN OPEN
POSITION. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, THE EFFECTS WOULD BE SAME
AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN LOSS OF VRCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1415
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1514 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23AR JII-Q (178) TYPE III; AR JII-N (161)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC OR "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL SWITCH" TO
CLOSE "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVES". ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST
TO CLOSE THE VALVES. THE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO
CLOSE CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN NO EFFECT SINCE PROPELLANT CAN
BE ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVES 3/4/5 A
OR B, AND VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1416
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1515 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE III
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23AR JII-Q (178) TYPE III; AR JII-N (161)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO AUTOMATICALLY INHIBIT CLOSING THE VALVES WHEN
THEY BECOME FULLY CLOSED. HOWEVER, VALVE CAN STILL BE OPENED VIA
SWITCH OR GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, EFFECTS WOULD BE SAME
AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN
LOSS OF VRCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1417
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1516 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
I
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23AR J8-70 (179) TYPE I; AR J8-56 (162) TYPE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC TO OPEN THE "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL
VALVES". VALVES CAN STILL BE OPERATED BY "AFT L RCS MANIFOLD 5
ISOL SWITCH". FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, EFFECT WOULD BE SAME
AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN LOSS OF VRCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1418
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1517 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
I
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23AR J8-70 (179) TYPE I; AR J8-56 (162) TYPE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONSTANTLY COMMANDS "OX & FUMANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVE" TO OPEN, EVEN
WHEN AT FULL OPEN POSITION. WHEN SWITCH OR GPC COMMANDS VALVE TO
CLOSE, BOTH OPEN AND CLOSE SOLENOIDS IN THE VALVES ARE POWERED
UP. THE EFFECT IS THE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE.
THIS CASE RESULTS IN NO EFFECT SINCE PROPELLANT CAN BE ISOLATED
FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVES 3/4/5 A OR B, AND
VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943a99 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1419
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1518 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J8-70 TYPE I; J8-56 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL SWITCH" TO OPEN
THE "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC
COMMANDS. VALVES CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY, EFFECT WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO
CLOSE CASE, RESULTING IN NO EFFECT SINCE PROPELLANT CAN BE
ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVES 3/4/5 A OR
B, AND VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1420
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1519 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, LCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AI21AR J8-70 TYPE I; J8-56 TYPE I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
CONSTANTLY COMMANDS "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVE" TO OPEN, EVEN
WHEN AT FULL OPEN POSITION. WHEN SWITCH OR GPC COMMANDS VALVE TO
CLOSE, BOTH OPEN AND CLOSE SOLENOIDS IN THE VALVES ARE POWERED
UP. THE EFFECT IS THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE.
THIS CASE RESULTS IN NO EFFECT SINCE PROPELLANT CAN BE ISOLATED
FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVES 3/4/5 A OR B, AND
VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1421
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1520 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] CC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
II
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23AR J8-68 (177) TYPE I; AR J8-50 (160) TYPE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE OPEN POSITION OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD
5 ISOL" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVES"
ARE FULLY OPEN - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. ALSO LOSE
CAPABILITY OF INHIBITING THE OPENING OF THE VALVES VIA THE SWITCH
WHEN VALVES BECOME OR ARE ALREADY FULLY OPEN, BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE
VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1422
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1521 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
II
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23AR J8-68 (177) TYPE I; AR J8-50 (160) TYPE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INHIBITS OPENING OF THE VALVES VIA "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL
SWITCH". VALVES CAN STILL BE OPERATED BY GPC. LOSE CAPABILITY
OF BARBERPOLE TALKBACK "AFT L RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL" TO PROPERLY
INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVES" ARE FULLY
CLOSED. INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. ALSO INDICATES OPEN WHEN
IT SHOULD INDICATE BARBERPOLE. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
EFFECTS WOULD BE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO OPEN CASE. THIS CASE
RESULTS IN LOSS OF VRCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1423
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1522 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE II
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23AR J8-71 (176) TYPE II; AR J8-48 (159)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CLOSE POSITION OF BARBERPOLE INDICATOR "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD
5 ISOL" TO INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVES"
ARE FULLY CLOSED - INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. ALSO LOSE
CAPABILITY OF INHIBITING THE CLOSING OF THE VALVES VIA THE
SWITCH WHEN VALVES BECOME OR ARE ALREADY FULLY CLOSED, BUT WILL
NOT DAMAGE VALVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1424
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1523 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER, HYBRID
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
DRIVER, HYBRID
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TYPE II
AV BAY 6, LCA 3
56V76AI23AR J8-71 (176) TYPE II; AR J8-48 (159)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INHIBITS CLOSING OF THE VALVES VIA "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL
SWITCH". VALVES CAN STILL BE OPERATED BY GPC. LOSE CAPABILITY
OF BARBERPOLE TALKBACK "AFT L RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL" TO PROPERLY
INDICATE WHEN BOTH "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVES" ARE FULLY
OPENED. INDICATES BARBERPOLE INSTEAD. ALSO INDICATES CLOSED
WHEN IT SHOULD INDICATE BARBERPOLE. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
EFFECTS WOULD BE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE. THIS CASE
RESULTS IN LOSS OF VRCS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1425
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1524 ABORT:
HDWlFUNC
312R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
33V73A7FI4; FI8
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 1/2 SWITCH" TO CLOSE THE
"OX & FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES 'I, OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS.
VALVES CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE
CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND
MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR
ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1426
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1525 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 S16; PNL 07 S19
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7FI3; FI7
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 1/2 SWITCH" TO CLOSE THE
"OX & FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS.
VALVES CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, EFFECTS WOULD BE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE.
THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1427
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1526 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3 / 3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S17; $20
33V73A7FI5; FI9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH" TO OPEN
AND CLOSE THE "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVES". VALVES CAN STILL
BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE
EFFECT WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN.
IF THE "TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE" ALSO FAILS, THIS CASE WILL AFFECT
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF SIX PRIMARY JETS WHICH, DURING
RTLS, MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET THE
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. SIMILARLY, FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY AND OTHER ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1428
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1527 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 S18; $21
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7FI6; F20
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 B SWITCH" TO OPEN
AND CLOSE THE "OX & FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVES". VALVES CAN STILL
BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE
EFFECT WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE.
IF THE "TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE" ALSO FAILS, THIS CASE WILL AFFECT
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF SIX PRIMARY JETS WHICH, DURING
RTLS, MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET THE
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. SIMILARLY, FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY AND OTHER ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1429
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1528 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/XR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3 / 3 RTLS : 2/ IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 S36
33V73A7F41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT SIGNAL PATHS FROM THE "MASTER RCS
XFEED" SWITCH TO THE GPCS TO CONTROL WHETHER TO AUTO CROSSFEED
FROM THE LEFT OR THE RIGHT OMS POD. NO EFFECT. FOR LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, THE EFFECT WOULD BE SAME AS ANY CROSSFEED VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO BALANCE AND/OR EXPEL
PROPELLANT, RESULTING IN THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINT AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES BEING EXCEEDED DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S
WEIGHT. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY TO CROSSFEED TO THE 3/4/5
THRUSTERS ONORBIT, AND NO REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS BECAUSE OF THE
FIXED DUMP LENGTH.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1430
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1529 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $36
33V73A7F42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT SIGNAL PATHS FROM THE "MASTER RCS
XFEED" SWITCH TO THE GPCS TO CONTROL WHETHER TO CROSSFEED FROM
THE LEFT OR THE RIGHT OMS POD. NO EFFECT. FOR LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, THE EFFECT WOULD BE SAME AS ANY CROSSFEED VALVE FAILS
TO OPEN CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO BALANCE AND/OR EXPELL
PROPELLANT, RESULTING IN THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINT AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES BEING EXCEEDED DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S
WEIGHT. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY TO CROSSFEED TO THE 3/4/5
THRUSTERS ONORBIT, AND NO REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS BECAUSE OF THE
FIXED DUMP LENGTH.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1431
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1530 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
211R
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $36
33V73A7F43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT SIGNAL PATHS FROM THE "MASTER RCS
XFEED" SWITCH TO THE GPCS TO CONTROL WHETHER TO CROSSFEED FROM
THE LEFT OR THE RIGHT OMS POD. NO EFFECT. FOR LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, THE EFFECT WOULD BE SAME AS ANY CROSSFEED VALVE FAILS
TO OPEN CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO BALANCE AND/OR EXPELL
PROPELLANT, RESULTING IN THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINT AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES BEING EXCEEDED DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S
WEIGHT. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY TO CROSSFEED TO THE 3/4/5
THRUSTERS ONORBIT, AND NO REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS BECAUSE OF THE
FIXED DUMP LENGTH.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1432
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1531 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7F34; F38
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 1/2 SWITCH" TO CLOSE THE
"OX & FUXFEED 1/2 VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS. VALVES
CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE.
THIS CASE MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS DURING
ONORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1433
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1532 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $32; PNL 07 $34
33V73A7F33; F37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 1/2 SWITCH" TO CLOSE THE
"OX & FUXFEED 1/2 VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS. VALVES
CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
EFFECTS WOULD BE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE.
THIS CASE MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS DURING
ONORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1434
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1533 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 $35
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7F36; F40
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 3/4/5 SWITCH" TO CLOSE THE
"OX & FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS.
VALVES CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE
CASE. THIS CASE MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS
DURING ONORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1435
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1534 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $33; PNL 07 S35
33V73A7F35; F39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 3/4/5 SWITCH" TO CLOSE THE
"OX & FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS.
VALVES CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, EFFECTS WOULD BE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE.
THIS CASE MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS DURING
ONORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1436
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1535 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTRO LS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $22; $27
33V73A7F21; F27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 1 SWITCH" TO OPEN AND
CLOSE THE "OX & FU MANIF ISOL 1 VALVES". VALVES CAN STILL BE
FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE
EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE.
DURING ENTRY, THIS CASE MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING ENTRY DTOS AND
PTIs. DURING RTLS, JETS ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME
DIRECTION AS THOSE ON THIS MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE
REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS OF THE THREE PRIMARY JETS ON THIS
MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET
THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1437
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1536 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $23; $28"
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7F22; F28
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 2 SWITCH" TO OPEN AND
CLOSE THE "OX & FU MANIF ISOL 2 VALVES". VALVES CAN STILL BE
FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE
EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE.
DURING ENTRY, THIS CASE MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING ENTRY DTOs AND
PTIs. DURING RTLS, JETS ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME
DIRECTION AS THOSE ON THIS MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE
REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS OF THE THREE PRIMARY JETS ON THIS
MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET
THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1438
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1537 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $24; $29
33V73A7F23; F29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 3 SWITCH" TO OPEN AND
CLOSE THE "OX & FU MANIF ISOL 3 VALVES". VALVES CAN STILL BE
FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE
EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE.
DURING ENTRY, THIS CASE MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING ENTRY DTOs AND
PTIs. DURING RTLS, JETS ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME
DIRECTION AS THOSE ON THIS MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE
REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS OF THE THREE PRIMARY JETS ON THIS
MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET
THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1439
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1538 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $25; $30
33V73A7F24; F30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS MANIF ISOL 4 SWITCH" TO OPEN AND
CLOSE THE "OX & FU MANIF ISOL 4 VALVES". VALVES CAN STILL BE
FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, WORST CASE
EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE.
DURING ENTRY, THIS CASE MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING ENTRY DTOs AND
PTIs. DURING RTLS, JETS ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME
DIRECTION AS THOSE ON THIS MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE
REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS OF THE THREE PRIMARY JETS ON THIS
MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET
THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1440
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1539 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, IA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: PNL 07 $26, $31
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7F25; F31
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL SWITCH" TO CLOSE
THE "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC
COMMANDS. VALVES CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY, THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS THE VALVES
FAIL TO CLOSE CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN NO EFFECT SINCE
PROPELLANT CAN BE ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION
VALVES 3/4/5 A OR B, AND VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING
ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1441
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1540 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 07 $26, $31
33V73A7F26; F32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF "AFT L/R RCS MANIFOLD 5 ISOL SWITCH" TO CLOSE
THE "OX & FU MANIFOLD 5 ISOL VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC
COMMANDS. VALVES CAN STILL BE FULLY OPERATED BY GPC. FOR LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY, THE EFFECTS WOULD BE THE SAME AS THE VALVES
FAIL TO CLOSE CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN NO EFFECT SINCE
PROPELLANT CAN BE ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION
VALVES 3/4/5 A OR B, AND VERNIER THRUSTERS ARE NOT USED DURING
ENTRY OR ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1442
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1541 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (DE-ENERGIZED)
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K30, K29; K38, K37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC COMMAND TO OPEN BOTH "OX & FU TK ISOL 1/2
VALVE", SIMULTANEOUSLY. CAN STILL OPEN BOTH VALVES WITH "AFT L/R
RCS TK ISOL 1/2 SWITCH" OR INDIVIDUALLY WITH TWO OTHER GPC
COMMANDS. FOR LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY, EFFECTS WOULD BE SAME AS
VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN LOSS OF MANIFOLDS
l&2. FIRST FAILURE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF SIX PRIMARY JETS WHICH
WILL AFFECT ONORBIT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs,
AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT
DURING RTLS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES. SIMILARLY, NEXT FAILURE ASSOCIATED WITH VALVE
FAILURE MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY AND OTHER
ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1443
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1542 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH (ENERGIZED)
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K30, K29; K38, K37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 1/2 SWITCH" TO
CLOSE "OX OR FU ISOL 1/2 VALVE". ROUTES FORWARD (OPENING) POWER
TO VALVE MOTORS REGARDLESS OF COMMAND SIGNAL, BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE
VALVE. THE EFFECTS ARE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE.
THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1444
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1543 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (DE-ENERGIZED)
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K31, K27; K39, K35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF ONE GPC COMMAND TO OPEN ONLY THE "OX (FU) TK
ISOL 1/2 VALVE". CAN STILL OPEN VALVE, ALONG WITH THE OTHER
VALVE "FU (OX) TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE", WITH ANOTHER GPC COMMAND OR
WITH SWITCH "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 1/2". FOR LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, EFFECTS WOULD BE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE.
THIS CASE RESULTS IN LOSS OF SIX PRIMARY JETS WHICH WILL AFFECT
ONORBIT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND MAY CAUSE
THE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING RTLS TO
MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND/OR CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES. SIMILARLY, NEXT FAILURE ASSOCIATED WITH THE VALVE
MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY AND OTHER ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1445
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1544 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
1/l
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH (ENERGIZED)
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K31, K27; K39, K35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 1/2 SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX OR FU ISOL 1/2 VALVE". ROUTES FORWARD (OPENING)
POWER TO VALVE MOTORS REGARDLESS OF COMMAND SIGNAL, BUT WILL NOT
DAMAGE VALVE. THE EFFECTS ARE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO
CLOSE CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS
AND MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY
OR ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1446
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1545 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
i/i
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (DE-ENERGIZED)
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 2 R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBI T: 3/ 2 R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K32, K28; K41, K36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 1/2 SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX OR FU ISOL 1/2 VALVE", OVERRIDING GPC COMMANDS.
THIS VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED ONLY IF THE VALVE WAS CLOSED AT
TIME OF FAILURE AND IF THE VALVE IS NOT COMMANDED OPENED
SINCE FAILURE. WHEN VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO CLOSE, EITHER FUEL
OR OXIDIZER LINE IS CLOSED BUT NOT BOTH. EFFECTS ARE SAME AS
VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1447
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1546 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH (ENERGIZED)
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K32, K28; K41, K36
] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. NEITHER VALVE WILL CLOSE UNTIL THE OTHER CLOSE RELAY
IS ENERGIZED, SINCE THAT RELAY'S SWITCH IS IN SERIES WITH THE
FAILED RELAY'S SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1448
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1547 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
1/1
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (DE-ENERGIZED)
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K33, K26; K40, K34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 1/2 SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX & FU ISOL 1/2 VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC COMMANDS.
THIS VALVE WILLREMAIN CLOSED ONLY IF THE VALVE WAS CLOSED AT
TIME OF FAILURE AND IF THE VALVE IS NOT COMMANDED OPENED
SINCE FAILURE. WHEN VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO CLOSE, EITHER FUEL
OR OXIDIZER LINE IS CLOSED BUT NOT BOTH. EFFECTS ARE SAME AS
VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH
PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY OR ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1449
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1548 ABORT:
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH (ENERGIZED)
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 2/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORB IT: 3/ 2R AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B.[ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K33, K26; K40, K34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN GPC ONLY COMMANDS CLOSE THE OTHER VALVE "FU (OX) ISOL 1/2
VALVE", THEN THIS VALVE (ASSOCIATED WITH THE FAILED RELAY) "OX
(FU) ISOL 1/2 VALVE" WILL ALSO CLOSE. VALVE CAN STILL BE OPENED.
FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY THIS UNINTENDED EVENT'S EFFECTS
ARE SIMILAR TO VALVE FAILS TO OPEN CASE. THIS CASE WILL CAUSE
LOSS OF SIX PRIMARY JETS WHICH WILL AFFECT ONORBIT CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS, ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs, AND MAY CAUSE THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT DURING RTLS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND/OR THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. SIMILARLY,
NEXT FAILURE ASSOCIATED WITH THE VALVE MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE DURING ENTRY AND OTHER ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1450
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1549 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN (DE-ENERGIZED)
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII41<30, K32; K26, K28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH"
TO OPEN THE "OX OR FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVE". THIS VALVE WILL
REMAIN OPEN ONLY IF THE VALVE WAS OPEN AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF
THE VALVE IS NOT COMMANDED CLOSED SINCE FAILURE. WHEN VALVES ARE
COMMANDED TO OPEN, EITHER FUEL OR OXIDIZER LINE IS OPENED BUT NOT
BOTH. EFFECTS ARE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO OPEN CASE. IF THE "TK
ISOL 1/2 VALVE" ALSO FAILS, THIS CASE WILL AFFECT CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WILL CAUSE LOSS OF SIX PRIMARY JETS WHICH, DURING RTLS, MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO MEET THE CG SAFETY
BOUNDARIES. SIMILARLY, FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY AND OTHER ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1451
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1550 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS CLOSED (FAILS IN ENERGIZED POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K30, K32; K26, K28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH"
TO CLOSE THE "OX OR FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVE". ROUTES FORWARD
(OPENING) POWER TO VALVE MOTORS WHILEUNCOMMANDED, AND NO POWER
WHILE COMMANDED TO CLOSE, BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVE. WHEN
VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO CLOSE, EITHER FUEL OR OXIDIZER LINE IS
CLOSED BUT NOT BOTH. EFFECTS ARE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE
CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND
POSSIBLE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY
OR ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1452
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1551 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4, M CA 1
54V76Al14K29, K31; K25, K27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH"
TO CLOSE THE "OX OR FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVE". THIS VALVE WILL
REMAIN CLOSED ONLY IF THE VALVE WAS CLOSED AT TIME OF FAILURE AND
IF THE VALVE IS NOT COMMANDED OPENED SINCE FAILURE. WHEN
VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO CLOSE, EITHER FUEL OR OXIDIZER LINE IS
CLOSED BUT NOT BOTH. EFFECTS ARE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE
CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND
POSSIBLE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY
OR ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1453
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1552 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K29, K31; K25, K27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 A SWITCH"
TO OPEN THE "OX OR FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 A VALVE". ROUTES REVERSE
(CLOSING) POWER TO VALVE MOTORS WHILEUNCOMMANDED, AND NO POWER
WHILE COMMANDED TO OPEN, BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVE. WHEN
VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO OPEN, EITHER FUEL OR OXIDIZER LINE IS
OPENED BUT NOT BOTH. EFFECTS ARE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO OPEN
CASE. IF THE "TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE" ALSO FAILS, THIS CASE WILL
AFFECT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF SIX PRIMARY JETS WHICH,
DURING RTLS, MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO
MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. SIMILARLY, FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY AND OTHER
ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1454
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1553 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RELAY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS : 2 / IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5K24, K29; K28, K30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 B SWITCH"
TO OPEN THE "OX OR FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVE". THIS VALVE WILL
REMAIN OPEN ONLY IF THE VALVE WAS OPEN AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF
THE VALVE IS NOT COMMANDED CLOSED SINCE FAILURE. WHEN
VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO OPEN, EITHER FUEL OR OXIDIZER LINE IS
OPENED BUT NOT BOTH. EFFECTS ARE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO OPEN
CASE. IF THE "TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE" ALSO FAILS, THIS CASE WILL
AFFECT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF SIX PRIMARY JETS WHICH,
DURING RTLS, MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO
MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. SIMILARLY, FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY AND OTHER
ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1455
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1554 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/I
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5K24, K29; K28, K30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 B SWITCH"
TO CLOSE THE "OX OR FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVE". ROUTES FORWARD
(OPENING) POWER TO VALVE MOTORS WHILE UNCOMMANDED, AND NO POWER
WHILE COMMANDED TO CLOSE, BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVE. WHEN
VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO CLOSE, EITHER FUEL OR OXIDIZER LINE IS
CLOSED BUT NOT BOTH. EFFECTS ARE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE
CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND
POSSIBLE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY
OR ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1456
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/2 i/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1555 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
i/1
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AIISK25, K27; K26, K31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 B SWITCH"
TO CLOSE THE "OX OR FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVE". THIS VALVE WILL
REMAIN CLOSED ONLY IF THE VALVE WAS CLOSED AT TIME OF FAILURE AND
IF THE VALVE IS NOT COMMANDED OPENED SINCE FAILURE. WHEN
VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO CLOSE, EITHER FUEL OR OXIDIZER LINE IS
CLOSED BUT NOT BOTH. EFFECTS ARE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE
CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND
POSSIBLE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS DURING ENTRY
OR ABORTS TO MEET THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR THE CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/27/87 C-1457
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1556 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 B
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5K25, K27; K26, K31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 3/4/5 B SWITCH"
TO OPEN THE "OX OR FU TK ISOL 3/4/5 B VALVE". ROUTES REVERSE
(CLOSING) POWER TO VALVE MOTORS WHILE UNCOMMANDED, AND NO POWER
WHILE COMMANDED TO OPEN, BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVE. WHEN
VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO OPEN, EITHER FUEL OR OXIDIZER LINE IS
OPENED BUT NOT BOTH. EFFECTS ARE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO OPEN
CASE. IF THE "TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE" ALSO FAILS, THIS CASE WILL
AFFECT CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND ENTRY DTOS AND PTIs. FAILURE
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE LOSS OF SIX PRIMARY JETS WHICH,
DURING RTLS, MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL ENOUGH PROPELLANT TO
MEET THE CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES. SIMILARLY, FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY AND OTHER
ABORTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1458
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1557 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORB IT: 3/ 3 ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K45, K46; K53, K54
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC COMMAND TO OPEN BOTH "OX & FU XFEED 1/2
VALVE", SIMULTANEOUSLY. CAN STILL OPEN BOTH VALVES WITH "AFT L/R
RCS XFEED 1/2 SWITCH" OR INDIVIDUALLY WITH TWO OTHER GPC
COMMANDS. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, EFFECTS WOULD BE SAME AS
VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL NEXT
ASSOCIATED FAILURE (VALVE 1/2) CAUSING INABILITY TO BALANCE
AND/OR EXPEL PROPELLANT, RESULTING IN THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINT
AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES BEING EXCEEDED. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY
TO CROSSFEED TO THE 3/4/5 THRUSTERS ONORBIT, AND NO REDUNDANCY
DURING RTLS BECAUSE OF THE FIXED DUMP LENGTH.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1459
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1558 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 2/ 2 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K45, K46; K53, K54
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 1/2 SWITCH" TO
CLOSE "OX OR FU XFEED 1/2 VALVE". ROUTES FORWARD (OPENING) POWER
TO VALVE MOTORS REGARDLESS OF COMMAND SIGNAL, BUT WILLNOT DAMAGE
VALVE. EFFECTS ARE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE. THIS
CASE MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS DURING ONORBIT
PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1460
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1559 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K43, K47; K51, K55
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF ONE GPC COMMAND TO OPEN ONLY THE "OX (FU)
XFEED 1/2 VALVE". CAN STILL OPEN VALVE, ALONG WITH THE OTHER
VALVE "FU (OX) XFEED 1/2 VALVE", WITH ANOTHER GPC COMMAND OR WITH
SWITCH "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 1/2". FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY,
EFFECTS WOULD BE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. THIS CASE
RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS, AND MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO EXPEL NEXT ASSOCIATED FAILURE (VALVE 3/4/5) CAUSING
INABILITY TO BALANCE AND/OR EXPEL PROPELLANT, RESULTING IN THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND SAFETY BOUNDARIES BEING EXCEEDED.
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY TO CROSSFEED TO THE 3/4/5 THRUSTERS
ONORBIT, AND NO REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS BECAUSE OF THE FIXED DUMP
LENGTH.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1461
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1560 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLI GHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K43, K47; K51, K55
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 1/2 SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX OR FU XFEED 1/2 VALVE". ROUTES FORWARD (OPENING)
POWER TO VALVE MOTORS REGARDLESS OF COMMAND OR LACK OF COMMAND,
BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVE. THE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE CASE. THIS CASE MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS DURING ONORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1462
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1561 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/ 3 ATO:
LANDING/SAF ING: 3/ 3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K44, K49; K52, }(57
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 1/2 SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX & FU XFEED 1/2 VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC
COMMANDS. THIS VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED ONLY IF THE VALVE WAS
CLOSED AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF THE VALVE IS NOT COMMANDED
OPENED SINCE FAILURE. WHEN VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO CLOSE, EITHER
FUEL OR OXIDIZER LINE IS CLOSED BUT NOT BOTH. EFFECTS ARE SAME
AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE. THIS CASE MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS DURING ONORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1463
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1562 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K44, K49; K52, K57
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. NEITHER VALVE WILL CLOSE UNTIL THE OTHER CLOSE RELAY
IS ENERGIZED, SINCE THAT RELAY'S SWITCH IS IN SERIES WITH THE
FAILED RELAY'S SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1464
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1563 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV i/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76Al16K42, K48; KS0, K56
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS XFEED i/2 SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX & FU XFEED 1/2 VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC
COMMANDS. THIS VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED ONLY IF THE VALVE WAS
CLOSED AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF THE VALVE IS NOT COMMANDED
OPENED SINCE FAILURE. WHEN VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO CLOSE, EITHER
FUEL OR OXIDIZER LINE IS CLOSED BUT NOT BOTH. EFFECTS ARE SAME
AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE. THIS CASE MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS DURING ONORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1465
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1564 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K42, K48; K50, K56
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN GPC COMMANDS CLOSE ONLY THE OTHER VALVE "FU (OX) XFEED 1/2
VALVE", THEN THIS VALVE (ASSOCIATED WITH THE FAILED RELAY) "OX
(FU) XFEED 1/2 VALVE" WILL ALSO CLOSE. VALVE CAN STILL BE
OPENED. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY THIS UNINTENDED EVENT'S
EFFECTS ARE SIMILAR TO THE VALVE FAILS TO OPEN CASE. THIS CASE
RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS, AND MAY RESULT IN NEXT
ASSOCIATED FAILURE (VALVE 3/4/5) CAUSING INABILITY TO BALANCE
AND/OR EXPEL PROPELLANT RESULTING IN THE TANK LANDING AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES BEING EXCEEDED. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY TO
CROSSFEED TO THE 3/4/5 THRUSTERS ONORBIT, AND NO REDUNDANCY
DURING RTLS BECAUSE OF THE FIXED DUMP LENGTH.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1466
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1565 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K67, K66; K40, K36
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC COMMAND TO OPEN BOTH "OX & FU XFEED 3/4/5
VALVE", SIMULTANEOUSLY. CAN STILL OPEN BOTH VALVES WITH "AFT L/R
RCS XFEED 3/4/5 SWITCH" OR INDIVIDUALLY WITH TWO OTHER GPC
COMMANDS. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, EFFECTS WOULD BE SAME AS
VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO BALANCE AND/OR
EXPEL PROPELLANT, RESULTING IN THE TANK LANDING CONSTRAINT AND CG
SAFETY BOUNDARIES BEING EXCEEDED DUE TO THE TRAPPED
PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY TO CROSSFEED TO THE
1/2 THRUSTERS ONORBIT, AND NO REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS BECAUSE OF
THE FIXED DUMP LENGTH.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1467
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1566 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K67, K66; K40, K36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 3/4/5 SWITCH" TO
CLOSE "OX OR FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE". ROUTES FORWARD (OPENING)
POWER TO VALVE MOTORS REGARDLESS OF COMMAND SIGNAL, BUT WILL NOT
DAMAGE VALVE. THE EFFECTS ARE SAME AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE
CASE. THIS CASE MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS
DURING ONORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1468
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1567 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K65, K68; K39, K35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF ONE GPC COMMAND TO OPEN ONLY THE "OX (FU)
XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE". CAN STILL OPEN VALVE, ALONG WITH THE OTHER
VALVE "FU (OX) XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE", WITH ANOTHER GPC COMMAND OR
WITH SWITCH "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 3/4/5". FOR LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY, EFFECTS WOULD BE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE.
THIS CASE RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS AND MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO BALANCE AND/OR EXPEL PROPELLANT, RESULTING IN THE
TANK LANDING CONSTRAINT AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES BEING
EXCEEDED DUE TO THE TRAPPED PROPELLANT'S WEIGHT. THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY TO CROSSFEED TO THE 1/2 THRUSTERS ONORBIT, AND NO
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS BECAUSE OF THE FIXED DUMP LENGTH.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1469
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1568 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K65, K68; K39, K35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 3/4/5 SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX OR FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE". ROUTES FORWARD (OPENING)
POWER TO VALVE MOTORS REGARDLESS OF COMMAND OR LACK OF COMMAND,
BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVE. THE EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS
VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE. THIS CASE MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS DURING ONORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1470
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1569 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K69, K70; K38, K34
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 3/4/5 SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX & FU XFEED 1/2 VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC
COMMANDS. THIS VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED ONLY IF THE VALVE WAS
CLOSED AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF THE VALVE IS NOT COMMANDED
OPENED SINCE FAILURE. WHEN VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO CLOSE, EITHER
FUEL OR OXIDIZER LINE IS CLOSED BUT NOT BOTH. EFFECTS ARE SAME
AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE. THIS CASE MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS DURING ONORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1471
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1570 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AlI4K69, K70; K38, K34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. NEITHER VALVE WILL CLOSE UNTIL THE OTHER CLOSE RELAY
IS ENERGIZED, SINCE THAT RELAY'S SWITCH IS IN SERIES WITH THE
FAILED RELAY'S SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1472
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1571 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K71, K72; K37, K33
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS XFEED 3/4/5 SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX & FU XFEED 3/4/5 VALVES", OVERRIDING THE GPC
COMMANDS. THIS VALVE WILL REMAIN CLOSED ONLY IF THE VALVE WAS
CLOSED AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF THE VALVE IS NOT COMMANDED
OPENED SINCE FAILURE. WHEN VALVES ARE COMMANDED TO CLOSE, EITHER
FUEL OR OXIDIZER LINE IS CLOSED BUT NOT BOTH. EFFECTS ARE SAME
AS VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE CASE. THIS CASE MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS DURING ONORBIT PHASE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1473
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1572 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
2/1R
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K71, K72; K37, K33
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN GPC COMMANDS CLOSE ONLY THE OTHER VALVE "FU (OX) XFEED 3/4/5
VALVE", THEN THIS VALVE (ASSOCIATED WITH THE FAILED RELAY) "OX
(FU) XFEED 3/4/5 VALVE" WILL ALSO CLOSE. VALVE CAN STILL BE
OPENED. FOR LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY THIS UNINTENDED EVENT'S
EFFECTS ARE SIMILAR TO THE VALVE FAILS TO OPEN CASE. THIS CASE
RESULTS IN AFFECTING CROSSFEED OPERATIONS, AND MAY RESULT IN NEXT
ASSOCIATED FAILURE (VALVE 1/2) CAUSING INABILITY TO BALANCE
AND/OR EXPEL PROPELLANT RESULTING IN THE TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINTS AND CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES BEING EXCEEDED. THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY TO CROSSFEED TO THE 1/2 THRUSTERS ONORBIT, AND NO
REDUNDANCY DURING RTLS BECAUSE OF THE FIXED DUMP LENGTH.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1474
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1573 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5K22; K23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 1 ISOL SWITCH" TO
OPEN THE "OX & FU MANIF 1 ISOL VALVE". THIS VALVE WILL REMAIN
OPEN ONLY IF THE VALVES WERE OPEN AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF THE
VALVES ARE NOT COMMANDED CLOSED SINCE FAILURE.
EFFECT WOULD BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. DURING
ENTRY, THIS CASE MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs.
DURING RTLS, JETS ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME DIRECTION
AS THOSE ON THIS MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE
REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS OF THE 3 PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY
CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET TANK LANDING
CONSTRAINTS AND/OR CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1475
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1574 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ .]. C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5K22; K23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 1 ISOL SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX & FU MANIF 1 ISOL VALVE". ROUTES FORWARD (OPENING)
POWER TO VALVE MOTORS WHILE UNCOMMANDED, AND NO POWER WHILE
COMMANDED TO CLOSE, BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVE.
EFFECTS ARE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE. HOWEVER,
PROPELLANT CAN BE ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION
VALVE 1/2.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1476
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1575 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76Al15K20; K21
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 1 ISOL SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX & FU MANIF 1 ISOL VALVES". THE VALVES WILL REMAIN
CLOSED ONLY IF THE VALVES WERE CLOSED AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF
NOT COMMANDED OPENED SINCE FAILURE. EFFECTS ARE THE SAME
AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE. HOWEVER, PROPELLANT CAN BE
ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1477
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1576 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/I
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 5, MCA 2
PART NUMBER: 55V76AII5K20; K21
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 1 ISOL SWITCH" TO
OPEN THE "OX & FU MANIF 1 ISOL VALVE". ROUTES REVERSE (CLOSING)
POWER TO VALVE MOTORS WHILE UNCOMMANDED, AND NO POWER WHILE
COMMANDED TO OPEN, BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVE. EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. DURING ENTRY, THIS CASE
MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. DURING RTLS, JETS
ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME DIRECTIONAS THOSE ON THIS
MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS
OF THE 3 PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO
EXPELL ENOUGH BROPELLANTS TO MEET TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND OR
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1478
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1577 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY ScREENs: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
i/i
312R
3/2R
3/2R
c[p]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K24; K22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 2 ISOL SWITCH" TO
OPEN THE "OX & FU MANIF 2 ISOL VALVE". THIS VALVE WILL REMAIN
OPEN ONLY IF THE VALVES WERE OPEN AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF THE
VALVES ARE NOT COMMANDED CLOSED SINCE FAILURE. EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. DURING ENTRY, THIS CASE
MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. DURING RTLS, JETS
ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THOSE ON THIS
MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS
OF THE 3 PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO
EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1479
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1578 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K24; K22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 2 ISOL SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX & FU MANIF 2 ISOL VALVE". ROUTES FORWARD (OPENING)
POWER TO VALVE MOTORS WHILE UNCOMMANDED, AND NO POWER WHILE
COMMANDED TO CLOSE, BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVE. EFFECTS ARE
THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE. HOWEVER, PROPELLANT CAN
BE ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1480
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1579 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K23; K21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 2 ISOL SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX & FU MANIF 2 ISOL VALVES". THE VALVES WILL REMAIN
CLOSED ONLY IF THE VALVES WERE CLOSED AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF
NOT COMMANDED OPENED SINCE FAILURE. EFFECTS ARE THE SAME
AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE. HOWEVER, PROPELLANT CAN BE
ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1481
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1580 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
1/l
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, MCA 1
PART NUMBER: 54V76AII4K23; K21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 2 ISOL SWITCH" TO
OPEN THE "OX & FU MANIF 2 ISOL VALVE". ROUTES REVERSE (CLOSING)
POWER TO VALVE MOTORS WHILE UNCOMMANDED, AND NO POWER WHILE
COMMANDED TO OPEN, BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVE. EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. DURING ENTRY, THIS CASE
MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. DURING RTLS, JETS
ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THOSE ON THIS
MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS
OF THE 3 PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO
EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND OR
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1482
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1581 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
1/1
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6KI9; K21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 3 ISOL SWITCH" TO
OPEN THE "OX & FU MANIF 3 ISOL VALVE". THIS VALVE WILL REMAIN
OPEN ONLY IF THE VALVES WERE OPEN AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF THE
VALVES ARE NOT COMMANDED CLOSED SINCE FAILURE. EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. DURING ENTRY, THIS CASE
MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. DURING RTLS, JETS
ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THOSE ON THIS
MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS
OF THE 3 PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO
EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1483
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1582 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3 / 3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6KI9; K21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 3 ISOL SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX & FU MANIF 3 ISOL VALVE". ROUTES FORWARD (OPENING)
POWER TO VALVE MOTORS WHILE UNCOMMANDED, AND NO POWER WHILE
COMMANDED TO CLOSE, BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVE. EFFECTS ARE
THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE. HOWEVER, PROPELLANT CAN
BE ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 A OR
B.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1484
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1583 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6KI8; K20
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 3 ISOL SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX & FU MANIF 3 ISOL VALVES". THE VALVES WILL REMAIN
CLOSED ONLY IF THE VALVES WERE CLOSED AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF
NOT COMMANDED OPENED SINCE FAILURE. EFFECTS ARE THE SAME
AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE. HOWEVER, PROPELLANT CAN BE
ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 A OR B.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1485
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1584 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
I/i
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6KI8; K20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 3 ISOL SWITCH" TO
OPEN THE "OX & FU MANIF 3 ISOL VALVE". ROUTES REVERSE (CLOSING)
POWER TO VALVE MOTORS WHILE UNCOMMANDED, AND NO POWER WHILE
COMMANDED TO OPEN, BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVE. EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. DURING ENTRY, THIS CASE
MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. DURING RTLS, JETS
ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THOSE ON THIS
MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS
OF THE 3 PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO
EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND OR
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1486
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1585 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
1/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K23; K25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 4 ISOL SWITCH" TO
OPEN THE "OX & FU MANIF 4 ISOL VALVE". THIS VALVE WILL REMAIN
OPEN ONLY IF THE VALVES WERE OPEN AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF THE
VALVES ARE NOT COMMANDED CLOSED SINCE FAILURE. EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. DURING ENTRY, THIS CASE
MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. DURING RTLS, JETS
ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THOSE ON THIS
MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS
OF THE 3 PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO
EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND OR
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 03/22/87 C-1487
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1586 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K23; K25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 4 ISOL SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX & FU MANIF 4 ISOL VALVE". ROUTES FORWARD (OPENING)
POWER TO VALVE MOTORS WHILE UNCOMMANDED, AND NO POWER WHILE
COMMANDED TO CLOSE, BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVE. EFFECTS ARE
THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE. HOWEVER, PROPELLANT CAN
BE ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 A OR
B.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1488
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1587 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K22; K24
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 4 ISOL SWITCH" TO
CLOSE THE "OX & FU MANIF 4 ISOL VALVES". THE VALVES WILL REMAIN
CLOSED ONLY IF THE VALVES WERE CLOSED AT TIME OF FAILURE AND IF
NOT COMMANDED OPENED SINCE FAILURE. EFFECTS ARE THE SAME
AS VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE CASE. HOWEVER, PROPELLANT CAN BE
ISOLATED FROM THRUSTERS BY THE TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 A OR B.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1489
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1588 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLVS
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] SIP] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6K22; K24
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY OF GPC AND "AFT L/R RCS MANIF 4 ISOL SWITCH" TO
OPEN THE "OX & FU MANIF 4 ISOL VALVE". ROUTES REVERSE (CLOSING)
POWER TO VALVE MOTORS WHILE UNCOMMANDED, AND NO POWER WHILE
COMMANDED TO OPEN, BUT WILL NOT DAMAGE VALVE. EFFECT WOULD
BE THE SAME AS VALVES FAIL TO OPEN CASE. DURING ENTRY, THIS CASE
MAY RESULT IN AFFECTING ENTRY DTOs AND PTIs. DURING RTLS, JETS
ON OTHER MANIFOLDS FIRING IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THOSE ON THIS
MANIFOLD ARE NOT CONSIDERED TO BE REDUNDANT, SINCE LOSS
OF THE 3 PRIMARY JETS ON THIS MANIFOLD MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO
EXPELL ENOUGH PROPELLANTS TO MEET TANK LANDING CONSTRAINTS AND/OR
CG SAFETY BOUNDARIES.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1490
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1589 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, MCA 3
56V76All6R J3-99; J3-71
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "OX TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FA1, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1491
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1590 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDWlFUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [ ]
LOCAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 6, M CA 3
56V76All6R J3-99; J3-71
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "OX TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC ii174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1492
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1591 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILSOPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6R J3-99; J3-71
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "OX TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1493
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1592 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2 ) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6R J3-99; J3-71
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "OX TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1494
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1593 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6R J2-61; J5-16
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX & FU ISOL 1/2 VALVE" MOTORS WHEN
VALVE REACHES OPEN OR CLOSED POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES
UNTIL "AFT L RCS TK ISOL 1/2 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS GPC
POSITION, IF NOT THERE ALREADY, OR GPC CLOSE OR OPEN VALVE
COMMANDS END. PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT.
ALSO LOSE THE TWO "OX ISOL VALVE" POSITION TALKBACKS AND
BARBERPOLE INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1495
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1594 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6R J2-61; J5-16
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1496
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1595 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6R J2-52; J5-17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "OX ISOL 1/2 VALVE" MOTORS WHEN VALVE
REACHES OPEN POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R
RCS TK ISOL 1/2 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION, IF NOT
THERE ALREADY, OR GPC OPEN OR CLOSE VALVE COMMANDS END.
PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT. ALSO
BARBERPOLE INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1497
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1596 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6R J2-52; J5-17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1498
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1597 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
2) CONTROLS
3) PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
4) L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AlI6R J2-28; J5-57
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L/R RCS TK ISOL 1/2 SWITCH" IN OPEN
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1499
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1598 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] cc ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6R J2-28; J5-57
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1500
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1599 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6R J2-51; J5-18
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO STOP THE "FU ISOL 1/2 VALVE" MOTORS WHEN VALVE
REACHES OPEN POSITION. POWER TO MOTORS CONTINUES UNTIL "AFT L/R
RCS TK ISOL 1/2 SWITCH" IS MOVED TO ITS GPC POSITION, IF NOT
THERE ALREADY, OR GPC OPEN VALVE COMMANDS END.
PROLONGED POWER TO VALVE MOTOR WILL NOT DAMAGE IT. ALSO
BARBERPOLE INDICATOR WILL BE STUCK ON BARBERPOLE INDICATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1501
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1600 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILS SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6R J2-51; J5-18
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1502
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1601 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AI16R J2-27; J5-13
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR "AFT L RCS TK ISOL 1/2 SWITCH" IN CLOSED
POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1503
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1602 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6R J2-27; J5-13
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECTS. TALKBACK IS STILL AVAILABLE TO GPC.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1504
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1603 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76All6R J3-109; J3-122
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO B12; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1505
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1604 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6R J3-i09; J3-122
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1506
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1605 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORB I T: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6R J3-i09; J3-122
] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE TALKBACK FOR THE "FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE" IN OPENED POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1507
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ARCS FLIGHT:
1606 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER SUBSYS LEAD: D.J. PAUL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTROLS
PROP STOR & DIST SUBSYSTEM
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 6, MCA 3
PART NUMBER: 56V76AII6R J3-I09; J3-122
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL
SHOCK, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECT TALKBACK FOR THE "FU TK ISOL 1/2 VALVE" IN OPEN POSITION.
LOSE VOLTAGE DIVISION TO MDM FAI, SO PROVIDES FULL (0 TO 28 VDC)
INSTEAD OF HALF (0 TO 14 VDC) VOLTAGE RANGE.
REFERENCES: VS70-943099 REV B EO BI2; JSC 11174, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 3/20/87 C-1508
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